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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past five years the Kentucky Law Journal has featured a
review of all decisions handed down by the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals during the preceding term. Last year the emphasis of the
Review was changed somewhat, and cases which recommended
themselves to the Journal as having far-reaching significance were
given extended analysis and discussion. This year the Review has
evolved one step further. The Court's decisions have been carefully
analyzed, and from this analysis an attempt has been made to select
those cases which have or will have the greatest impact on Kentucky
law. Those considered to be unimportant have been omitted. The
cases selected for comment have been treated in depth, i.e., they have
been thoroughly analyzed, discussed, criticized, and, where necessary,
alternative solutions have been suggested. Thus, the 1966-67 Court of
Appeals Review contains only those cases which will significantly affect
Kentucky law. It is hoped that by so limiting the Court of Appeals
Review, the Journal may provide a greater service to judges and prac-
titioners throughout the Commonwealth.
HI. ADMINISTBATIVE LAW
Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter referred to as KRS] 44.070
authorizes the Board of Claims to "compensate persons for damages
sustained to either person or property as a proximate result of negli-
gence on the part of the Commonwealth." (Emphasis added.) Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways'
involved a finding by the Board of Claims that the plaintiff, an in-
surance company, was not a "person" within the purview of KRS
44.070 and therefore, could not seek indemnification from the Common-
wealth.
2
The Court of Appeals reversed the Board, reasoning that since the
plaintiff was pursuing the subrogated claim of its insured, a person, it
stood in his position. By so finding, the Court was able to hold that
under KRS 44.070, a "tort-feasor (or person subrogated to his rights),
who has settied a claim based on the negligence of the joint tort-
feasors, should be able to recover the Commonwealth's share of the
obligation when the latter is one of the joint tort-feasors."3
Goodwin v. City of Louisville,4 Louisville and Jefferson County
Planning and Zoning Commission v. Stoker,5 and Kentucky Board of
Hairdressers and Cosmetologists v. Stevens6 guarantee parties ad-
versely affected by the findings of an administrative agency "direct
judicial relief without exhaustion of administrative remedies when
there are no disputed factual questions"7 and the only question is the
validity or applicability of a statute or ordinance. This term, in Har-
rison's Sanitarium, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Health,
the rule was extended under limited circumstances to administrative
regulations.9 Violation of the regulations involved in the case10 would
1414 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1967).
2 The appellants sought contribution from the Commonwealth on a claim for
wrongful death arising out of a highway accident. It was alleged that the "dece-
dents death 'was caused and brought about by the joint and concurrent negligence
. of [the appellants] insured and agents of the Commonwealth." Id. at
579.
3 Id. at 580.
4309 Ky. 11, 215 S.W.2d 557 (1948).
5 259 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1953).
6393 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1965).7 Harrison's Sanitarium, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Health, 417 S.W.2d
137, 138 (Ky. 1967).
8417 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1967).
9 The Court found that an administrative regulation, properly adopted and
filed, was analogous to an ordinance or statute since all three have the full effect of
law and require enforcement. Once promulated, a regulation is as final as a
legislative act. Id. at 138.
10 The appellants, operators of nursing homes, challenged the validity, as
applied to them, of certain regulations of the Department of Health, the Depart-
ment of Economic Security, and the Louisville and Jefferson County Board of
(Continued on next page)
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have subjected the appellants to criminal sanctions as well as a for-
feiture of their licenses.' Moreover, the regulations made previously
lawful conduct unlawful.12 Thus, the Court felt justified in granting
judicial review without exhaustion of administrative remedies. How-
ever, it indicated that a different result might have ensued if the "ad-
ministrative avenues had been opened first by some affirmative action
to penalize or revoke the license of one or more of the appellants." 3 In
addition to dispensing with the requirement of exhaustion of admini-
strative remedies, the Court held that the possibility of criminal
sanctions eliminated the requirement for the appellants to plead an
"irreparable injury with no adequate remedy at law."' 4
In American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Commission,15 the Court of Appeals held
that "judicial review of administrative action [was] limited to the
question of arbitrariness of the administrative body."16 Board of
Education of Ashland School District v. Chattin,17 following American
Beauty Homes, applied this rule to the review of a school board's
actions in dismissing teachers. Chattin limited the circuit court to an
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Health. These regulations had the "effect of increasing the minimum room size
and space per bed required in nursing and rest homes, thereby reducing the
number of resident patients the various plaintiff institutions [were] licensed to
accommodate." Id.
11 Id. at 189.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 The circuit court had dismissed the plaintiffs' suit and request for injunctive
relief on two grounds: 1) The administrative remedies at law had notbeen ex-
hausted; and 2) An "irreparable injury with no adequate remedy at law" had not
been pleaded in their complaint. With regad to the latter point, the Court
adopted the view of the Supreme Court that 'enforcement of regulations may be
enjoined whenever a violator is subject to criminal penalty, without any special
showing of irreparable injury or threat of enforcement."' Id., citing 3 K. DAs,ADI~NiSTrATnV LAW § 21.08 (1958). Th  cir uit court was ordered to issue a
temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of the regulation since there washno emergeny s tuation by reason of which the public interest [was] 
likely to
suffer fom a stay of enforcement pending disposition of the litigation in the trialcourt." 417 S.W.2d at 189.
15379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964). American Beauty Homes, a zoning case,
stands for the proposition tha the Legislature may not requir te thejudiciary 
to
hear de novo a matter previously determined b aplaning and zoning commission
in the exercise of a legislative function, i.e., the doctrne of separation of powers
forbids the Legislature from thrusting legislative powers and functions upon the
judiciary. Ky. CONST. § 27 provides:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth shall be divided
into three distinct departments and each of them be confined to a
separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one;
those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to
another.
16 Osborne v. Bullitt County Bd. of Educ., 415 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky. 1967).
17 376 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1964).
[Vol. 56,
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examination of the record compiled by the school board, i.e., no de
novo hearing was allowed.
Last term, the Court of Appeals in Osborne v. Bullitt County Board
of Education8 overruled Chattinfs application of the American Beauty
Homes' rule to review of teacher dismissals. By so doing, the Court
reconsidered 19 the de novo implications of KRS 161.790(6) which
provides:
The teacher shall have a right to make an appeal both as to law and as
to fact to the circuit court.... The court shall examine the transcript and
record of the hearing before the board of education and shall hold such
additional hearings as it may deem advisable, at which it may consider
other evidence in addition to such transcript and record. (Emphasis
added.)
In order to retreat from its position in Chattin, the Court had to
find that the de novo implications of KRS 161.790(6) did not violate
the doctrine of separation of powers.20 Relying heavily upon two
Alabama cases21 and the writings of Louis L. Jaffee, 22 the Court
reasoned that a board of education, when trying a teacher, is not
purely administrative, but it takes on quasi-judicial characteristics. In
such a role, the requirements of due process must be met. To insure
due process, the Court continued, the Legislature "may properly re-
quire a trial de novo... without doing violence to the constitutional
requirement of separation of powers."23 Apparently, the Court has
qualified American Beauty Homes so that the Legislature may provide
de novo hearings for those administrative decisions which have re-
sulted from quasi-judicial proceedings.
24
18415 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1967).
10 In Chattin, the Court had held that the de novo implications of Ky. Ixv.
STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 161.790(5), predecessor of KRS § 161.790(6),
were unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers. See note 15
supra.
20 See note 15 and 19 supra.
21 Ex Parte Darnell, 262 Ala. 71, 76 So. 2d 770 (1955); State ex rel. Steele
v. Board of Educ. of Fairfield, 252 Ala. 254, 40 So. 2d 689 (1949). Both cases
deal with the same situation as was before the Court in Osborne, i.e., discharge of
a teacher for misconduct.2 2 L. JArFEE, Juiricmr. CoNTRoL OF ADmINISTRATION ACTION 103 (1965).
23415 S.W.2d at 612. The Court said that de novo review was especially
important where due process had not been observed in the administrative pro-
ceedings. In Osborne, the Court intimated that due process had been violated be-
cause the appellant was not allowed to conduct a voir dire te of examination
of the Board members and the charges were too vague and indefinite to furnish
the appellant with sufficient notice.
24
1n a case comment on American Beauty Homes in 53 Ky. L. J. 388, 392
(1965), it was urged and hoped that "when the proper case arises, the Court
wl... permit some latitude of judgment as to the weight of the evidence pre-
sented to the board."
III. COMMERCIAL LAW
With the advent of technological innovations and the industrial
revolution, the pace of trading and distribution of goods quickened.
But although commercial intercourse responded dynamically to the
techniques of mass production, the common law rules governing com-
mercial transactions remained agonizingly static. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code is the successor to many uniform acts designed to con-
temporize commercial law.1 Although, by adopting the Code in 1958,2
Kentucky took the initial step toward predictable results in suits arising
out of business transactions, the scarcity of case law since the effective
date of the enactment reflects the unfortunate reluctance of the legal
profession to utilize the Code to its fullest extent. During the past year,
the Court of Appeals construed only two previously uninterpreted
sections of the statute.
A. Ss
In Permalum Window & Awning Manufacturing Co. v. Permalum
Window Manufacturing Corp.,3 the Court settled a dispute involving
the terms of a shipment contract and a subsequent waiver of objections
to defects in materials delivered. The plaintiff, a New York corporation,
sued the Kentucky defendant for money due on a mutual account. The
parties had entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to
provide raw materials for the defendant, who in turn would fill the
plaintiff's orders for aluminum windows. The cost of the finished pro-
duct was to be balanced against the cost of the raw materials to de-
termine which party owed money on the account. The plaintiff was to
pay freight f.o.b. Louisville for the manufactured windows, and the
defendant agreed to pay common carrier charges for the raw materials
f.o.b. New York. When the plaintiff was notified that prices for the
finished product would have to be raised, he terminated the business
relationship and brought suit for $8,541.23 claimed due on the account.
The Kentucky corporation counterclaimed for overpayment and $10,-
1The Code was adopted by the American Law Institute and National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and was endorsed by the
American Bar Association in 1952. Its predecessors included the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law (1896), Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (1906),
Uniform Sales Act (1906), Uniform Bills of Lading Act (1909), Uniform Stock
Transfer Act (1909), Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918), and the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act (1933).
2KRS ch. 355 (1962). Kentucky was the third state to adopt the Code,
preceded only by Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Presently, all states except
Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, and Mississippi, have adopted the UCC. The District
of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have also adopted the Code.
3412 S.W.2d 863 (Ky. 1967).
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000 for breach of contract, alleging that the materials shipped by the
plaintiff were defective. From a decision for the plaintiff, defendant
appealed, contending that there had been insufficient evidence to prove
sale and delivery of the goods and, furthermore, that the materials
were defective.
The Court concluded that the testimony and records introduced at
trial were sufficient to establish a sale. In disposing of the problem of
proof of delivery, the Court referred to the shipping agreement, noting
the specificity of the Uniform Commercial Code on fo.b. contracts. It
was determined that the parties had a shipment contract, and evidence
that the seller shipped the goods was sufficient to establish delivery
in the absence of an affirmative pleading that the goods were not re-
ceived.4 The seller's duty was to tender delivery by placing the
materials in the hands of a carrier, bearing the expense and risk of loss
only until the goods were in the carrier's possession.5 Proof of this fact
constituted proof of delivery.
Turning to the question of the alleged defective quality of the
goods, the Court held that the defendant's delay in objecting worked
an estoppel.6 Although this is undoubtedly a correct disposition of the
issue, the sole authority relied upon to support this holding was a case
decided more than thirty-five years before Kentucky adopted the
Code.7 This is unfortunate because the Code sets forth specific pro-
cedures for raising objections to the quality of goods received. The
buyer has a right to inspect the goods before payment or acceptance
as long as he does so within a reasonable time,8 and if defects are
revealed, he has a right to reject the goods.9 For effective rejection,
41d. at 867. The Court relied on IRS § 355.2-504 (1962) to determine the
seller with respect to delivery of the materials. This provision, limited to shipment
contracts, imposes upon the seller an obligation to put the goods in the possession
of a carrier, tender the necessary documents for the buyer to obtain possession,
and notify the buyer of shi pmet.
• KRS § 355.2-319(1)(a) (1962). Had the shipping agreement been a
"destination" contract, the seller would have bome the expense and risk of loss
until the goods were delivered to the specified place of delivery. KItS § 355.2-
319(1) (b) (1962). See generally Phalan, The Obligations of Parties to Sales of
Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 DicK L. BEv. 235 (1958).
6 Although the precise length of the delay is not known, it is a reasonable
assumption that the defendant did not object to the materials until suit was
brought.
7 412 S.W.2d at 867, citing Cogan v. Wall, 206 Ky. 89, 266 S.W. 884 (1924).
Cogan held that acceptance occurred when the buyer's employee had been
negligent in examining a shipment of shoes and consequently did not discover the
defective quality of the goods for five months. The buyer was barred from com-
plaining by the doctrine of estoppel.
sKRS § 355.2-513 (1962).
9KRS § 355.2-601 (1962). No fixed amount of time has been set during
which a buyer may reject goods, but notification must be made within a reasonable
(Continued on next page)
KENTvcKY LAw JouRNAL
the buyer must seasonably notify the seller,10 and failure to parti-
cularize the objections in the notice may constitute waiver of the
right.' Where a shipment is rejected in whole or in part, the seller is
given a right to cure the defect within the contract time by delivery of
conforming goods.' 2 Acceptance of a shipment occurs when the buyer
signifies he will keep the goods, fails to make an effective rejection
after he has had a reasonable time to inspect, or does any act in-
consistent with the seller's ownership of the goods.' 3
In the instant case, there was no indication that the appellant had
notified appellee of any objections to the quality of the goods shipped
or had attempted to reject them in any manner. Rather, he continued
receiving the raw materials, using them to manufacture the windows,
and delivering the windows in accordance with the contract terms.
This clearly indicated acceptance within the meaning of the Code.
Once goods have been accepted, a buyer is precluded from later
attempting to reject them.14 However, acceptance may be revoked
within a reasonable time if the buyer subsequently discovers a latent
defect in the materials.' 5 There is no evidence to support this in
Permalum. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the appellant had ac-
cepted the goods and that this barred him from raising objections to
the goods' quality at the trial. Although the proper result was reached
by the Court, it is most regrettable that the Code was not used to
dispose of an issue so explicitly covered by it.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
time under the existing circumstances. L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super.
117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958). Whether a buyer acted promptly enough is ultimately
a question for the jury to determine. John E. Smith's Sons Co. v. Lattimer
Foundry & Mach. Co., 19 F.R.D. 379 (D. Pa. 1956). Where the defects
complained of were readily ascertainable, a period of two months has been held
too long. Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 382 S.W.2d 191 (Ark. 1964).
10KRS § 855.2-602 (1962).
"1 KRS § 855.2-605(1) (1962) provides:
(1) The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a parti-
cular defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection pre-
cludes him from relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection or
to establish breach
(a) where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably; or
(b) between merchants when the seller has after rejection made a
request in writing for a full and final written statement of all
defects on which the buyer proposes to rely.
'2 KRS § 355.2-508 (1962).
'3 KRS § 355.2-606 (1962).
14 KRS § 355.2-607 (1962). Clause (3) of this section states that where
tender of delivery has been accepted (but acceptance of the shipment has not yet
occurred), the buyer must notify the seller of a breach within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered the breach, or he will be barred
from any remedy.
15 KRS § 855.2-608 (1962).
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B. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Buehrer v. Gates'0 involved a check executed as payment for an as-
signment of mineral leases. The instrument, which recited that it was
payment in full for 1,010 acres, was returned by the bank marked
"insufficient funds," whereupon the plaintiff brought suit. The check
was made an exhibit by the plaintiff. Defendant pleaded lack of con-
sideration but did not offer any evidence at trial. He appealed from
an adverse judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to prove
consideration.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the holder of an instrument
takes it subject to all valid claims and defenses available in a simple
contract action, including failure of consideration.17 However, pro-
duction of the instrument entitles the holder to recover when the
signatures are admitted or established unless a valid defense is also
established.' Relying on this principle, the Court held that the burden
of proving failure of consideration was on the defendant.19 This holding
and the pertinent Code provisions seem to be consonant with the
policy of upholding the validity of commercial transactions.
16411 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1967).
17 KRS § 355.3-306(c) (1962).
18KRS § 355.3-307 (1962) provides that when a signature is admitted or
established, the holder is entitled to recover when he produces the instrument
unless a defense is established. As indicated in the text of the decision, this is a
departure from the earlier rule that the negotiable form of an instrument raised a
presumption that it was issued for valuable consideration.
19 Although the foregoing provisions were controlling, the Court found that
the plaintiff bad introduced ample evidence to prove consideration.
1968]
IV. CONDEMNATION
A. Pr ocxatm
A jury view of condemned or damaged property is almost, if not
absolutely, essential to enable the jury to intelligently understand the
testimony regarding the value of property.1 KRS 177.087, recognizing
the importance of a jury view of condemned property, provides that
the "jury, on the application of either party, shall be sent by the court
... to view the land and material."2 (Emphasis added.) On numerous
occasions the Court of Appeals has held it reversible error to deny a
request for a jury view.3 It has stated: "The peremptory language of
the statute [KRS 177.087] has been consistently held to make it the
duty of the trial court, at the request of either party, to permit the jury
to go upon the land sought to be taken or damaged."4
Although the Court has stressed the peremptory language of the
statute, if the jury awards compensation higher than that estimated by
any witness, the judgment will be reversed.5 Therefore, while a jury
view is mandatory upon request, the jury is not allowed to base its
verdict solely upon that view.( A balance is struck by allowing the
jury to consider the view in connection with their own knowledge and
experience in determining the weight of conflicting testimony. Thus,
damages may be fixed in light of both evidence and view.7
The law and policy underlying jury views become important in light
of recent condemnation developments. In Commonwealth, Department
of Highways v. Hackworth,8 dictum indicated that the trial court may,
in the exercise of sound discretion, refuse to allow a jury view when
buildings have been relocated.9 Following Hakworth, the Court, in
Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Jewell,10 upheld a trial
judge's decision denying a jury view of condemned property. In Jewell,
15 P. NICHOLS, Eimwr DOMAil § 18.3 (1962).
2 KRS § 177.087 (1962) applies to the right to a jury view in highway
eminent domain proceedings while KBS § 416.050 (1962) is applicable to rail-
road eminent domain proceedings.
3 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Bates, 408 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1966);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Garland, 394 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1965);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Farra, 338 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1960).
4 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Farra, 388 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky.
1960).
5 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Doolin, 411 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1967).6 Pierson v. Commonvealth, Dep't of Highways, 350 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky.
1961).7 Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Huddleston, 312 Ky. 833, 836, 229
S.W.2d 983, 984 (1950).
8400 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1966).
9 Id. at 220.
10 405 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1966).
CouRT oF APPEALs RLEmw
a view of the property would have required the jury to walk approxi-
mately two miles over fences and rough terrain. The allegation was
made that some of the jurors, including one woman, were physically
unable to make the journey. In sustaining the trial judge's decision, the
Court stated:
Under the difficult circumstances, we think the trial judge had a discretion
and did not abuse it in overruling appellants motion notwithstanding the
use of the word shall in connection with the statutory right of either
litigant to have the jury view the land affected by condemnation. 11
The import of Jewell is to give the trial judge discretion to deny a
jury view when access to the property is difficult; the import of
Hackworth is to grant the trial judge discretion to deny a jury view of
property on which the buildings have been relocated or changed. 2
Is the next step to allow the trial judge to deny a jury view when there
is adverse weather?
The two judges dissenting in Jewell urged that "'shall' as used in
KRS 177.087 makes a requested jury view mandatory" and that to
construe it otherwise would be to chip at the foundation of an
established area of law.13 This dissent, coupled with decisions of the
Court in Jewell and Hackworth, presents three factors to be considered
when deciding whether a jury view should be granted: 1) the in-
terpretation of KRS 177.087 and in particular the term "shall" contained
therein; 2) the value of a jury view to an intelligent and just disposition
of the condemnation proceeding; and 8) the expediency and safety in-
volved in getting the jury to the location in question.
KRS 446.010 provides: "as used in the statute [s] ... of this state,
unless the context requires otherwise: ... 'shall' is mandatory."14 The
context of the word "shall" in KRS 177.087 may seem to require an
interpretation that it is mandatory; however, jury views in other types
of condemnation actions have been at the discretion of the trial judge.15
Likewise, in highway condemnation, when the jury view would be
extremely difficult, the trial judge should be given discretion to deny
1 Id. at 680.
12 But see Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Bates, 408 S.W.2d 424,
42.5 (Ky. 1966). In Bates, the Court held that absent evidence showing that there
had been a substantial change in the building and that because of this change a
view would not be helpful or would be misleading, it was reversible error to deny
a request to view a residence which had been removed from condemned property.
13 405 S.W.2d at 679.
14 See cases cited supra note 3 for a determination of the use of "shall" as
directory or mandatory.15KRS § 416.050 (1962) applies to railroad eminent domain proceedings
and provides: "Upon the request of either party, the jury may be sent by the
court.., to view the land or material." (Emphasis added.)
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such a view.16 In such a case the jurors' knowledge and understanding
of the property involved could be greatly increased by the use of
color pictures. The expediency and safety of having the jury view
condemned property is a value judgment to be made within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, and the abuse of such discretion can be re-
viewed on appeal.
In the past the Court has indicated that "shall" as used in KRS
177.087 is to be construed as mandatory. The Court has also indicated
that this interpretation is to apply to the future. Interests other than
the proper interpretation of "shall" have, however, entered the problem
of a party's right to have a jury view in a condemnation proceeding.
The Court's attempts to preserve precedent in statutory interpretation
have been noble, and the information gained by jurors during a viev
is important. However, the protection of the jurors' health is essential.
These interests have created confusion in this area, but it would seem
that granting the trial judge discretion to deny a jury view is the
soundest course.
B. R .EvEE CONDmVNAnoN
'Where private property is taken for public use, or where there
is a trespass thereon which amounts to such taking, the state's im-
munity from suit is waived"1 by Sections 13 and 242 of the Kentucky
Constitution, 18 i.e., "reverse condemnation" results. "Reverse con-
16 Id. at 679. The Court stated: "KRS 177.087 makes it mandatory that the
jury be allowed to view the premises on motion of either party. ... Even so,
there may be unusual or extreme circumstances, such as in the present case, in
which the court may have discretion."
17 5 P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, at § 18.8(8).
18 See Lehman v. Williams, 301 Ky. 729, 731, 193 S.W.2d 161, 162 (1946),
citing Kentucky State Park Commission v. Wilder, 256 Ky. 313, 317, 76 S.W.2d
4, 6 (1984), which provides:
As appears from the record, the state has taken private property for
public use without compensating some of the joint owners thereof. Section
13 of our Constitution, which is included in the Bill of Rights, forbids
such a taking and section 242 of the Constitution likewise provides that
just compensation shall be made for private property taken, injured, or
destroyed for public use. Under these express provisions, an appropriate
action will lie against the Commonwealth as well as against corporations
or individuals for damages growing out of the taking, injuring, or destroy-
ing of private property for public purposes.
This is the interpretation given Sections 13 and 242 of the Kentucky Consti-
tution. Ky. CONST. § 18: "Nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to
public use without the consent of his representatives, and without compensation
being previously made to him." Ky. CONST. § 242: "Municipal and other corpora-
tions, and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for
public use, shall make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed
by them."
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demnation"' 9 is a legal fiction which allows the injured party to waive
the tort and sue on an implied promise to pay. The fiction is permitted
to enable the landowner to receive compensation for his property with-
out the delay incidental to obtaining specific legislative approval for a
tort action against the Commonwealth. 20
In the early case of Commonwealth, Department of Highways V.
Davidson,21 the landowner contended that at the time his property was
acquired for a right of way, he was told that a private road was to be
built, but that after completion, the road was used by his neighbors.
In Davidson, the Court reversed an award by the lower court and held
that no condemnation in reverse would lie where the Highway Depart-
ment did nothing beyond that allowed by the right of way deed.
22
This term the Court, in Commonwealth, Department of Highways v.
Gamble,23 reversed an award because the incident out of which the
alleged damages arose was construction in accordance with a right of
way deed. The landowner had attempted to recover on a "reverse
condemnation" theory for drainage flowing from the construction. By
way of dictum, the Court indicated its readiness to extend the
Davidson theory24 to drainage damages resulting from construction
work in accordance with a right of way deed.2
5
The reasoning adopted by the Court in Davidson and Gamble ap-
parently indicates that in the absence of negligence, mistake, or bad
faith there can be no reverse condemnation when alleged damages
arise from construction in accordance with the terms of the right of
19 For a discussion of reverse condemnation in Kentucky, see Oberst, Claims
Against the State of Kentucky-Reverse Eminent Domain, 42 Ky. L. J. 163 (1953).20 Curlin v. Ashby, 264 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Ky. 1954).
21383 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1964).
22 The Court stated:
The reverse condemnation principle rests on the premise of the taking,
destroying or injuring of property by the sovereign without any color of
right or title so to do. In the case before us the Commonwealth has done
nothing beyond that which the right of way deeds authorized. It has
constructed the road according to the plans, just as specified by the deeds.
Thus, there has been no taking, destruction, or injury to the Davidson's
property other than authorized by the deed-hence, there can be no
condemnation in reverse. Id. at 348.
23415 S.W.2d 101 (Ky. 1967).
24 Id.
25Id. at 103. The Court stated:
Although there was no pleading of such damages, the Gambles in their
testimony sought to show damages from improper drainage. It is sufficient
to say that there was no evidence that the construction work by the
Department of Highways in any way departed from the plans incor-
porated in the deed, wherefore, under Commonwealth, Department of
Highways v. Davidson, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 346, no claim can be pro-
secuted for the drainage damages.
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way deed. Such decisions will discourage suits in "reverse condemna-
tion." Therefore, if relief is to be gained, the injured party must turn
to the Board of Claims. The Board provides a method whereby private
citizens can collect for damages inflicted by the Commonwealth or its
employees.26 Encouraging "reverse condemnation" cases to be brought
before the Board should be continued so long as the amount of the
claim is under ten thousand dollars.27 The justification for the Board's
hearing these claims rather than the circuit courts is that "reverse con-
demnation" is merely a tort action cloaked with a legal fiction in order
to by-pass the sovereign immunity principle. The theory should be
discarded and the action brought before the authority established to
hear tort claims against the Commonwealth.2 8
C. VALUATION AND THE ADfMIssIIxry OF EViDENCE
The problems of valuation and admissibility of evidence are so
interrelated as to necessitate concurrent consideration. The underlying
problem in arriving at just compensation29 in a condemnation action
is the determination of the before and after valuation. The Court con-
tinues to employ the widely accepted method of determining the
market value3° by using the willing buyer-willing seller concept.8 '
26 For a discussion of the Board of Claims in Kentucky, see Lewis & Oberst,
Claims Against the State of Kentucky-The Board of Claims, 42 Ky L.J. 334
(1953).
27 KBS §§ 44.070-.110 (1962).
28 Lewis & Oberst, supra note 26, at 856 n.67 which states: "Indeed, if either
the Board or the circuit courts must lose their jurisdiction over these claims (both
willprobably continue to hear them) the act would seem to oust the circuit courts
of their ,urisdiction."
29 Just compensation, as the term implies, is compensation that is just to the
public as well as to the owner of the property taken." Sackman, The Right to
Condemn, 29 ALBANY L. 1REv. 177, 190 (1965). However, an analysis of the
Court's decisions indicates that it continues to employ the fundamental test of
what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained?" This test is set out in
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910); e.g., Jones v. Com-
monwealth, Dep't of Highways, 413 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1967). See 27 Am. Jun. 2d
Eminent Domain § 282 (1966). See generally Note, Just Compensation for Real
Estate Condemnation, 15 Ctsv.-M n. L. REV. 171 (1966).
30 Market value is the best measure by which just compensation may be
awarded. See, e.g., City of Newport Municipal Housing Comm'n v. Turner Ad-
vertising Co., 334 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1960). The legal obligation is to pay just
compensation for the taking. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The market value test is
merely a commonly used means toward this end. See Sackman, supra note 29;
see also Winner, Rules of Evidence in Eminent Domain Cases, 13 Arx. L. REv. 10
(1958-59).
31 The traditional definition of market value is the amount of money which
a purchaser willing, but not obliged, to buy the property would pay to an owner
willing, but not obliged, to sell it, taking into consideration all uses to which the
land is adapted which may reasonably be utilized. Commonwealth, Dep't of
Highways v. Claypool, 405 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1966); City of Newport Municipal
Housing Comm'n v. Turner Advertising Co., 334 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1960); Com-
monwealth v. Begley, 272 Ky. 289, 114 S.W.2d 127 (1938); See also Sackman,
supra note 29.
[Vol. 56,
COURT oF APPEALs REviEw
In Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Claypool,3 2 the
Court made an important distinction between the measure of compen-
sation used in a condemnation action and that used in a non-condemna-
tion action. In Claypool, part of a tract of land was condemned, and
on appeal the issue arose as to when the after valuation should be
determined. The Court held that where the need for compensation
arises from a partial taking the measure of compensation is the dif-
ference between the fair market value of the whole property im-
mediately before the taking and the fair market value of the remaining
property immediately after the taking.33 The Court based its reasoning
on the sound premise that in a condemnation action, the taking itself
is the act which caused the need for compensation, and the probable
completion of subsequent improvements by the condemnor is only one
factor which may be considered in determining this value.
3 4
The Court distinguished Claypool from those cases where damage
was caused by government work on adjacent property.3 5 In these in-
stances, there is no taking and the after valuation is to be made only
after the work which has caused the need for compensation is fully
completed.36 Thus, the measure of damages would be the difference
between the fair market value of the property before it was generally
known that the construction would take place and its fair market value
immediately after completion of the work.37 In Claypool, the Court
clarified and soundly reaffirmed the long-used market value test3 8 and
32405 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1966).
Elizabeth & P. R.R. v. Helm's Heirs, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 681 (1871); for jury
33 The first use of the market value test in Kentucky was apparently in
instructions, see Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Priest, 387 S.W.2d 302
(Ky. 1965); the "taking" date is set out in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v.
Wood, 380 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. 1964).
34There is no dichotomy between taking and resulting damages. All of the
factors which affect the value of the land are subsumed under the before and
after valuation instruction. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Sherrod, 367
S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963).3 5 City of Ashland v. Queen, 254 Ky. 329, 71 S.W.2d 650 (1934); Hutcherson
v. Louisville & N. R.R., 247 Ky. 317, 57 S.W.2d 12 (1933); Watson v. Chesapeake
& 0. By., 238 Ky. 31, 36 S.W.2d 641 (1931).36 In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Claypool, 405 S.W.2d 674 (Ky.
1966), the Court, referring to cases where damage was caused by government
work on adjacent property, stated that since there was no taking there could be
no damage until the work was completed. However, while it is obviously possible
for a landowner to sustain damage before such work is fully completed, the Court
has apparently ruled, in order to avoid multiple litigation, that no assessment of
damage can be made until the work is finished.3 7 See, e.g., City of Dayton v. Rewald, 168 Ky. 398, 182 S.W. 931 (1916).
38 See 4 P. Nichols, supra note 1, at § 14.232(1) where it states, "The
simplicity of the application of the before and after rule commends itself to the
courts as the method most likely to attain a result that is fair both to condemnor
and condemnee." See also, L. ORGEL, VALUAION UNER EmaNENT DoAIN §§
51-52 (1953); but see Sackman, supra note 29; for other measures of valuation
see 27 Am. Jun. 2d Eminent Domain § 310 (1966).
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distinguished it from that used in non-condemnation actions. This
should facilitate accurate jury instructions and result in fewer ap-
peals.8 9
A significant step forward was taken in Commonwealth, Depart-
ment of Highways v. Standard Oil Co.,40 when the Court held that the
trial court's refusal to allow a landowner to use the accepted and
recognized formula of the gasoline industry41 to prove the value of
his land was reversible error. The formula related the land value
directly to the gallons of gasoline sold at the service station. The trial
court allowed the owner to prove the number of gallons sold, but re-
fused to permit him to use the formula to relate this to the value of his
land. While the Court reiterated its position that loss of business profits
is a non-compensable item in condemnation actions, it distinguished
this from the income producing quality of the real estate which is a
compensable item.4
In resolving this problem of first impression in Kentucky, the Court
relied heavily on St. Louis Housing Authority v. Bainter.43 There,
property used for a gasoline station was condemned and on appeal the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that evidence as to the custom and
practice in the gasoline industry of using gallons of gasoline sold as the
primary factor in determining the market value of service station
property was properly admitted. The Missouri Court specifically re-
jected an argument advanced by the dissent in Standard Oil that
evidence of market value based upon gallonage is speculative and un-
certain because it depends upon such highly variable items as manage-
ment, hours of operation, and discounting practices.
In Standard Oil, the Court soundly permitted a widely accepted
business standard to be used to directly relate the value of the con-
demned land to the product sold on the land. The use of such standards
39 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Claypool, 405 S.W.2d 674 (Ky.
1966), overruled Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Wood, 380 S.W.2d 73
(Ky. 1964) and Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Baldwin, 229 S.W.2d 744
(Ky. 1950) to the extent that they held when the after valuation was to be made.
40 414 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. 1966).
41 Id. at 571.
42Lost business profits is a noncompensable item in condemnation actions
since they depend largely on the individual skill of the owner and are therefore
too speculative and uncertain. City of Newport Municipal Housing Comm'n v.
Turner Advertising, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1960); Henderson v. City of
Lexington, 132 Ky. 390, 111 S.W. 818 (1908). Contra, e.g., Korf v. Fleming, 289
Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d 85 (1948); In re Park Site, 247 Mich. 1, 225 N.W. 498
(1929). However, the income producing quality of the real estate is compensable
because it depends upon more certain factors such as location and suitability for
a particular business. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Smith, 358 S.W.2d
487 (Ky. 1962). See 27 Am. JuR. 2d Eminent Domain § 285 (1966).
43297 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1957). This case was one of first impression in
Missouri.
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can provide an important factor for the jury's consideration in arriving
at fair market value.44 Although uncertainty may occur in the use of
such standards, it is difficult to justify the rejection of evidence that
businesses rely on in the conduct of their affairs.45 Because Standard
Oil is the first affirmation of this practice in Kentucky, the Court should
at its first opportunity set appropriate evidentiary standards. While the
use of widely accepted business standards should be encouraged,
sound evidentiary guidelines can prevent the obvious danger inherent
in the indiscriminate use of unreliable standards. The flood of appeals
which would otherwise result with increasing attempts to introduce
such standards in condemnation actions can also be prevented.
In Jones v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways,46 the Court
applied a universally accepted doctrine for the first time in Kentucky.47
The landowner appellants had purchased two non-contiguous tracts of
land which bad recently been subdivided for residential construction.
One parcel was used for a residence and the other was bottomland for
use as a recreational area and buffer between the road and the resi-
dential area. Because other land owners in the subdivision had pre-
viously exercised the option to purchase buffer lots, appellants buffer
lot was not contiguous to his residential lot. However, deed restrictions
prevented the buffer from being used for any other purpose.
44 Rental value is generally held to be an important factor in determining
fair market value. See, e.g., State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d 750 (1963);
State, Dept of Highways v. Varino, 129 So. 2d 495 (La. 1961). See 29A CJ.S.
Eminent Domain § 168 (1965). Evidence as to the gallons of gasoline sold on the
condemned premises was admitted in State Highway Comm'n v. Ellis, 882 S.W.2d
225 (Mo. 1964), but the first use of a business formula to directly relate the
gallons sold to the rental value of the land as a factor in the market value
determination appears to have been in St. Louis Housing Authority v. Bainter,
297 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1957). The use of such a standard when it is widely
accepted by industry is consistent with the modem practice of allowing all
relevant factors to be considered as evidence in condemnation valuations. 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 273 (1965).
41In Wade v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 147 N.C. 219, 60 S.E. 987 (1908),
the court upheld the use of expert opinion testimony as evidence in a condemnation
valuation action. It reasoned that the jury must know the value of the property
which the owner is deprived of and any evidence tending to show this value should
be regarded as competent. No amount of purely factual data would enable a lay
jury to do anything but speculate as to the value of the property. The court
gtated, "It is difficult to perceive why testimony, which experience has taught is
generally found to be relied upon by men in their important business affairs out-
,ide, should be rejected inside the court house." Id. at 219, 60 S.E. at 989.
Reliable business and industrial standards, as in the Standard Oil case, can
,erform a functional role similar to that of expert testimony in enabling a jury to
irrive at the elusive concept of value.
46 413 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1967).
47 See City of Williamstown v. Wallace, 316 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1958), where
:eparate parcels were devoted to a single use, but where non-unity of title de-
eated compensation. See also Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Slusher, 371
;.V.2d 851 (Ky. 1963).
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A portion of the bottomland was condemned, but none of the resi-
dential land was taken. The Court held that because the two parcels
were devoted to a single use they were entitled to be considered as one
for condemnation valuation purposes, even though they were non-
contiguous. The "unity rule," is widely accepted" and the main issue,
as in Jones, is whether or not the parcels are devoted to a single use.
49
Where two or more separate tracts under common ownership are
devoted to a single use so that the taking of one would impair the
value of the other, non-contiguity should not deny the owner just
compensation.50 While contiguity is a factor to be considered in
determining whether or not the property is devoted to a single use, it
is not conclusive. Thus, integrated use, not physical contiguity, is the
principal test.51 The measure of compensation is the same for owners
of separate tracts devoted to a single use as for owners of single tracts.
Thus, the "unity rule" facilitates just compensation to the property
owner and the Court is on firm ground in adopting it.
52
48 See, e.g., Ives v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 184 Kan. 134, 334 P.2d 887
(1959); City of Denton v. Hunt, 285 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1950). See 4 P. Nichols,
supra note 1, at § 14.31(1). 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 815 (1966).
49 Some courts rule on the issue as a matter of law. See, e.g., City of Chicago
v. Equitable Assur. Soc'y, 8 IMI. 2d 841, 134 N.E.2d 296 (1956). Other courts
consider this a factual question for the jury. See, e.g., Pittsburg C.C. & St. L. R..
v. Crockett, 182 Ind. 490, 106 N.E. 875 (1914).
50 Ives v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 184 Kan. 184, 884 P.2d 399 (1959).
51 Id.
52 In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Rogers, 899 S.W.2d 706 (Ky.
1965), a single tract of land was devoted to two separate and distinct uses, but
when one part was condemned, the Court held that the tract would be considered
as two separate tracts for valuation purposes in order to avoid duplication of
damages. This rule is in line with a majority of other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Cameron v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 51 Minn. 158, 58 N.W. 199 (1892). See 27
AM. JuRn. 2d Eminent Domain § 315 (1966). For a development of the unity
doctrine see Rezzolla, Unity of Use and Unity of Ownership in Eminent Domain,
70 Dtc . L. Rzv. 189 (1966).
V. CONFLICTS
A. CHoIcE oF LAw
The lex loci delictil-the law of the place of the wrong-has been
the traditional solution, applied in a long line of Kentucky cases,2 for
resolving choice of law questions in multi-state tort cases. However, in
recent years various jurisdictions3 have cast aside the mechanical lex
loci delicti, "rules" approach and have adopted versions of the
Restatement Second4 approach, often called the "center-of-gravity" or
"most significant contacts theory." This approach, while in a sense
more flexible than the lex loci delicti, is nevertheless merely another
rules approach. For some torts, specific choice of law rules apply,5 but
in most tort cases, a court must apply the law of the state of the most
significant relationship, regardless of the fact-law pattern. The state of
the most significant relationship is determined by "weighing" the
contacts quantitatively. Although this weighing process may allow a
1 RESTATiEmT OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAws §§ 377-78 (1934):
§ 377 The Place of Wrong
The place of wrong is the state where the last event necessary to make
the actor liable for the alleged tort took place.
§ 378 Law Governing Plaintiff's Injury
The Law of the Place of the Wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury.2 This rule began with Louisville & N. R.R. v. Whitlow's Adm'r, 114 Ky.
470, 43 S.V. 711 (1897). A few recent cases employing the lex loci delicti rule
are Stewart v. Martin, 349 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1961); Carter v. Driver, 316 S.W.2d
378 (Ky. 1958); Drahmann's Adm'x v. Brink's Adm'x, 290 S.W.2d 449 (Ky.
1956). In these cases the Court gave no reason for following the rule except
stare decisis. The rule was first questioned in Ansback v. Greenberg, 256 S.W.2d
1 (Ky. 1952), where it was argued that application of a Georgia guest statute
was against public policy as reflected in the Kentucky Constitution, Sections 14,
54, and 241, which, when read together, forbid legislative enactment of a guest
statute. See note 10 infra. The Court rejected the argument and followed the
rules approach of the first Restatement. See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Ken-
tucky: Judicial Method and the Policy Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27
(1967), for a comprehensive historical development of the lex loci rules
approach.
3 Farbicus v. Horgan, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Baits v. BaIts,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Griflth v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
416 Pa. 3, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965).4
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CoNmrc-r OF LAws § 379(a) (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1964):
In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the in-
jury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless
some other state has a more significant relationship with the occurrence
and the parties as to the particular issues involved, in which event the
local law of the latter state will govern.
5 Intra-family immunity is governed by the law of the family domicile. RE-
sTAT AmNT (SEcoND) OF = Comra OF LAWS § 390(g) (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1963).
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court to reach a desirable result, the Restatement Second approach
requires the same application to any case classified as a tort, irre-
spective of the fact-law pattern presented. This, in essence, is simply
an expanded rules approach.
Another method of solving choice of law problems in multi-state
tort cases is the policy-centered approach. The underlying premise of
this theory is that a court should not make a choice of law on the basis
of a rigid rule which applies to all cases classified as torts.6 Decisions
should be reached on a case-by-case basis, utilizing prior decisions as
precedent in accord with the common law tradition. In resolving the
question of which of several laws to apply, a court should first deter-
mine the pertinent social and economic policies underlying the con-
flicting laws. After discovering these policies, the court should then
determine which state has an interest in applying its policies, as re-
flected in its law, to the particular fact situation. Will the policies of
the state be promoted by applying its law to the facts, and will the
result be fair to the parties? Does the state have a valid "govern-
mental interest" in having its law applied? These inquiries form the
basic procedural structure of the policy-centered methodology7
In Wessling v. Paris,8 a case certain to become a landmark in
Kentucky conflicts law, the Court of Appeals rejected the lex loci
delicti approach and adopted a version of the policy-centered metho-
dology. The fact pattern was that Helen Wessling was a passenger in
a car owned and operated by her host, Lenice Paris. Both were Ken-
tucky residents, and the car was garaged and licensed in Kentucky.
There was an accident in Indiana, and Helen Wessling was injured.
She brought suit in Kentucky. The law pattern revealed that Indiana
had a guest statute,9 granting drivers immunity from suits by pas-
6 This was the "rules" approach of the first Restatement, and it is similar to
the civil law whereby a codified set of rules is applied to all cases falling within a
broad classification, regardless of the fact-law pattern. See Sedler, supra note 2,
at 41.
7 This explanation of the policy-centered approach has been vastly simplified
and condensed. For an excellent and comprehensive treatment of policy-centered
conflicts incorporating the views of prevailing conflicts theorists see Sedler, supra
note 2. Contra Moreland, Conflicts of Law-Choice of Law in Torts-A Critique,
56 Ky. L. J. 5 (1967).
8417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
9 IND. STAT. AiNN. § 47.1021 (1965), provides:
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor
vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or
for death of a guest, while being transported without payment therefor,
unless such injuries or death are caused by the wanton or wilful mis-
conduct of such operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation
of such motor vehicle.
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sengers. Kentucky had no guest statute.10 Under Kentucky law Helen
Wessling had a cause of action, but under Indiana law, her cause of
action would be barred. So the issue was simply whether Helen
Wessling had a cause of action.".
Under the traditional lex loci rule, Kentucky law would be dis-
placed and Indiana law applied by the Kentucky Court. However, the
Court declined to adhere to stare decisis, saying that the time had
come to reexamine the lex loci rule since the only reason for its con-
tinued application was that it was a well-established precedent. The
Court found that the traditional "rules" approach, while simple and
convenient avoided "the necessity of examining the true legal re-
lationship of the parties or other considerations which might be more
consonant with a just result."
12
In applying Kentucky law, the Court adopted a policy-centered
approach to the solution of conflict problems. The Court noted that
Kentucky's public policy, as embodied in the Constitution, was to
allow recovery as a matter of social justice. The apparent policy behind
Indiana's law was to protect Indiana drivers from suits by guest pas-
sengers.13 The parties involved were Kentucky residents and domicili-
aries; the trip began and was to end in Kentucky, and the car was
garaged and licensed in Kentucky. Thus, the Court concluded that
Indiana had no interest in applying its law since its protective policy
only extended to drivers who are Indiana residents or to those suing
in Indiana courts. In addition, no issue of Indiana highway safety was
1OThe 1980 General Assembly enacted a guest statute which barred a cause
of action by passengers unless an accident resulted from an intentional act of the
owner or operator. BALDwin, SuPPLE-MENT TO CAr Or.'s K N STATUTES §
12-7 (1931). Then a year later, in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 534, 49 S.W.2d
847 (1932), the Court declared the guest statute to be unconstitutional and void
since it violated three sections of the Kentucky Constitution. Section 14 provides
that every person shall have a remedy for injuries done; Section 241 allows re-
covery of damages for death; Section 54 prohibits the General Assembly from
limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries
to person or property. Reading these sections together, the Court found that the
guest statute violated "[tihe spirit of the Constitution as well as its letter." 243
Ky. at 542, 49 S.W.2d at 351. As a result, guest statutes are against Kentucky
public policy as embodied in its Constitution.
11 In tort conflicts cases in Kentucky, this fact-law pattern has been common.
This situation is also typical of other non-guest statute states bordered by states
having guest statutes.
12 Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1967).
13 Threal policy reason for guest statutes is not grounded in social justice
for drivers but economic protection for insurance companies against collusive suits.
The Court failed to mention the true underlying policy behind Indiana's law, but
this was not fatal since Indiana would have had no interest in promoting that
policy under the facts of this case. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133
N.W.2d 408 (1965), where the insurability considerations are analyzed and ap-
plied in the policy-centered approach.
19681
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
involved.14 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that Kentucky had a
"more significant relationship" with the occurrence and the parties,15
and thus Kentucky law should govern the rights and liabilities of
these Kentucky residents.
The Court was clearly justified in abandoning the lex loci rule.
Indiana legislators were considering Indiana residents and Indiana
interests (insurance) when they enacted the Indiana guest statute.
Common sense dictates that if Indiana has no realistic interest in the
case, there is no reason for a Kentucky court to apply Indiana law,
particularly when Kentucky has compelling interests in applying its
own law. From a practical standpoint, the results reached must be
fair to the parties, and the different interests of the states in our
federal system must be accommodated. The "rules" approach cannot
achieve these goals; it considers no interests and blindly follows pre-
determined standards. The policy-centered approach, however, allows
a realistic appraisal of which states' interests should be promoted to
achieve a just result in an individual case.
B. BECOGNITION OF FoREGN DEmEES
Three significant child custody cases were decided by the Court of
Appeals last term. Brengle v. Hurst16 involved the issue of whether
Kentucky should give full faith and credit to a foreign custody decree
when Kentucky had an interest in the affected child's custody.
Walden v. lohnsonj7 and Batchelor v. Fulcher'8 indicated when a
court could and should take jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody.
In Brengle, the mother of two small girls was awarded custody
under a 1961 Indiana divorce decree. The mother and children moved
14 Had insurance reasons been considered, Indiana would still have no in-
terest in protecting Indiana insurance companies and policy holders where the
car was garaged in Kentucky. Since insurance rates are determined by the
geographical area in which the car is garaged, an accident occurring in Indiana
involving a car garaged in Kentucky would have no effect on Indiana insurance
interests.
15 The Court cited the Restatement Second rule as precedent. The Restate-
ment Second has been called another version of the "rules" approach since a
decision can be rendered by counting the sheer number of contacts a particular
state may have. In this sense, the Restatement Second is another "rules" approach,
for no policy behind the laws is considered and no interest analysis is made after
the states having the relevant contacts are determined. In Wessling, however, the
Court is construing the contacts or relationships qualitatively by considering
policies and interests, thus achieving a policy-centered result. For other courts
that have adopted the policy-centered approach, see Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J.
226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967), and Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 851, 222 A.2d 205
(1966).
16408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966).
17417 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1967).
18 415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1967).
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to Kentucky shortly after the divorce, 19 but, in 1966, the father
obtained custody under an Indiana judgment. Since Indiana had re-
tained sufficient jurisdiction over the children's status to justify the
transfer of custody, the husband filed a habeas corpus action in Ken-
tucky to enforce the Indiana judgment. The lower court held that full
faith and credit required enforcement of the judgment without a
hearing on the merits.
In a well-reasoned opinion grounded on sound precedent, the
Court of Appeals reversed and held that, in child custody matters,
full faith and credit does not require recognition of a foreign custody
order if the forum has a substantial, bona fide interest in the child's
welfare, and that such recognition should not be given without a
hearing on the merits. Kentucky's interest in the children's welfare was
predicated on their bona fide residency in the state from 1961 to
1966. The effect of the decision is that full faith and credit is not con-
trolling in child custody cases, and, regardless of another state's ruling,
Kentucky can take jurisdiction in the interest of the children's wel-
fare.20
Brengle is indicative of the developing approach in child custody
cases which allows the lower court full discretion to consider the
welfare of the children.2I Ehrenzweig labels this approach the Kansas
Rule of Independent Investigation:
19 The Court does not mention domicile of the children or the mother, saying
only that the mother in good faith established residency in Kentucky and that the
children have been citizens of Kentucky for several years. From this language,
the Court is apparently using the words residency and domicile interchangeably
as many courts do.
20 In May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), the Supreme Court held that
in a habeas corpus proceeding attacking the right of a mother to retain possession
of her minor children, Ohio was not bound by full faith and credit to give effect
to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody of children to their father when the
Wisconsin decree was rendered without personal jurisdiction over the mother. But
the decision was split 4-1-4, with Justice Frankfurter concurring in the result. He
said that in child custody cases the full faith and credit clause does not require
Ohio to accept the disposition made in Wisconsin since the child's welfare has a
strong claim upon Ohio. A state must not forget its responsibility because of
another state's prior adjudication. Frankfurter turned the decision on the welfare
of the child, and not on lack of jurisdiction over the mother. Thus the precise
holding of this case is questionable. At any rate, the Supreme Court cases are in-
conclusive as to the extent, if any, to which a custody decree is entitled to full
faith and credit in a sister state. See also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962),
and Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1957).2 1 A. E-RENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAws §§ 86-89 (1962). Here Ehrenzweig
outlined the development of the "welfare of the child" approach. He stated that
courts have long abandoned the much criticized view that a custody decree is in
rem with the res being the status of the parents or children. See Stumberg, The
Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Cm. L. BEv. 42, 61 (1940).
See also R. LEFxLaI, ThE CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 180 (1959), for a discussion of
the same "welfare of the child trend."
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[T]he courts of several states have abandoned any pretense of recog-
nizing foreign [custody] decrees on grounds of full faith and credit or
comity, and have claimed complete discretion in reexamining the merits
of such decrees.... This approach has been adopted most emphatically
by the Supreme Court of Kansas; as between the parents themselves,
they may be bound by a former adjudication ...but the state, in its
relation of parens patriae, looks to the welfare of the child at the time
the inquiry is being made, and for that purpose former adjudication
between parents is evidentiary only and not controlling.
22
In adopting this rule of full discretion, the Court of Appeals first
established that another state's custody decree can be modified.
23
Then the Court indicated that jurisdiction can be accepted and prior
custody orders disregarded when the children have "acquired new
residences in the interim or are personally before the second court."
24
Although the children were seized from Indiana, the Court found
that they were bona fide Kentucky residents. Accordingly, Kentucky
had such a substantial interest in the welfare of the children as to war-
rant a hearing on the merits of the habeas corpus proceeding.25 The
decision is an excellent example of the Kansas Independent Investiga-
tion or full discretion rule, and the result reached is sound.20
22 A. EHBENZWE[G, supra note 21, at § 87, citing Moyer v. Moyer, 171 Kan.
495, 223 P.2d 711 (1951). Two states, Connecticut and New York, have re-
pudiated full faith and credit to foreign decrees altogether. See Boardman v. Board-
man, 135 Conn. 124, 137, 62 A.2d 521, 527 (1948), and Bachman v. Megias,
1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956).
23 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610
(1949); Kovacs v. Brewer, 856 U.S. 604 (1938). See also Ford v. Ford, 371
U.S. 187 (1962). In these cases the Court held that a custody decree could be
modified, reserving for future decision the question of whether the fll faith and
credit clause or the emerging welfare full discretion approach should be the
rationale for decision.
24 The Court cited R. LEFLAR, supra note 21, at § 180 as authority for
jurisdiction based on residence or personal presence before the court. The Court
evidently is using the words residence and domicile interchangeably, for it
mentioned that Leflar cited Rodney v. Adams, 268 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954) as
precedent. In Rodney, citing numerous Kentucky cases, the Court held that it
could not take jurisdiction to determine child custody unless the child was domi-
ciled in Kentucky, and likewise, it would not recognize a decree of a foreign court
awarding custody of a child who was not domiciled in the foreign state vhen the
custody proceedings were instituted, except when the child had been involvedin violation of a statute or a court order for the purpose of avoiding jurisdiction.
So. now in Kentucky the basis for jurisdiction in custody cases appears to beeither domicile or residency.
25 See Annot., 4 A.L.R.Sd 1277 (1965) for an excellent annotation of habeascorpus modifying custody.
2 6 The correctness of the decision has been borne out by the BE.STATEMEmT
(Szco~ND) OF Tmx CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967) which
states:
The welfare of the child is always the overriding consideration. For this
reason, probably the majority of courts have not felt themselves bound
by fuollfait and credit, even in the absence of changed conditions, to
enforce without question the provisions of a custody decree rendered in
another state . B. Such a reexamination is particularly likely to be made
(Continued on next page)
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Walden v. Johnsom2 7 and Batchelor v. Fulcher28 reach different
conclusions as to the proper bases of jurisdiction in child custody
cases. Walden was a habeas corpus proceeding to determine immediate
possession, rather than permanent custody, of a six-year-old child.29
The child's mother died in 1961 and the father in 1966. Vonda Walden,
a paternal aunt, took the child from Indiana to his father's funeral in
Kentucky. While there, the paternal grandparents assumed control of
the child and refused to permit the aunt to return him to Indiana. The
father's will had appointed the aunt guardian, and the Indiana probate
court directed her "to take physical custody of said minor child."30
Shortly thereafter, the Kentucky court appointed the grandmother
guardian, and the aunt instituted a habeas corpus proceeding to regain
possession of the child. The Court did not consider full faith and
credit, but rather decided which state had jurisdiction to determine
the right to immediate possession or control of the child.
At the outset, the Court stated that Indiana "would have jurisdiction
to make a custody award, and the fact that the child was temporarily
residing in Kentucky in no way affected that jurisdiction."31 The
Court did not decide that Indiana had sole jurisdiction, and it indicated
that temporary residence or presence might give Kentucky a sufficient
interest in the child's welfare to take jurisdiction and determine
whether the natural guardians (grandparents) had a right of control
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
at the behest of a parent who did not appear in the original action and
was not otherwise subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court.
27417 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1966).
28415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1966).2 9 In Chamblee v. Chamblee, 248 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1952), the Court ruled
that the question of ultimate right to custody was not in issue in a habeas corpus
proceeding, pointing out that equity courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine
questions of custody. In Chamblee, the Court cited Wright v. Wright, 805 Ky.
680, 205 S.W.2d 491 (1947), which also pointed out the distinction between the
immediate right to possession of the child (the true issue in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding), and the permanent right of ultimate custody, justiciable only in an
equity court. Thus, the Court correctly limited its decision to that of immediate
possession or control of the child.
30 Walden v. Johnson, 417 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1967).
31Id. at 222. See also Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 454 (1950):
A decree awarding custody of a child... will be considered binding and
recognizable in another state where at the time of its rendition the child
was domiciled in the state of the decree, and consequently the court of
that state had jurisdiction even though the child was physically outside
such state at this time.
Here the decree was not for custody, but to appoint a guardian. According to
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF T=z CoNFLIcT OF LAws § 79 (Proposed Official Draft
1967), there is in actual practice no sharp distinction to be drawn between thetwo decrees, for the same type of legal relationship is created between the child
and the person to whose care he is awarded. A child's custody is normally awarded
to a parent in a divorce decree while a guardian may be appointed to take care of
a child whose parents are dead.
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or possession greater than the statutorily appointed guardian. How-
ever, Kentucky's claim to jurisdiction was denied because, in this case,
temporary presence was insufficient to give "custodial jurisdiction" of
the child. The one month detention in Kentucky neither converted the
child into a bona fide Kentucky resident nor changed his domicile. The
Court concluded that "in all other cases we have examined where the
trial court went into the question of the child's best welfare and its
ultimate custody, jurisdiction was assumed on the ground that the
child was a bona fide resident of, or domiciled in Kentucky."
3 2
Brengle was easily distinguished since in that case the children
were bona fide residents of Kentucky; thus, the state had a parens
patriae interest in their welfare. In effect, Walden indicated that there
was an insufficient basis on which jurisdiction could or should be as-
sumed. This may indicate that the Court realizes jurisdiction could be
assumed, but should not be unless an adequate interest in the welfare
of the child can be shown. For an interest to be adequate, the state
must be parens patriae because of the child's bona fide residency or
domicile. Thus, Walden indicated that jurisdiction should not be
exercised on the basis of temporary residency or the mere presence
of a child detained in the forum. The Court recognized the Indiana
order, not on full faith and credit, but as a matter of comity.
33
Batchelor v. Fulcher, involved a suit between a mother and father
over the custody of their two small children. The mother was granted
a Florida divorce in 1965, without adjudication of the children's
custody. Later that year, the father obtained an Indiana divorce giving
him custody of the childien. The Indiana court, however, did not
have personal jurisdiction over the mother. The mother later seized
the children, returned to Kentucky, and filed this action seeking per-
manent custody. The father was personally served when he went to
Kentucky to regain the children.
The Court first concluded that Indiana's lack of personal jurisdiction
over the mother rendered their custody decree unenforceable in Ken-
tucky. Thus, the mother was not deprived of her right to seek custody
of her children in Kentucky. The majority cited May v. Anderson34 for
the proposition that without personal jurisdiction over both parties, a
32 417 S.W.2d at 223.
3 3 In distinguishing full faith and credit from comity, the Court here is un-
doubtedly reaffirming Brengle, departing from the full faith and credit rationale
for recognition of custody decrees to that of full discretion. This approach is called
by Ehrenzweig "comity without compensation" in that "a state court, in con-
formity to state policy, may, b7 comity, give a remedy which the full faith and
credit clause does not compel.' A. EnRENZWEi, supra note 21, at § 47(b). See
also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953).
24 345 U.S. 528 (1958).
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court's decree is not entitled to full faith and credit. On this issue a
long dissent sought to distinguish the May case to show that the In-
diana child custody decree should be upheld. The dissent thought the
issue was "whether the Indiana judgment should be accorded full faith
and credit by the courts of Kentucky.... ."35 The dissent forgot the full
discretion approach adopted in Brengle. Under Brengle, full faith and
credit no longer requires recognition of enforceable foreign child
custody decrees, for regardless of a prior adjudication, the welfare of
the child is the chief concern. Thus, if the courts of Kentucky have
jurisdiction, full faith and credit is irrelevant because the court can
reach a result based on its own independent investigation.
As seen in Walden, the bases for jurisdiction in custody cases had
been bona fide residency or domicile. Temporary residence or mere
presence was never considered sufficient. However, Batchelor adopted
the developing concept of concurrent jurisdiction which recognizes
that presence alone is sufficient. The Restatement of Conflicts of Law
adopts this theory and promulgates three independent bases:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the
custody, or to appoint a guardian, of the person of a child or adult
(a) who is domiciled in the state, or
(b) who is present in the state, or
(c) who is neither domiciled nor present in the state, if the contro-
versy is between two or more persons who are personally subject to the
jurisdiction of the state.
8 6
Presence, as a basis, was justified in that the state where the child is
physically present is the state most immediately concerned. Moreover,
its courts have direct access to the child and may be most qualified to
decide the child's best interest. The Restatement further states that
"each of these bases of judicial jurisdiction provides a reasonable and
suitable basis upon which a court may proceed in a proper case....",7
(Emphasis added.)
The Restatement carefully points out that a court having jurisdic-
tion will not necessarily entertain the suit, and where jurisdiction is
based only on physical presence, the state should refuse to entertain
the action unless necessary for the child's best interests. This reasoning
closely follows the leading case advocating concurrent jurisdiction in
child custody cases, Sampsell v. Superior Court.38 There, Justice Tray-
nor stated that "courts of two or more states may have concurrent
jurisdiction . . . in the interest of the child. . ... 9 This doctrine is
35 415 S.W.2d at 831.
3 0 RFsTATEmENT (S~coND) OF E ComLC or LAws § 79 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967).
37 Id.
38 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (1948).
39 Id.
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tempered by the fact that a court should decline such jurisdiction
where "the other state has a more substantial interest in the child. ... 40
The Court of Appeals, citing the Restatement, showed that two
concurrent bases of jurisdiction were present4l-presence of the child-
ren and personal jurisdiction over the contending parties. Thus, juris-
diction existed technically. However, in deciding whether to exercise
that jurisdiction, the welfare of the child should be the overriding
consideration. Under the facts of this case, it is not clear whether
Kentucky should have taken jurisdiction to reexamine the Indiana de-
cree. In fact, the Restatement says: "As a matter of policy, such decrees
will frequently not be reexamined when a parent, who is dissatisfied
with the first award, brings the child into the State of the forum for the
sole purpose of obtaining a re-determination of the custody issue."42 So
40 Id.
41 An earlier Kentucky case, Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S.W.2d
220 (1941), seemed to recognize concurrent jurisdiction. There, the mother was
granted custody of minor children by a West Virginia divorce decree. Before the
judgment was rendered, the father had taken the children to Kentucky. The mother
then filed a petition in Kentucky seeking custody of the children which was
denied. The Court, on appeal, recognized that West Virginia had jurisdiction to
render a custody decree, but denied that West Virginia had sole jurisdiction. The
Court cited Workman v. Workman, 191 Ky. 124, 127, 229 S.W. 879, 380 (1921)
to the effect that "no consideration short of a statutory inhibition will interfere
with the power of a chancellor to adjudge the custody of an infant to whom-
soever it might appear the welfare and happiness of the infant demands-whether
that person be a resident or nonresident of this state."
In Stafford, the Court took jurisdiction and gave custody to the mother, a
nonresident, after a thorough analysis of facts relating to the child's welfare.
There, as in Batchelor, both parents were before the Court, and the child, while
not a domicile of Kentucky, was present in the state. An important factual dif-
ference is that in Stafford, the nonresident mother came into the state to regain
custody; in Batchelor, the Kentucky mother was suing in Kentucky for a change
of custody after bringing the child to Kentucky for this purpose. The child was
present for one month in Stafford while only for three days in Batchelor.4 2 RESTATEmINT (SEcoND) or i CoNFIcr OF LAws § 79 (Proposed Of-
ficial Draft 1967). See also Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody De-
crees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345, 857-74 (1953), for an excellent discussion of the
considerations a court should use in taking jurisdiction. Ehrenzweig discusses the
"clean hands" doctrine, which he deems the "true rule" in child custody cases.
An automatic applicatin of the rule of full discretion does not represent desirable
or existing law in the case of a parent who, dissatisfied with a custody award,
seeks a redetermination of the issue in the courts of another state. "To encourage
such scheming is clearly harmful particularly where the second court's jurisdiction
has been obtained in bad faith.' Id. at 358. Thus, Ehrenzweig concludes that
"[T]he petitioner's 'clean hands' are the most important criterion for the ap-
plication for any one of the tools available to courts desirous of reexamining the
merits of a foreign decree." Id. at 359.
The Stafford case is cited in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 54 (1949), as authority for
the view that
notwithstanding an admittedly valid foreign custodial award, some cases
hold that a court has power to award the custody of a child domiciled
without the state, even though such child has been unlawfully removed
or abducted into the state or detained therein without permission.
In addition, Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 57 (1949) states:
(Continued on next page)
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while the rule laid down is doubtlessly correct, the result reached may
be questionable.
This case is important as the first distinct recognition in Kentucky
of concurrent jurisdiction in child custody cases. The domicile or bona
fide residence of a child no longer has exclusive jurisdiction. The theory
of concurrent jurisdiction naturally flows from the full discretion ap-
proach, for how could a court exercise full discretion without exercising
jurisdiction. Thus, courts using concurrent jurisdiction may now "as-
sume or declare jurisdiction over domestic and foreign children, of
domestic and foreign parents, without regard to earlier decrees of
other courts and obsolete formulas, whenever the welfare of the child
so requires and the rights of the parties have realistically been fairly
protected."
43
Batchelor is confusing, however, due to the prior Walden case
which held that only bona fide residency or domicile were adequate
bases of jurisdiction. However, if Walden failed to take jurisdiction
because Kentucky had no interest and not because it lacked a
jurisdictional base, the two decisions can be reconciled. Another pos-
sible means of reconciliation may be that Walden was concerned with
a decree appointing a guardian for temporary custody of the child,
and Batchelor was concerned with a "permanent" custody decree. The
significance of this basis is doubtful since "in actual practice ...no
sharp distinction may be drawn between the two kinds of decrees."44
In addition, the permanent versus temporary distinction may be in-
valid since courts can change "permanent" custody decrees as the
welfare of a child may dictate. Since reconciliation of the two cases is
difficult, the apparent conflict between Walden and Batchelor must
await a later case for clarification.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
even though the child has been removed from the foreign state without
the knowledge or consent of one in lawful custody under a foreign
custody decree, nevertheless courts of a state to which such child has
been removed have been held in many cases to have the power to make
an award on the merits.
Here it is important to distinguish between having the power and deciding
whether or not to exercise it. In Stafford, the mother seeking custody had clean
hands, while in Batchelor, the mother seized the child and came to Kentucky to
seek a redetermination of a prior decree.4 3 A. EHRENZWEIG & D. LOUISELL, JUIUSDICTION IN A NuTsEL. § 14 (1964).4 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CoNrLIcT OF LAws § 79 (Proposed
Official Draft 1967).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. CREATION OF ADDmONAL JUDGEsHIs
Asbury v. Robinson1 lends credence to those who believe that
the Kentucky Constitution is, in certain areas, hopelessly outdated.
Asbury involves the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Section 188 of
the Constitution which provides:
Each county having a city of twenty thousand inhabitants, and a popula-
tion, including said city, of forty thousand or more, may constitute a dis-
trict, and when its population reaches seventy-five thousand, the General
Assembly may provide that it shall have an additional Judge, and such
district may have a Judge for each additional fifty thousand population
above one hundred thousand. And in such counties the General As-
sembly shall, by proper laws, direct in what manner the Court shall be
held and the business therein conducted. (Emphasis added.)
The respondent took office after the 1966 General Assembly
authorized an additional judge for the Thirty-Second Circuit Court
District which is located in Boyd County.2 An original proceeding3
was initiated in the Court of Appeals seeking an order to prohibit the
respondent from acting in his new capacity. The order was sought
on the grounds that the judgeship was unconstitutional because the
county did not have the constitutionally required population of
seventy-five thousand. In denying the relief prayed for, the Court
adhered to Runyon v. Smith4 which held that the General Assembly's
reorganization of existing judicial districts was a proper exercise of
its power. That case had relied on Section 188 of the Kentucky
Constitution as complemented by Sections 128 and 132.
While it is difficult to criticize the creation of additional judge-
ships, it is evident that the reasoning behind the opinion is some-
what strained. The Constitution clearly states the population re-
quirement for authorization of a new judgeship. But Asbury, like
Runyon, indicates that Section 188 is neither the sole nor controlling
requirement that must be satisfied before the Legislature can act.
These cases declare that Sections 128 and 182 are also bases for the
Legislature to create additional posts. The former allows the General
1409 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1966).
2KRS § 24.046 (1966). S. 199 § 4 granted specific authority for the judge-
ship in Boyd County.
3 Propriety for the original proceeding here is based, as the Court states, on
Harrod v. Meigs, 340 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky. 1960), where it states that it is
necessary that such an action be allowed since the very court the petitioner
challenges would hear the case if the Court of Appeals refused to hear the
original proceeding.
4 308 Ky. 73, 212 S.W.2d 521 (1948). Runyon was the first decision to over-
rule Scott v. McCreary, 148 Ky. 791, 147 S.W. 903 (1912). Scott held that the
required population must be met before an additional judgeship can be created.
CouRT oF APPEALs BEviEw
Assembly to have "due regard to the territory, business and popula-
tion" in dividing the state into judicial districts; the latter provision
authorizes the General Assembly to act "when deemed necessary."
Runyon declares:
Immediate difficulty would ensue were we to lift section 138 out of
the Constitution and consider it alone.... All the provisions bearing upon
a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the purposes of all the provisions.... Thus the various
provisions of the Constitution relating to the creation of districts should
be construed together and if possible they should be harmonized. 5
(Emphasis added.)
By following Runyon and construing Section 188 in light of Sections
128 and 132, the Court reached a questionable decision.
Sections 128 and 132 set out the criteria for the Legislature to
consider in creating additional districts. The Court was asked to
construe only the criteria for creating additional judgeships-an entirely
different matter.6 While Section 138 can undoubtedly seek support
from Sections 128 and 132 in determining whether a new district is
to be created, it is doubtful whether these complementary provisions
can lend support to the independent clause in Section 138 dealing
with additional judgeships. Granted, the analysis is grammatical,
but the provisions for judgeships and districts are two independent
clauses separated by a comma. When reference is made to only one
clause, it is difficult to comprehend how this reference can be in-
terpreted to apply to the other independent clause. Perhaps public
necessity and expanded business should be considered in establishing
an additional judgeship for Boyd County. Unfortunately, these
criteria are applicable only to creating additional districts-not judge-
ships.
5Id. at 75, 212 S.W.2d at 522. In declaring this policy of constitutional con-
struction, Runyon admits that the population requirement has not been met to
create a new judicial district, but that "the docket in each of the counties (Pike
and Harlan) is so congested that with the pre-existing setup there is such delay as
to deny persons the constitutional right as provided in Section 14 of the Consti-
tution." Id. at 77, 212 S.W.2d at 523.
6 Close analysis of Sections 128 and 132 discloses that these provisions speak
in terms of judicial districts only. Sec. 128 provides in part: "the General As-
sembly, having due regard to territory, business and population, shall divide the
State into a sufficient number of judicial districts to carry into effect the provisions
of this Constitution concerning Circuit Courts."
See. 132 provides:
The General Assembly, when deemed necessary, may establish additional
districts; but the whole number of districts, exclusive of counties having
a population of one hundred and fifty thousand, shall not exceed at any
time one for every sixty thousand of population of the State according to
the last enumeration.
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An analogy to the reasoning used here reveals the treacherous
ground upon which the Court stepped. The legal profession has
felt for sometime that the Court of Appeals is sorely overworked.7
The absence of specific constitutional provisions, however, has pre-
vented the General Assembly from constitutionally establishing inter-
mediate appellate courts. Would public necessity allow their crea-
tion? Hardlyl The dilemma in Asbury points out the short sighted-
ness of the framers of the Constitution. It is becoming increasingly
apparent that the Constitution should be revised to provide for
exigencies such as that presented in Asbury. Admittedly, the pop-
ulation requirement should not be the sole criterion in light of today's
expanded judicial activity. However, the defect in the Constitution
is still present. It can be removed only by the prescribed methods
of constitutional revision. Judicial interpretation should not be the
means of revising the Constitution; it should be reformed in ac-
cordance with the law.
B. SEPARATION OF ALLE IANCE
The Separation of Allegiance Clause8 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion was the subject of interpretation and refinement last term. In
Lasher v. Commonwealth,9 the appellant was successful in obtaining
a ruling that a rural mail carrier can hold office as a member of a
county school board. Unfortunately for him, however, the Court
held the ruling should have purely prospective application, and he
was ousted. Lasher had been a member of the Livingston County
School Board while employed as a mail carrier. The circuit court
dismissed him from the Board because his position as a mail carrier
was considered "an office of trust or profit under the United States"
within the meaning of Section 287 of the Kentucky Constitution.10
The early case of Waddle v. Hughes" had held that a mailman
7 Address by Honorable Henry Meigs, Judge, Franklin Circuit Court to Uni-
versity of Kentucky Law Alumni, 1966 Kentucky Bar Annual Convention. Re-
printed in 30 Ky. B.J. 16 (1966).
sKy. CONST. § 237 provides in part: "No member of Congress or person
holding or exercising an office of trust or profit under the United States . . . shall
be eligible to hold or exercise any office of trust or profit under this Constitution,
or the laws made in pursuance thereof."
9 418 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1967).1o Ky. CONST. § 237. See note 8 supra.
11260 Ky. 261, 84 S.W.2d 75 (1935). In this case the defendant, a rural
mail carrier, was judged ineligible to hold the office of school board member in
Pulaski County. In following Groves v. Barden, 169 N.C. 8, 84 S.E. 1042 (1915),
the Court of Appeals affirmed declaring that "A mail carrier is a public officer
within the meaning of the statute forbidding the holding of two offices at the
same time." Id. at 263, 84 S.W.2d at 77.
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could not be a member of a school board. In overruling Waddle,
the Court of Appeals declared that it was a matter of common
knowledge that a mail carrier has no decision-making powers con-
cerning postal procedures or policy; he merely performs perfunctory
duties assigned to him by his superiors. The purpose of Section 237
is to prohibit a separation of allegiance between one sovereign and
another. 12 The word "office" in Section 237 connotes a sense of
power and does not apply to a rural mail carrier; otherwise, the
term "regular, salaried position" could just as well have been used.
13
Although no other case in any jurisdiction can be found in point,
the holding that no incompatability exists between the two positions
is not troublesome. Indeed, Waddle's holding that a conflict of interest
exists between the two positions can not be justified. As early as
1909,14 the basic requirement for one to be in a position termed a
"public office" was the possession of some authority to exercise a
portion of the sovereign power.
If there is any difficulty with Lasher, it must concern the ap-
plicability of the holding. As stated in Haney v. City of Lexington,15
three courses are available to the Court in applying a new ruling:
1) merely announce the new rule without applying it and suggest
that it be applied by the Court in the future; 2) give relief to the
instant appellant while denying it to those injured before the date
of the opinion; 8) apply the rule instantly and allow all others who
are not barred by the statute of limitations to take advantage of the
new decision.10 Lasher followed the first course of action, stating
that the appellant should not be rewarded for his acts in defiance of
12418 S.W.2d at 418, where the Court adopted the reasoning of Baker v.
Dixon, 295 Ky. 279, 174 S.W.2d 410 (1943). Here the plaintiff was the Com-
monwealth s attorney until he was drafted into the Army. Respondent, believing
that the induction into the Army rendered the office vacant, filed as a candidate
for the position. Plaintiff sought an injunction against respondent to prevent him
from placing his name on the ballot. The Court of Appeals enjoined the respondent
from seeking the office, declaring that no incompatibility existed between plain-
tiff's two positions.
14 Id. at 417, citing Commonwealth v. Bush, 113 Ky. 384, 115 S.W. 249
(1909). In Bush, the defendant was indicted for usurpation of the office of sheriff
after one term of his office had expired. The Court affirmed a demurrer to the
indictment adopting the definition of office found in Olmstead v. Mayor, 42 N.Y.
Super. Ct. 481: "It implies an authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign
power of the state, either in making, administering or executing the lawg."
It is interesting to note that while numerous courts have used the Bush
definition of "office," the Attorney General Reports have consistently failed to
utilize it See 1929 Op. Att'y Gen. 1666; 1955 Op. Att'y Gen. 38819; 1961 Op.
Att'y Gen. 785.
15 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
1a Id. at 742.
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a law which had previously been in effect.17 The decision signifies
that an appellant's position can be viewed in different ways; the
Court can reward him for his industry in obtaining a new rule of
law, or it can chastise him for originally taking a position in defiance
of the law.
Moreover, the Court interjected the concept of fundamental fair-
ness in not applying the new rule to the appellant. Not only was
the new rule rendered unavailable to the appellant, it will not apply
to any other person presently holding office in defiance of the Waddle
rule. While at first glance this result seems unfair, the Court's
position is consistent with sound reason. The appellant entered office
charged with the knowledge that he was ineligible to be a school
board member. The decision in Waddle was very much in effect,
whether publicly known or not. That the Court of Appeals refused
to allow any other person presently holding office to benefit from
this ruling indicates that the Court presumes everyone to know the
law, statutory or common. Had the appellant requested an Attorney
General's opinion on the matter, he undoubtedly would have been
advised of his ineligibility.
The Legislature confers certain powers and duties to school
districts which are exercised by the school's board of education1 8
Members of the board perform a state function and are considered
state officers.'9 It is proper for the Court to indulge in the presump-
tion that all state officers have knowledge of the law of the Common-
wealth, both statutory and common, bearing on their eligibility to
occupy public office.
C. SUNDAY CLosING LAW
In City of Ashland v. Heck's,20 the Court reached a decision which
may have far-reaching significance for many Kentucky business estab-
lishments. Hecek's, a large discount department store, opened a branch
in Ashland, Kentucky, and began doing business seven days a week.
The mayor of Ashland had previously advised Heck's that if it opened
17 418 S.W.2d at 419. Haney indicates that the first approach constitutes
dictum. But Lasher cites as authority for its position, Great Northern Ry. v. Sun-
burst Oil & Refining Co. 287 U.S. 358 (1932). The Court's attitude toward pro-
spective application of the new ruling presents the familiar problem of whether
or not there was an existing law before the rule was changed by Lasher, i.e., do
courts "find" or "make" law? In any event, the Court reiterates that it is acting
within its inherent power in deciding to give the rule prospective application.
18 See generally KRS ch. 160 (1962).
19 L. GCAmmr & N. EnwAms. Trm LAW Covuirwc SCHOOL Bomn MEMi-
BERS AND SCHOOL BOARD MExrxNcs No. 5, (1963).
20 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966).
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on Sunday, the Sunday closing law2' would be enforced. At the
same time, the mayor stated publicly that the city did not intend to
enforce the law against those establishments which had traditionally
remained open on Sunday.m2
21 KRS § 436.160 (1962).
22 This statement was made public through an announcement in the news-
paper. Ashland Daily Independent, Sept. 4, 1963, at 1, col. 1.
The laws concerning Sunday closing are state statutes. Every city
is obligated to enforce these statutes even if there is no local ordinance on
the subject.
In a recent decision, the Commonwealth vs. Arlans Department Store
of Louisville, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky sustained the consti-
tutionality of the law under which the store was ordered to remain dosed
on Sundays. Although Arlans sold food, their entire operation was classed
as non-essential.
Certain enterprises, such as filling stations, movie picture establish-
ments, bowling alleys, and some others are specifically exempted by the
statutes. Grocery stores and drug stores are not mentioned, but they
always have been considered as work of necessity. This has never been
challenged in the courts.
In West Virginia, a Sunday closing law has been adopted. The
department stores in Huntington that have been keeping open on Sun-
day immediately obeyed the law (grocery stores stay open). In Kentucky,
we have a statute pertaining to Sunday operations which has been de-
clared constitutiona and became the law of the state.
A firm which complies with the law in West Virginia cannot expect
to evade the law in Kentucky. City officials would be derelict to their
duties to permit this to happen.
Sunday in Ashland has always been a day of peace and quiet-I hope
it remains so. Essential work is necessary and essential business is neces-
sary; but operations of a department store like Arlan has been declared
non-essential for Sunday opening by our highest court.
The mayor said he was not issuing the statement 'looking for a con-
troversy" but added "I have had many phone calls, mostly agreeing with
our stand."
0*0
The mayor also sent an open letter to the Businessmen of Ashland on
October 29, 1963, which read in part:
1. The Appellate Court of the State of Kentucky has ruled that the
operation of a department store on the Sabbath is not considered to be
a necessity and as such is unlawful.
2. There has never been a test case argued before the Appellate Court
in the matter of the operation of a drug store, a grocery store, a news
stand, etc., to the best knowledge of this organization.
0 0 0 0
5. There has never been any desire to interfere with the operation
of any business which, historically, has been in operation here on Sundays
and which has not had its "operation of a necessity," or lack thereof,
argued before the Appellate Court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
0 * a
These statements may also be found in the Appellee's brief ot 19-21, City of
Ashland v. Heck's, 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966).
Regarding the Mayor's assertion that grocery stores have always been con-
sidered works of necessity, see McAfee v. Commonwealth, 173 Ky. 83, 190 S.W.
671 (1917) which held that the Sunday operation of a grocery store was not a
work of necessity.
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Hecek's agreed to remain closed on Sunday, provided the law
would be enforced uniformly.23 The discount house closed for six
Sundays, during which time no arrests were made and no citations
were issued to any persons engaged in Sunday business. On the
seventh Sunday, Heck's opened and citations were issued to various
employees of the store and also to several previously unmolested
businesses. At trial, Heck's personnel were each fined fifty dollars
and costs, but the other cases were either dismissed or continued
indefinitely. One was continued even after the defendant, a grocery
store clerk, had entered a guilty plea.
Heck's then filed a complaint in circuit court demanding injunctive
relief against enforcement of the Sunday law by the city officials,
including the police judge, on the ground that the discriminatory
enforcement deprived Heck's of equal protection of the laws. The
court delayed granting the injunction in order to ascertain whether
the law would be enforced against other open violators. After de-
termining that no further enforcement was intended, the injunction
was granted, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court's decision raised an interesting and timely issue: should
the violator of a valid Sunday law24 be given injunctive relief against
prosecution because the judicial body involved knowingly refused to
prosecute other violators of the law? Two distinct sub-issues must
be resolved in seeking a solution: 1) should a judicial body be en-
joined from enforcing a constitutional law which it has been given
discretionary power to administer; and 2) should an injunction be
granted to a violator of a constitutional statute, enjoining his criminal
23 At this time, drug stores, newstands, car washes, and grocery stores were
allowed to open on Sunday with impunity. In fact, the record showed that the
Sunday closing law had not been enforced in Ashland for twenty-five years.
24 KRS § 486.160(1) (1962), provides:
(1) Any person who works on Sunday at his own or at any other
occupation or employs any other person, in labor or other business,
whether for profit or amusement, unless his work or the employment of
others is in the course of ordinary household duties, work of necessity or
charity or work required in the maintenance or operation of a public
service or public utility plant or system, shall be fined not less than two
dollars nor more than fifty dollars. The employment of every person
employed in violation of this subsection shall be deemed a separate
offense.
The statute lists several exemptions, but department stores are not among them.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of this statute in Arlan's Dept Store
of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1963), which involved the
prosecution of a department store for violation of the Sunday closing law. The
Court held that the statute, excepting a "work of necessity" from its effect, was
not so vague as to be unenforceable. It also held that the operation of the
department store was not a "work of necessity.'
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prosecution under that statute on the ground that the law is being
discriminatorily enforced.
The Supreme Court has resolved the first issue. In Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago,25 the Court declared
that "prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment refer to all the instru-
mentalities of the state, to its legislature, executive, and judicial
authorities.. 26 More recently, in Shelley v. Kraemer,27 the Court
stated:
The short of the matter is that from the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent ruling
of this court that the actions of the states to which the Amendment has
reference, includes action of state courts and state judicial officials.
28
The second issue has not been so easily resolved. Courts have
been hesitant to enjoin criminal proceedings, and it is only the ex-
ceptional case where such a remedy is granted. This reluctance stems
from the very core of our legal system. Historically, courts have
refused to allow equity to interfere with judicial process on two
grounds: 1) equity's dominant function is the protection of property
in civil cases;2 9 and 2) practical considerations require such refusal,
25166 U.S. 226 (1896). This case involved a dispute over the amount of
compensation to be given the railroad company for the taking of a portion of its
land for a street. The railroad contended that the payment of one dollar as
compensation deprived it of property without due process of law. The Court, by
way of dictum, stated that "due process of law" applied to the judgment of the
highest state court.
26 Id. at 233-34. This quotation continues:
and, therefore, whoever by virtue of public position under a state govern-
ment deprives another of any right protected by that amendment against
deprivation by the state, "violates the constitutional inhibition; as he
acts in the name and for the state, and is clothed with the state's power,
his act is that of the state." This must be so, or as we have often said,
the constitutional prohibition has no meaning, and "the state has clothed
one of its agents with power to annul or evade it."
27334 U.S. 1 (1947). Here, a covenant restricting the use or occupancy of
certain real property to persons of the Caucasian race was enforced in state
court. The Supreme Court held that judicial action, even for the enforcement of
private agreements, was state action, and within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment.
28 Id. at 18. The Court continued:
Although, in construing the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, dif-
ferences have from time to time been expressed as to whether particular
types of state action may be said to offend the amendment's prohibitory
provisions, it has never been suggested that state court action is im-
munized from the operation of those provisions simply because the act
is that of the judicial branch of the state government.
29Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818), illustrates the
deep-rooted idea that only property will be protected in civil cases. This case
involved a motion to dissolve an injunction enjoining the plaintiff from printing
and publishing letters written by him. In answer to testimony offered that the
basis for an injunction would have to be libel, Lord Chancellor Eldon stated by
way of dictum, "he publication of libel is a crime; and I have no jurisdiction to
(Continued on next page)
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i.e., if law enforcement agencies operated under continual threat of
contempt penalties, their needed freedom to exercise discretionary
powers would be impaired. 0 In spite of these reasons, courts of
equity will permit an injunction to issue if the traditional criteria
of equity are met.3 1 Included in these criteria are the following:
1) there must be a property interest involved; 2) the injury must
be irreparable; 3) the person claiming injunctive relief must come
into court with clean hands.
In regard to the first criterion, the Court of Appeals overruled
Cohen v. Webb,3 2 which held that there must be a property right
involved before a criminal prosecution would be enjoined.33  In
recent years, the law's emphasis has shifted to the protection of
individual freedoms, resulting in a trend toward issuing injunctions
based solely on violation of personal rights.34 Thus, the overruling of
Cohen came as no shock, but there is some doubt as to whether it
was necessary to do so in order to reach a decision.
Certainly a property interest was involved in Hecks. Because
they were required to close on Sunday, the discount house was
placed at an economic disadvantage since other businesses, selling
the same products,33 were allowed to remain open. Persons who
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
prevent the commission of crimes. . .*. The question will be, whether the bill
has stated facts of which the Court can take notice, as a case of civil property
which it is bound to protect." Id. at 413, 36 Eng. Rep. at 674.
30 For further thoughts on the reluctance of courts to enjoin criminal prose-
cutions, see Note, Equity: Enjoining Criminal Prosecutions, 37 CAL. L. REv.
685 (1949); and 31 MrcH. L. REv. 128 (1932).
31 For a detailed discussion of the grounds advanced as a basis for determining
whether an injunction should be granted, see Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 404, 420 (1965).
32 175 Ky. 1, 192 S.W. 828 (1917). The plaintiff, a Jew, sought an in-
junction restraining the police judge of the town from repeatedly trying and
convicting him of violating the Sunday closing law. The plaintiff alleged that, in
accordance with his religion he closed his store on Saturday which he believed to
be the true Sabbath, but opened on Sunday which he believed to be a working
day. The Court refused to grant an injunction because no property right was
involved.
33 Id. at 830.
34 See, e.g., Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241
(1946). There, the city had enacted an ordinance prohibiting distribution of hand-
bills in the interest of keeping the streets clean. Jehovah's Witnesses circulating
handbills advertising a religious meeting were arrested. In granting an injunction
to prevent future arrests under the ordinance the court declared that equity would
protect personal rights on the same terms as property rights-namely ifa sub-
stantial right was being impaired to a material degree and no adequate remedy at
law was available. See also 33 CoRNxm L. Q. 579 (1948); and 21 ST. Jon's L.
REv. 225 (1947).
35 Brief for Appellee at 9, City of Ashland v. Heck's, 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky.
1966). On a Sunday before the opening of Heck's, a witness who later appeared
at the trial purchased the following articles from businesses in Ashland: doll
clothing, hair shampoo, toy rifle, home permanent, toothpaste, model car, Kotex,
clothespins, lawn table, bed tray, toilet tray and toilet tissue. All of these products
were available for sale at Heck's.
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would purchase goods at Heck's during the week, may well have
purchased their goods on Sunday from the competitors who were
allowed to conduct business with impunity. Thus, Heck's was denied
a concrete property right in not being able to compete on the same
basis with other stores.
The second criterion, the need for an irreparable injury, is met
with the same analysis. The loss which Heck's suffered in not being
allowed to open on Sunday could never be recovered. Those busi-
nesses allowed to open on Sunday gained an economic advantage
which Heck's could not overcome so long as the Sunday closing law
was unequally enforced.
The third criterion for an injunction is the so-called "clean hands"
test. The familiar principle is that "he who comes into a court of
equity must come with clean hands." Undeniably, Heck's was guilty
of violating the Sunday closing law. The question then arises: In
violating the law itself, did Heck's waive its right to injunctive relief?
The Court in Hecks concisely disposed of this query:
With respect to the argument that as admitted violators of the law the
plaintiffs [Heck's] do not have clean hands and thus are not entitled to
equitable relief, we think the answer is that if a person singled out for
prosecution under a law that is not being enforced against anyone else
could be denied relief because he stands in violation of that law, in
practical effect the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
could never be invoked against any arbitrary and wilful discrimination in
the enforcement of criminal laws.3 6
The foremost decision concerning discriminatory enforcement of
a valid law was made by the Supreme Court in Yicl Wo v. Hopkins.
37
The Court held that discriminatory enforcement of a constitutional
law was forbidden because it violated equal protection of the laws.
This proceeding was initiated by a person who had "violated" the
law. The Court further emphasized in Yick Wo that the law was
valid on its face, and that it was only the unequal application of it
by public authorities which rendered it discriminatory.38 A more
36 407 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Ky. 1966).
37 118 U.S. 856 (1885). The City of San Francisco had passed an ordinance
setting up certain requirements for laundry buildings on grounds that it was
needed for fire protection. At trial, it was brought out that this ordinance was only
being enforced against Chinese laundrymen, and laundrymen of other nationali-
ties were unmolested although their establishments were not different in any
manner. The Court held that such an ordinance was a violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
38 Concerning the discriminatory enforcement, the Supreme Court held:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal dis-
(Continued on next page)
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recent Supreme Court decision in the Sunday closing law controversy
has also added support to Heck's position. In Two Guys From
Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley,3 9 the Court indicated that if a con-
tinuing threat of discriminatory enforcement were shown, an in-
junction would have been granted.
The Court of Appeals cited Kentucky's version of Yick Wo as
upholding the right of a violator of a constitutional law to contest
its discriminatory enforcement. In City of Covington v. Gausepohl,40
the Court held that an injunction could issue to prohibit the city
from enforcing a city ordinance against only one violator when
several others were allowed immunity when performing the same
acts.
However, before concluding that it is ridiculously easy for a
violator of a Sunday closing law to obtain an injunction enjoining
prosecution, one must consider the proof needed to show discrimi-
natory enforcement. In People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co.,41 the New
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
criminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution. Id. at 373-74.
39 366 U.S. 582 (1961). The appellant, a corporation operating a large dis-
count department store (similar to Hecks) in Pennsylvania, brought suit for an
injunction in the United States District Court to restrain the district attorney from
enforcing a Sunday closing law, alleging that it violated the constitutional
guarantees of equal protection of the laws and religious freedom and because the
district attorney was discriminating against the appellant in enforcing the law.
The Court held that the question was moot since at the time of their review,
the county had a new district attorney and there was no indication that he intended
to discriminate against the appellant. Regarding this fact, the Court stated: "Since
appellant's employees may defend against any such proceeding that is actually
prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination, we do not believe the
court below was incorrect in refusing to exercise its injunction powers at that
time." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 588-89. This would seem to indicate that if a
continuing threat of discriminatory enforcement were shown, an injunction would
have been granted.
40250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040 (1933). The city of Covington had passed
an ordinance prohibiting the use of sidewalks for displaying merchandise. The city
enforced the ordinance against the plaintiff and other storekeepers, but allowed
farmers to continue using the sidewalks for display and sale of merchandise.
The Court of Appeals, citing Yick Wo, upheld the injunction noting that
the evil sought to be abated was obstruction of the sidewalks. Regarding this, the
Court stated: "The city would be commended for its efforts to keep its sidewalks
clear of obstructions if it acted impartially but it cannot be allowed to discriminate."
Id. at 1040.
41 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962). This case presented the
question of the proper way to deal with a claim by a criminal defendant that the
law had been enforced against him in a discriminatory manner, in violation of the
equal protection clause. The defendant, operator of a drugstore, was convicted
for a violation of the Sunday dosing law by sale of certain proscribed items. The
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed and held that the defendant's claim
of discriminatory enforcement should not have been treated as a defense for
determination by the jury, but should have been treated as an application to the
trial court for a dismissal or quashing of the prosecution, with the court to
(Continued on next page)
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York court succinctly stated the proof required before an injunction will
issue: "A heavy burden rests on the defendant to establish conscious,
intentional discrimination... "42 (Emphasis added.) In this very short
statement the court raises an obstacle which is insurmountable in most
cases. It is insufficient merely to prove other offenders have not been
prosecuted,43 a laxity of enforcement,44 or a conscious exercise of
selective enforcement. 45 It is essential that sufficient evidence be pre-
sented to establish the existence of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion based deliberately upon an unjustifiable classification. 46 In the
instant case, the appellees were able to sustain this heavy burden of
proof.
4 7
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
decide any fact question involved by taking evidence in the jury's absence. The
court expressed no opinion as to whether the prosecution in the case should be
held to be discriminatory, but stated by way of dictum, that a heavy burden was
on the defendant to establish conscious, intentional discrimination.
42 Id. at 135.
43Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963). Evidence that only two
persons in a particular area of the state had been prosecuted for violation of the
Sunday closing law in one year was insufficient to show purposeful discrimination
by the state prosecutors. Thus, appellant had not shown he was deprived of equal
protection of the law.
44 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1962). The court, by way of dictum, stated that mere laxity of enforcement by
itself would not be sufficient to prove intentional discrimination, but it should be
admitted as relevant evidence bearing on that contention.
Id. at 136. Selective enforcement may be justified when a striking example
is sought in order to deter other violators, as part of a bona fide rational pattern
of general enforcement, in the expectation that general compliance will follow,
and that further prosecutions will be unnecessary. "It is only when the selective
enforcement is designed to discriminate against the persons prosecuted, without
any intention to follow it up by general enforcement against others, that a con-
stitutional violation can be found." Id.
46 The Supreme Court has recognized that selective enforcement, in itself is
not sufficient evidence of intentional and knowing discrimination. In Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Court held:
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions,
requiring different remedies. . . . Or the reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind .... The protection of the Equal Protection
Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. Id. at 489.
47 The following points were offered by the appellees as evidence:
1. For twenty-five years prior to their prosecutions, groceries, drug stores,
car washes and auto dealers were allowed to operate on Sunday with impunity.
2. The mayor of Ashland stated publicly, at least tvice, that establishments
traditionally open on Sunday would not be molested, but that Heck's would be
cited if it should open in Ashland on Sunday. (See note 3, supra.)
3. Citations were issued to Heck's employees when it opened on Sunday
and citations were also issued to several other business establishments. However,
in police court, only Heck's employees were fined; all of the other businessmen's
prosecutions were either dismissed or filed away. One suit was filed away even
after the subject pleaded gilty.
4. Subsequenty the law was not enforced against any other business estab-
lishment in AslantddBrief for Appellee at 1-10, City of Ashland v. Hecles, 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966).
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Some courts have been reluctant to enjoin criminal prosecutions in
spite of discriminatory enforcement, for it is feared that a guilty person
will thereby escape prosecution and the law would fall into disrepute.
This seems to be an unfounded apprehension, for Heck's, even though
it has gained an injunction, will not be immune from a new prosecution
if and when public authorities decide to enforce the Sunday closing
law against all violators. Only when selective enforcement is designed
to discriminate against the persons prosecuted, without any intention
of ever enforcing it against all similar violators, will a constitutional
violation be found.
An opportunity for a decision such as Heck's will not often appear
since public officials will seldom be so blatantly discriminatory. It is to
the Court's credit that when such a situation did arise, it recognized
its duty and affirmed the injunction.
VII. CONTRACTS
To protect qualified and experienced teachers from socially or
politically inspired dismissals and promote educational interests in
general, most states have enacted tenure laws.1 The Kentucky Teachers'
Retirement and Tenure Act2 attaches specific rights to the positions of
teacher and principal, including the right to continued employment 3
without reduction in salary4 and freedom from dismissal except for
specified reasons.; However, these protections are not absolute;
authority for personnel changes calculated to serve the best interests
of the school system is vested in the board of education. It has the
power to transfer an employee from one school or position to another,
unless his contract specifies otherwise.0
There is a clear distinction between statutes regulating the dismissal
of teachers for personal reasons7 and those regulating dismissals or
transfers because of economic necessity or lack of pupils.8 Several
states, including Kentucky, have allowed school boards to remove or
transfer teachers with tenure when their services are no longer re-
quired,9 e.g., in the consolidation of school districts or the abolition of
an entire department in a school.
In Huff v. Harlan County Board of Education,0 the appellant was
employed as an elementary school principal under a continuing service
ISee generally Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1298 (1940) and 47 Am. Jun. Schools §
129 (1943).
2 KRS ch. 161 (1962).
3 "The term 'continuing service contract' shall mean a contract for the
employment of a teacher which shall remain in full force and effect until the
teacher resigns or retires or until it is terminated or suspended as provided in
KRS 161.790 and 161.800." KRS § 161.720(4) (1962).
4 KRS § 161.760 (1962) prohibits a reduction in the amount of compensation
received during the preceding year unless such reduction is part of a uniform
plan affecting the entire school district. Conversely, some jurisdictions give per-
manency to the job but allow the school board to change the salary. See Annot.,
127 A.L.R. 1298 (1940); 113 A.L.R. 1495 (1938).
G KRS § 161.790 (1962) lists as grounds for dismissal: insubordination, im-
moral conduct, inefficiency, incompetency, mental or physical disability, or
neglect of duty. The statute also sets forth specific procedures for termination of
a contract of employment.
6 The superintendent has the authority to make recommendations for all
appointments, promotions, and transfers. KRS § 160.380 (1962). Although the
tenure law does not guarantee a teacher the right to continue his post in a
particular school, his salary may not be reduced upon transfer to another post.
Board of Educ. of Bath County v. Hogge, 239 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1951).
7KRS § 161.790 (1962). See note 6 supra.
8KRS § 161.800 (1962) provides in part: "Whea by reason of decreased
enrollment of pupils, or by reason of suspension of schools or territorial changes
affecting the district, a board of education decides that it will be necessary to re-
duce the number of teachers, it shall have full authority to make reasonable
reductions."
9 See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1159 (1965).
10 408 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1966).
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contract which he had held for many years. A comprehensive merger
of appellants school and three others eliminated his position.1 The
appellant was then offered the position of principal at a high school
in the same system at no reduction in salary. He rejected this offer,
giving the initial reason that he "thought" himself unqualified.'2 He
later refuted this, stating that he was legally qualified and held a
masters degree. Appellant was subsequently offered, and he accepted
at a reduced salary, a teaching position. The question before the Court
was whether the appellant's compensation could lawfully be reduced.
The Court of Appeals strictly construed KRS 161.760, stating that
a school principal with a continuing service contract could be trans-
ferred from one school or position to another, but his salary could not
be reduced unless the reduction were part of a uniform plan affecting
the entire district.13 Since there was no uniform plan, the Court held
that the school board could not reduce the appellant's salary. This
interpretation was consistent with that rendered in several earlier
Kentucky cases.14
The particular facts of this case fit squarely under KRS 161.800
which provides in part:
When by reason of decreased enrollment of pupils, or by reason of
suspension of schools or territorial changes affecting the district a board
of education decides that it will be necessary to reduce the number of
teachers, it shall have full authority to make reasonable reduction. But
in making such reduction, the board shall proceed to suspend contracts
in accordance with the recommendation of the superintendent of schools
11 The reason for the merger was a decline in the coal industry, which caused
many families to leave the area. Consequently, there was a loss of revenue
available for the school and a corresponding reduction in the number of pupils.
Brief for Appellees at 1-2, Huff v. Harlan County Bd. of Educ., 408 S.W.2d 457
(Ky. 1966).
12Another reason suggested at trial was that appellant did not accept the
first position because his wife did not want to move. Id. at 2.
'8 In Board of Educ. of Nelson County v. Lawrence, 375 S.W.2d 880 (Ky.
1963), a teacher who had received additional pay for various responsibilities as
principal was entitled to continue to receive that compensation when assigned to
an ordinary teaching position.
The plain fact is that the tenure law states a clear policy that a teacher
with a continuing service status, once promoted in salary, cannot be
demoted in salary without such cause as would justify termination of her
contract, and elimination of duties or responsibilities cannot be used as
a device for demotion in salary. Id. at 813.
The appellees sought to distinguish this case, saying the action of the board had
clearly been arbitrary in Lawrence since there, the teacher had not been offered
a position at a commensurate salary. Brief for Appellees, supra note 12, at 4.
14 Court had previously held that an employee's salary could not be
reduced when he was transferred from one principal position to another, Board of
Educ. of Bath County v. Hogge, 289 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1951), or from principal
to teacher, Williamson v. Cassidy, 311 Ky. 666, 224 S.W.2d 934 (1949). How-
ever, it must be noted that in neither of these cases was there an offer of a com-
mensurate salary as there was in Huff.
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who shall, within each teaching field affected, give preference to teachers
on continuing contracts and to teachers who have greater seniority.
This procedure was followed in Huff. Due to a sharp decrease in en-
rollment, a merger of several schools was necessary. When the con-
solidation was effected, appellants particular position was abolished,
and, in accordance with the above provision, a man with greater
seniority than appellant was made principal of the new school.' 5 How-
ever, the superintendent, subject to the board's approval, had the
authority to determine all appointments, promotions, and transfers.16
Pursuant to this authority rather than any statutory obligation, it was
decided that appellant was qualified and would be offered the position
of high school principal. Appellant refused this offer on the ground
that he was not qualified. As was noted in the dissenting opinion, "it
is not [the] law in this Commonwealth that a teacher may determine
his educational qualification or his qualifications from experience."
7
However, the Court's refusal to permit a reduction in salary, even
though appellant had rejected a position for which he was fully
qualified, was tantamount to holding that a teacher may refuse to
accept a proper transfer to a position for which he is qualified without
legal justification and at the same time demand an inferior job at a
commensurate salary.'8
Although tenure laws are enacted to provide security for teachers
by regulating the conduct of school boards, allowing salary reductions
commensurate with alleviation of various duties and responsibilities
does not impair this security. The Legislature must have been cogni-
zant of the problems created by the former provision relating to non-
reduction of salaries, for it adopted an amendment in 1964 which
covers cases such as Huff. This amendment provides that there shall be
no reduction in salary "unless there is a reduction or elimination of
extra service, administrative and/or supervisory duties and responsi-
bilities of the teacher or other certified personnel. . . .".,9 If Huff had
been decided under this amendment, it would seem reasonable to as-
sume that appellant's salary could have been reduced since his justified
change in position lessened his administrative duties and responsi-
bilities.
Clearly the Legislature intended for individual teachers to be pro-
15 Brief for Appellees, supra note 12, at 2.
16 KS § 160.880 (1962).
17 408 S.W.2d at 459.
Is As stated in the dissent, "when appellant refused to accept a position ...
at the salary provided in his continuing service contract, he had no right to
protest assignment to a position paying less than his contract provided." 408
S.W.2d at 459. See generally Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1090 (1948).
10 KRS § 161.760 (1966).
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tected from the political whims of school boards. It seems equally clear
that the Legislature intended to give school boards the necessary
authority to manage their affairs intelligently and efficiently. Perhaps
the statute as amended will attain this balance.
VIII. CRIMINAL LAW
A. CR.mA IBEL
Libel is an injury to the reputation which may be redressed by an
action in tort. However, if the libel has an injurious effect on the public
it may also constitute a criminal offense either at common law or under
statute. Libel is thought to have an injurious effect on the public if it
tends to disgrace or degrade and is done with malice. The English
common law crime of libel was invoked whenever a court found, in
the defendant's publication, an incitement to breach the peace. Ameri-
can courts have been reluctant to consider this as adequate grounds
for a criminal prosecution of libel, and in Cantwell v. Connecticut,1
the Supreme Court held that criminal libel prosecutions based upon
incitement to breach the peace abridged first amendment rights be-
cause "incitement to breach the peace" furnished too vague a standard.
Ashton v. Commonwealth2 presented the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals with its first prosecution for criminal libel since the Supreme
Court decided Cantwell. The defendant, while involved in a serious
labor dispute, caused a publication to be printed and circulated which
contained defamatory attacks upon certain local leaders. He was in-
dicted for "the offense of criminal libel, by publishing a false and
malicious publication which [tended] to degrade or injure [the com-
plainants] against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky."3
At trial, the defendant admitted that certain of the statements were
false and defamatory per se. The trial judge charged the jury that
criminal libel is "any writing calculated to create disturbances of the
peace, corrupt the public morals, or lead to any act which, when done,
is indictable."4 He further charged that both malice and falsity were
essential to conviction. The jury, presumably guided by these in-
structions, convicted the defendant.
On appeal, the defendant argued that to define the crime in terms
of its tendency to incite a "disturbance of the peace" or to lead to an
"indictable act" is too vague to serve as a constitutional basis for the
imposition of criminal sanctions. However, the majority of the Court
believed that since there was no issue as to the defamatory nature of
the published material, the possible overreach of the breach of peace
concept was immaterial. The Kentucky Court rejected the "breach of
peace" criterion, recognizing that the Supreme Court had done like-
1310 U.S. 296 (1939); see also Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
2 405 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1965).
3 Id. at 564.
4 Id. at 565.
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wise. Thus, the Court of Appeals redefined the common law crime of
libel as "the publication of a defamatory statement about another
which is false, with malice,"5 but upheld the verdict as reasonably
based on those grounds.
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and
promptly reversed. The Supreme Court pointed out that the defendant
was indicted, tried, and convicted under a charge which included the
offensive element of incitement toward a breach of the peace. The
Supreme Court cited Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham6 which held that
where an accused is tried and convicted under an unconstitutional
construction of a statute, the conviction cannot be sustained on appeal
by construing the statute so as to eliminate the unconstitutional
features.
A hasty reading of Ashton might lead one to think that the Supreme
Court has denied Kentucky the right to any prosecution for criminal
libel. However, Ashton was reversed because of the inconsistency of
the trial and appellate definitions. A general distaste for the nature of
the indictment was evident in the Supreme Court's opinion. It ex-
pressed agreement with the Kentucky dissent that "the elements of the
crime are so indefinite and uncertain that it should not be enforced as
a penal offense in Kentucky."7 The Supreme Court in Ashton warned
that vague laws in any field suffer a constitutional infirmity and that
when first amendment rights are involved statutes must be carefully
and narrowly drawn. Some other states have prosecuted persons for
criminal libel without using incitement to breach of peace as an
element,8 but most states have utilized many of the same elements
rejected in Ashton.9 Whatever the difficulties raised to the drafting of
a constitutional statute and regardless of the actions taken in other
states, the crime of criminal libel is, for the time being, a dead letter
in Kentucky law.
5 Id. at 568.
6882 U.S. 87 (1965). This case was very similar on its facts to Ashton
although it involved a breach of a local ordinance rather than a common law
crime.
7 405 S.W.2d at 571.8 Some statutes do not define criminal libel at all; e.g., FLA. STAT. § 836.01
(1965) provides: Any person convicted of the publication of a libel shall be
punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by fine .... Obviously where
the statu te i elements of the crime
and the common-law basis of incitement to breach of the peace is often included.9 See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 112 Conn. 5, 151 A. 349 (1930), where it
states: the gist of the crime is not the injury to the reputation of the ersonlibelled,, but that the publication affects injuriously the peace and good ord  of
society." See atso Brooke v. State, 154 a. 53, 45 So. 622 (1907); People v.
Spielman, 318 IIl. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925); Commonwealth v. Sleakys, 254
Mass. 424, 150 N.E. 190 (1928).
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B. SEDuCToN
The Latin word from which "seduction" arises means "to lead
aside." Seduction has been described as the act of persuading or in-
ducing a woman of previous chaste character to depart from the path
of virtue by the use of any species of arts, persuasions, or wiles which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of the person
accused.10 In an 1894 case, Commonwealth v. Wright," the Kentucky
Court wrote:
The statute was enacted for the protection of the pure, innocent and in-
experienced woman, who may be led astray from the paths of rectitude
and virtue by the acts and wiles of the seducer under promise of mar-
riage by compelling him to marry her or suffer the penalty of the law.
Its primary object is to compel the seducer to marry his victim. ... J2
Whether the Kentucky seduction statute13 protects divorcees was a
novel issue before the Court in Amburgey v. Commonwealth.'4 The
defendant argued that the protection of the statute did not extend to
divorcees. Having no Kentucky precedent directly in point, the Court
cited foreign cases to support its ruling that divorcees are within the
class of women protected by the seduction statute. The defendant's
argument was based on a statement by the Virginia Court of Appeals
in Jennings v. Commonwealth.'5 That case held that a woman who has
been married can no longer be considered chaste and has become so
knowledgeable that she is immune to seduction. This theory was
strongly criticized in State v. Eddy, 16 a South Dakota case, and People
v. Weinstock,'7 a New York case. The Oregon Court in State v. Wal-
lacei s expressed the opinion "the spirit of the law does not and cannot
take into consideration the wisdom and experience of those whom it
undertakes to protect from wrong."' 9 In interpreting the New York
1047 AM. Jum. Seduction § 2 (1943).
"116 Ky. L. Reptr. 251, 27 S.W. 815 (1894).
12 Id. at 252, 27 S.W. at 816.
13 KRS § 436.010(1) (1962) provides: "Any person who, under promise of
marriage seduces and has carnal knowledge of any female under twenty-one years
of age, shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than
five years."
14 415 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1967).
15 109 Va. 821, 63 S.E. 1080 (1909).
16 "We think no court should say as a matter of law that a woman who has
been married is incapable of being the victim of seduction." State v. Eddy, 40
S.D. 390, 391 167 NW. 392, 393 (1918).
7 "Confidence and affection seem to play a great part in all cases of seduction.
May not inducements lead even a previously marriedwoman, not single, to con-
sent?" People v. Weinstock, 140 N.Y.S. 453, 459 (1912).
1879 Ore. 129, 154 P. 430 (1916).
19 Id. at 129, 154 P. at 430.
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seduction statute (which is similar to Kentucky's), the New York
Court noted that the statute "does not use the term 'maid' nor 'widow'
... but the more comprehensive word 'female,' which is generic in its
meaning, including therein all unmarried women, whether spinsters,
widows or divorcees."2 0
The policy and wisdom of any seduction statute is certainly open
to question.21 However, given the existence of KRS 436.010, the
Court of Appeals has logically applied the law to the facts. Early cases
indicated that the Legislature, by passing the seduction statute, in-
tended to protect a group consisting of women under twenty-one and
presumed to suffer from sexual disability common to the young. The
Court, in Hoskins v. Commonwealth,22 considered the question of the
complainant's previous chastity and held that while it must appear that
the seduced female was of chaste character at the time of the seduction,
the fact that she was unchaste would not remove her from the class to
be protected. Amburgey simply extends this protection to cover minor
women who have once been married and are therefore presumed to
have established a full sexual maturity. In Amburgey, the Court has
underlined a presumption of the present chastity of women under age
twenty-one. The inclusion of the divorcee in this category is reasonable.
In effect, the statute protects the young woman from exploitation of
her sexual weakness gained by an appeal to her mental and emotional
immaturity. The practical consequences of early marriage and divorce
may well be the heightening of sexual weakness because of the young
divorcee's appreciation of sexual relationships. However, her youth
is still a disability and her immaturity makes her a prime candidate
for this legislative protection.
20People v. Weinstock, 140 N.Y.S. 453, 459 (1912).
21 See, e.g., NoTE, 22 VA. L. REV. 205 (1935); NoTm, 13 N.Y.U.L. REv. 104
(1935).
22 188 Ky. 80, 221 S.W. 230 (1920).
IX. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. APPEULATE PRocEuBE
The Court of Appeals has declared that the same name given to a
pleading shall not be decisive of the rights of the parties before the
court and that the spirit of the Rules of Civil Procedure demands that
trivial defects be ignored.' Thus, says the Court, a pleading labeled
wrongly will be heard as if properly presented. However, as indicated
by several cases which came before the Court last term, this informal
attitude does not prevail in appellate procedure. In each of these the
appeal was rejected solely because the Court found a failure to comply
with technical details of appellate procedure.
2
Particularly striking is Sherley v. Commonwealth.3 Mrs. Sherley was
convicted in 1966 of violating local option laws. Her attorney filed a
notice of appeal, stating that appeal was taken from an order of June
3, 1966, denying her motion for a new trial. In fact, however, the state-
ment of appeal clearly showed that this was an appeal not from the
order but from the judgment of June 3, 1966. Unfortunately for Mrs.
Sherley, the Rules of Criminal Procedure4 state that the notice of ap-
peal shall designate the judgment or order appealed from. The appeal
was in fact "from the judgment," but it read "from the order," and this
defect was fatal to Mrs. Sherley's appeal.
The Court has made frequent statements regarding strict com-
pliance with the rules and practitioners are well warned. 5 Undoubtedly,
the pressure of an ever-mounting caseload has contributed to the
Court's willingness to dismiss cases quickly on technicalities and with-
out any inquiry into the merits. However, any policy which denies
appellate review simply because an attorney used an improper word
is questionable.
One case must be reviewed to reveal the reasoning behind the
Court's ruling. In 1957, Kentucky held6 that an order overruling a
motion for a new trial is not a final order and therefore can not be ap-
pealed. In that case, the Court declared that each rule prescribes a
condition from which a party litigant may invoke appellate procedure.
It states that the rules are not for the benefit of the parties but rather
' Powell v. Hazen, 322 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1959).
2 See, e.g., Marcum v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1967);
Sherley v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1967); McGregor v. Common-
wealth, 407 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1966).
3 413 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1967).
4 RCr 12.52 (3).
5 See Rose Bowl Lanes, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 373 S.W.2d 157 (Ky.
1963).
o UMW Dist. 23 v. Morris, 307 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1957).
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to control the operation of judicial machinery. The Court cannot allow
one litigant to disregard the rules while requiring others to rigidly ad-
here to them. Without rules there could be no order in the Court's
judicial business. However, the early cases which establish this policy
of judicial convenience are civil cases. Sherley is a criminal case, and
the defendant faces prison. While the Court might be justified in
regarding appellate rules as intended for the benefit of the Court in a
civil proceeding, this is hard to rationalize in a criminal case. In short,
where life or liberty are imperiled, technical considerations should
not be invoked to deny a party his day in court.
In Oatts v. Hopkinsville,7 the defendant had been convicted in
police court for driving while intoxicated and fined one hundred
dollars. He paid the fine and appealed to the circuit court. The appeal
was dismissed on the ground that by paying his fine the appellant had
waived his right to review. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning
that the defendant paid the fine to preserve his freedom and did not
intend to relinquish his right to appeal.
The majority of jurisdictions consider the case moot when the
judgment is satisfied.8 Some courts hold that after payment of the fine
there is no controversy, 9 and others deny appeal because the defendant
would be unable to recover the fine paid.10 Many jurisdictions adopt
the majority rule by statute. Until 1962, Kentucky had such a statute,"
but it was repealed and the Legislature did not enact anything com-
parable in its place.
The decision in this case is sound. It is absurd to hold that an
individual, by paying his fine, voluntarily waives his right to review.
As the Court stated, in most cases the person is merely trying to stay
out of jail.12 A person's legal rights should not be jeopardized merely
because he wants to protect his freedom and reputation.
Regardless of whether the defendant can recover his fine, the case
is not moot. The results of the police court penalty may persist despite
the payment of the fine. The defendant's insurance rates may be raised,
his reputation impaired, and his employment lost. These factors seem
sufficient to perpetuate the controversy.
7406 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1966).
8See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1668 (1961); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 867 (1922);
74 A.L.R. 688 (1931).
9 See, e.g., State v. Pefley, 80 Idaho 525, 335 P.2d 340 (1959); People v.
Pyrios, 323 Mich. 329, 35 N.W.2d 281 (1948).
10 See, e.g., State v. Cohen, 45 Nev. 266, 201 P. 1027 (1921).
11Ky. Crim. Code § 369 (Carroll, 1948).
12 Justice Holmes stated that "the payment of the fine in accordance with the
sentence was not a consent to the sentence, but a payment under duress." Com-
monwealth v. Fleckner, 167 Mass. 13, 44 N.E. 1058 (1896).
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B. EViDENcE
1. Credibility of Defendant's Testimony-In recent years it has be-
come the practice of attorneys, when defending persons with a prior
felony conviction, to minimize the impact of this conviction upon the
jury. This is accomplished by conditioning the jury to the fact from the
very beginning of the trial. During the voir dire examination, the
jurors are asked such questions as "Would the fact that the defendant
has been convicted of a felony influence you in deciding this case?"
Moreover, in order to avoid an inference that the felony is being
hidden, the accused admits the prior offense on direct examination.
In Shockley v. Commonwealth5 and Peyton v. Commonwealth1
4
the Court of Appeals, by four to three decisions, held that where the
accused volunteers the fact that he has been convicted of an offense
during the direct examination, it is not error for the trial judge to re-
fuse to admonish the jury that the prior conviction should be con-
sidered only as it affects the accused's credibility. In Shockley, the
defendant testified that he had been in the penitentiary, and, on cross:
examination, the Commonwealth elicited the nature of the offense.
The accused in Peyton took the stand in his own defense and testified
that he had been convicted of a felony. In both cases the trial court
was requested to admonish the jury and refused. The Court of Appeals
held that "under the circumstances . . . the appellant 'opened the
door' on direct examination [and] .. . that the failure to give the
usual admonition, even though it was requested, was not error."' 5
The dissenters16 inquired:
Why should the law be different when the defendant has made the
disclosure voluntarily upon direct examination? . . .Are we in a game,
in which by the introduction of competent evidence a party deprives him-
self of the right to have the jury properly instructed that its purpose is
limited to impeachment of his credibility? .. . [We are] rather surprised
that the majority of the court should be befuddled by such a red herring
as, "Well, you brought it up first." What does that have to do with
whether an admonition should be given? After all, the purpose of an
admonition is to help the jury decide the case according to law. It is
not a trading stamp.17
To support its holding, the majority examined the intent of CR
43.0718 and its predecessor, section 597 of the Civil Code. It concluded
13 415 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1967).
14 417 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1967).
15 415 S.W.2d at 872.
16 Williams, C.J. and Palmore and Hill, J.J.
17 415 S.W.2d at 872.
This rule provides that "a witness may be impeached by any party
[by the fact] that he has been convicted of a felony.' The Court of Appeals has
interpreted the civil rule governing impeachment of witnesses to be applicable to
criminal cases. See Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695, 697 (ky. 1966).
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that the rule did not contemplate that the accused could show, for his
own purposes, that he had been convicted of a felony and then require
the court to admonish the jury that the conviction only affected his
credibility. 9 The cases cited in support of the Court's conclusion 0 are
not in point; they only re-affirm the proposition that an admonition
should be given if the fact of a prior conviction is brought out on
cross-examination. The only case that could even remotely support the
decision is easily distinguished. The case, Turpin v. Commonwealth,2'
involved a situation where the defendant attempted to use the con-
finement resulting from his prior conviction as an affirmative defense.
22
The Turpin Court correctly held that where the accused offers, as
an element of his defense, the information that he was in the
penitentiary, the jury should not be admonished.
Moreover, the majority reasoned that since there apparently have
been no cases dealing with the urged interpretation of the rule, such
an interpretation does not exist. Perhaps this lack of precedent may
be explained by observing that, up to now, no court has been "be-
fuddled by such a red herring" as that urged by the Commonwealth in
these cases. Usually, when one tries to determine the intent of a rule or
statute, the policy and purpose of the rule or statute is investigated.
Why should the jury be admonished that a prior conviction may only
be considered as to the credibility of the defendant's testimony? As the
dissenters pointed out, "A man ought not to be convicted by his pre-
vious record."23
Shockley and Peyton allow the jury to "consider the prior con-
viction for any and all purposes, including the probability of guilt and
the length of the sentence to be imposed."24 That this is not idle con-
cern is well illustrated by the following passage from the closing
argument of the Commonwealth's Attorney in Shockley: "'Now if you
want to break this up... find him guilty and give him ten years in the
pen.... He's been there once and didnft learn a lesson for the same
19 415 S.W.2d at 872.2 0 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 804 Ky. 225, 200 S.W.2d 459
(1947); Shell v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 223, 53 S.W.2d 524 (1932); Atkins v.
Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 126, 5 S.W.2d 889 (1928).
2125 Ky. L. Rptr. 90, 74 S.W. 734 (1903).
22The defendant was accused of stealing a horse in October, 1902 but he
testified that since September 22, he had been in jail. The prosecution then pro-
duced evidence to show that the actual date of the theft was September 17. It is
apparent that the defendant used his stay in the penitentiary in aid of his defense.
This was not the situation in Shockley. There is no suggestion that the previous
conviction was introduced by Shockley for any purpose other than to mitigate its
impact on his credibility.
23 415 S.W.2d at 878.
24 Id.
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crime, and now he tells us today that he didn't do it.' (Emphasis
added.)"25 To allow this type of argument is not proper and is "bad"
law. It is urged that the Court of Appeals re-evaluate its decisions in
the Shockley and Peyton cases.
2. Local Option Violations: Offer of Proof-Effective use of the ad-
versary system to develop the facts of a dispute looks toward stringent
rules of evidence and procedure. In a criminal case these rules
have traditionally been slanted toward protection of the defendant.
One widely recognized exception to the stringent evidentiary standards
placed on both parties in a criminal prosecution is the doctrine of
judicial notice. The principal effect of the doctrine is to excuse the
party from having to establish formal proof of a particular well-known
fact. The doctrine is utilized when the fact in question is so well known
by reasonably intelligent people of the community as to make presen-
tation of proof unnecessary.26 It is universally true that courts will
take judicial notice of the law of the forum.
Allen v. Commonwealth27 and Morris v. Commonwealth28 affirmed
the fact that Kentucky courts will judicially notice the general statutes
of the Commonwealth. However, Kentucky has had a longstanding
problem regarding judicial notice of local option laws. In Patterson
v. Commonwealth29 the Court reaffirmed the well-established rule in
Kentucky that failure to prove a territory is dry in an action for illegal
sale of alcoholic beverages is fatal to conviction."0 In many jurisdictions,
courts will take judicial notice of the fact that a particular area is wet or
dry,31 but there is a conflict of authority on the subject.8 2 In those
jurisdictions which, like Kentucky, require that proof be given of the
result of a local option election33 several reasons are given why
25 Id.
26 C. McComuncx, EvrENcE § 324 (1954).
27 272 Ky. 533, 114 S.W.2d 757 (1938).
28231 Ky. 838, 22 S.W.2d 295 (1929).
29 411 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1967).
30 Click v. Commonwealth, 247 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1952); Ramsey v. Com-
monwealth, 314 Ky. 702, 236 S.W.2d 930 (1951); Musgrove v. Commonwealth,
301 Ky. 475, 211 S.W.2d 687 (1946); Sipple v. Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 725,
190 S.W.2d 354 (1945); Hensley v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 316, 188 S.W. 408
(1916).
31 Downey v. City of Bay Minette, 39 Ala. App. 619, 106 So. 2d 32 (1958);
Williams v. State, 323 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1959); Peebles v. State, 96 Ga. App.
836, 101 S.E.2d 726 (1958); State v. Schmitz, 19 Idaho 566, 114 P. 1 (1911);
Savage v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 582, 5 S.E. 563 (1888).
32 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 551 (1961).
33 People v. Mueller, 168 Cal. 521, 143 P. 748 (1859); State v. Kusick, 148
Minn. 1, 180 N.W. 1021 (1921); State v. Wright, 202 Mo. 241, 216 S.W. 545
(1919); Geisse v. State, 85 Ohio St. 457, 98 N.E. 1125 (1911); Rylee v. State,
135 Tex. Cr. 87, 117 S.W.2d 85 (1938).
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judicial notice will not be taken. One explanation is that the condition
of being a wet or dry territory is subject to change by another elec-
tion.3
4
In State v. O'Brien,3 5 the Montana Court stated that it will not take
judicial notice of extrinsic facts, the establishment of which must
depend on evidence given. In Craddick v. State,3 6 the Texas Court
asserted that "the Court does not judicially know when these laws are
put into operation. These are matters of fact to be proved."37 How-
ever, other courts would be quick to point out, as did the court in
State v. Schmitz38 that the judge of the court "could find out this fact
just as he is required to find out numerous other facts."39
The frequency with which a conviction is voided for failure of the
prosecuting attorney to properly stipulate the prevailing local option
law does not credit the profession's attention to detail. But there is
little reason for the Kentucky Courts to refuse to take judicial notice of
local option laws. In effect, the Court is saying that a moment of
carelessness on the part of a prosecutor allows a violation of the laws
to go unpunished. This result is untenable when one recognizes the
practical simplicity of ascertaining the status of local option laws with-
in a court's own jurisdiction.
C. INSTRUCTIONS
The purpose of instructing the jury is to guide their deliberations
by explaining the law of the case, explaining the essential elements to
be proved, and relating the evidence to the particular issues involved.40
It is universally accepted that instructions must be warranted by the
evidence.4
1
It is equally well established, with a few statutory exceptions,4
that where intentional homicide is involved, if there is any evidence
3 4 People v. Mueller, 168 Cal. 521, 143 P. 748 (1859).
35 85 Mont. 482, 90 P. 514 (1907).
3648 Tex. Cr. 385, 88 S.W. 347, 848 (1905).
37id.
8819 Idaho 566, 114 P. 1 (1911).
39 Id. at -, 114 P. at S.40 Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 95, 221 S.W. 215 (1920). See
generally 53 Am. Jur. Trial §§ 509-11 (1940).41 Higgs v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 547, 554, 75 S.W.2d 21, 25 (1934).
See also Davis v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 597, 237 S.W. 24 (1922); Jolly v.
Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 190, 61 S.W. 49 (1901); State v. Foust, 254 N.C. 101,
118 S.E.2d 769 (1961). See generally 26 Am. Jur. Homicide § 517 (1940).
42 For example, some state statutes which define all homicides committed by
certain means, e.g., by poison, lying in wait, or under felony-murder, as murder
in the first degree and specify that the court is not to instruct the jury on any
grade of homicide less than murder in the first degree. See, e.g., Smith v. State,
222 Ark. 650, 262 S.W.2d 272 (1953); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 587,
43 S.E.2d 906 (1947). See generally 26 Am. Jur. Homicide § 564 (1940).
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tending to show that the crime was of less magnitude than murder,
it is the court's duty to give instructions on the lesser offenses.43 Con-
versely, if there is no evidence to support an instruction on a lesser
degree of homicide, such instruction should not be given.4 4 In Ken-
tucky the rule is well settled and has been clearly expressed that where
the intention to kill is present, involuntary manslaughter cannot be
found.41
In Vinson v. Commonwealth,46 the issue was whether it was pre-
judicial error for the trial court to give an instruction on involuntary
manslaughter in a case where the only possible theories were those
based on intentional homicide. The appellant, while fighting with the
deceased, shot and killed his fellow combatant. The trial court in-
structed the jury on the offenses of murder, voluntary manslaughter,
involuntary manslaughter in both degrees, and on self-defense. The
appellant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the first de-
gree, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that...
in situations of mutual combat where one of the participants shoots,
knifes, bludgeons or mauls his adversary to death, his acts being in-
tentional and his victim known, an involuntary manslaughter in-
struction should not be given.... [0] nly when one acts wantonly and
recklessly and death follows, not intentionally but incidentally, from the
acts do we have the crime of involuntary manslaughter.
47
Vinson discusses the recent cases involving involuntary man-
slaughter instructions in mutual combat cases, and attempts to clarify
the precise nature of involuntary manslaughter in Kentucky.48 Ulti-
43 Combs v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Ky. 1964). See also
Duff v. Commonwealth, 297 Ky. 502, 180 S.W.2d 412 (1944). See generally 26
Am. Jur. Homicide § 517 (1940).44 Davis v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 597, 237 S.W. 24 (1922).
4
; Maulding v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 370, 378, 189 S.W. 251, 254 (1916).
The Court went on to say that
[Wlhere the killing is done in such a manner and under such circum-
stances as to exclude the idea that it was not intended to kill, the crime
falls under the definition of murder or of voluntary manslaughter, as the
case may be, and no instruction on the subject of involuntary man-
slaughter should be given.
The Court indicated that an instruction on involuntary manslaughter would be
proper in a case where death resulted from "sudden simple fistfight." Id.
Maulding was used as authority in White v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.2d
198 (Ky. 1962), where the Court, in overruling a line of cases sustaining voluntary
manslaughter convictions in simple fistfight cases, held that an intent to kill
cannot be inferred from a sudden simple fistfight. Id. at 203.
46 412 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1967).
47 Id. at 568.48 Involuntary manslaughter was not a statutory offense in Kentucky until
1962, prior to which time the offense was a common law misdemeanor defined in
Hunt v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 527, 530, 159 S.W.2d 23, 25 (1942) as:
[T]he killing of another person in doing some unlawful act not amounting
(Continued on next page)
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mately, the Court sets down a rule as to when involuntary man-
slaughter instructions should be given in mutual combat cases.
Several recent cases provide the foundation for the Court's decision.
In Shanks v. Commonwealth49 the appellant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter in the slaying of his fellow combatant, and on appeal he
contended that an involuntary manslaughter instruction should have
been given. The Court rejected this contention, holding that where,
in a mutual combat case, "a deadly weapon is used and the defendant
admits he was trying to defend himself with such weapon there is no
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
to a felony and not likely to endanger life, and without an intention to
kill, or where one kills another while doing a lawful act in an unlawful or
negligent manner where the negligence is not such as to indicate a dis-
regard for human life.
See also R. Mos LAND, Tm LAw oF HoncmE chs. 10, 11, 17 and 18 (1952);
Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law with Recommendations, 51 Ky. L.J. 59, 112
(1962). The offense as a common law misdemeanor was punishable under KRS §
431.075 (1950) which provided that all common law crimes, not provided for by
statute, were punishable by imprisonment for up to twelve months in the county
jail or a five thousand dollar fine, or both. Because of this rather lenient punish-
ment for involuntary manslaughter, the Court was hesitant to overturn in-
voluntary manslaughter convictions in intentional homicide cases. See, e.g., Spriggs
v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 724, 63 S.W. 1087 (1902), where the Court
recognized there had been opinions by the Court in which the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter was overlooked. Id. at 724, 68 S.W. at
1089. This hesitancy disappeared however with the passage of KBS § 435.022
(1962) which provides that:
(1) Any person who causes the death of a human being by an act
creating such extreme risk of death or great bodily injury as to manifest
a wanton indifference to the value of human life according to the stand-
ard of conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances shall be
guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree and shall be con-
fined in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than fifteen years.
(2) Any person who causes the death of a human being by reckless
conduct according to the standard of conduct of a reasonably [sic] man
under the circumstances shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter in
the second degree and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for a term
not exceeding twelve months or fined a sum not exceeding five thousand
dollars or both.
A wanton act as used in KRS § 435.022(1) has been defined as "[a] wrongful
act done on purpose in complete disregard of the rights of others. The actor must
have conscious knowledge of the probable consequences and complete disregard
for them." Further, a reckless act as used in KRS § 435.022(2) "is that conduct
which displays an indifference to the rights of others and an indifference as to
whether wrong or injury will result from the act done." Lambert v. Common-
wealth, 377 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Ky. 1964). The Court distinguished the two degrees
by stating that "recklessness involves thoughtlessness while wanton conduct in-
volves actual knowledge of the probable result and complete disregard for those
results." Id. With the more severe punishment for conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter in the firrt-degree, the Court ceased to permit the offense to be used as
"an appendage to the offenses of murder and voluntary manslaughter" and in-
stead 'began to treat it as an "important offense in its own right.' 412 S.W.2d
565 at 567.
49 390 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1965).
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room for argument that he did not intend the result of [his] actions.
.*"0O In Martin v. Commonwealth,51 involving the same type of fact
situation as Shanks, the converse issue was presented, i.e., whether it
was error to give an instruction on involuntary manslaughter where
the evidence justified a conviction only on theories of intentional
homicide and appellant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
The Court, relying on Shanks, held that the giving of such instruction
was error and reversed appellants conviction.52 Before Vinson, the
most recent case applying the Shanks and Martin rule was Cowan v.
Commonwealth 3 where the appellant was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter for shooting his fellow combatant during a fistfight.
Here, as in Shanks and Martin, the appellant made no claim of ac-
cidental or unintentional killing, relying on self-defense. The Court
held that Shanks and Martin controlled, and therefore, where no at-
tempt was made to suggest that appellant did not intend to kill his
fellow combatant, "there was neither occasion nor justification for an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter." 4 Thus, where the appellant
uses a deadly weapon to defend himself and the death of his fellow
combatant follows, and where there is no attempt to suggest that the
act was either accidental or unintentional, the Court clearly holds that
no involuntary manslaughter instruction should be given.
The one inconsistent decision in this line of cases was Lambert v.
Commonwealth"5 There, the appellant, incarcerated in the same cell
block with his fellow combatant, "stomped" the deceased to death.
The circuit court instructed the jury on murder and voluntary man-
slaughter, but refused to instruct on involuntary manslaughter. The
Court reversed, holding that under the circumstances of the case
appellant was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction. The
facts were that Lambert did not use a deadly weapon, was under the
influence of alcohol, was suffering from shock as a result of loss of
blood from previous attacks by the deceased, and was aggravated by
assaults by the deceased on three prior occasions. 56 In Vinson, the
GO Id. at 890.
51406 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1966).
52 Id. at 845.
53407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1967). The material facts and issue are un-
distinguishable from Martin v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1966), or
Shanks v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1965).
54 Id. at 698. However Cowan was reversed on other grounds, the Court
stating that "even though the giving of the involuntary manslaughter instruction
was error, counsel's blanket objections to the instructions and failure to move for
a new trial operated as a waiver." Id. at 698.
55877 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
56 Id. at 78. This case was severely criticized as being identical on the facts
with Maulding v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. 870, 189 S.W. 251 (1916), and the
(Continued on next page)
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Court overruled Lambert to the extent that it was inconsistent with
the Court's present holding, stating that: "where the intent to kill is
the gravamen of the offense and where the person who is ultimately
killed is the one toward whom the intent is directed, an involuntary
manslaughter instruction should not be given."67
Logic militates in favor of the Court's decision in Vinson. Where
an act is admittedly intentional, there could be no justification for an
instruction enabling the jury to find the defendant guilty of an
unintentional act, i.e., involuntary manslaughter. In mutual combat
cases where the defendant is asserting self-defense, there can be no
finding that his acts are unintentional. For a trial court to instruct on
involuntary manslaughter under these circumstances is to permit the
jury to compromise on a lesser, more palatable offense when the only
two answers which could be justified by the facts are that the act was
done intentionally and without justification or that it was intentional
but done in self-defense.
D. PROBATON AND PARoLE
Probation is the process whereby one convicted of an offense,
usually a misdemeanor, is released on a suspended sentence under
supervision and upon specified conditions instead of being im-
prisoned. 58 In Lovelace v. Commonwealth,59 the Court while upholding
the constitutionality of Kentucky's probation statute, distinguished
probation from parole by stating that: "Probation relates to the action
taken before the prison door is closed-before final conviction, while
parole relates to the action taken after the door has been closed." 0
Parole is an adjunct of the pardoning power, and according to Section
77 of the Kentucky Constitution, only the Governor may pardon.
61
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
only case recorded "which has allowed drunkenness to reduce a crime from
murder to involuntary manslaughter." Comment, 53 Ky. L.J. 201, 203 (1964).
57 412 S.W.2d at 568. The Court further underscores its holding by stating
that:
In these cases of mutual combat where one of the participants shoots,
knifes, bludgeons, or mauls his adversary to death, his acts being in-
tentional and his victim known, an involuntary manslaughter instruction
should not be given. Id.
5 8 WEBs s NEw INTERNATIONAL DICrIoNARIY 1806 (1961).
59 285 Ky. 326, 147 S.W.2d 1029 (1941).
60 Id. at 1033. See also United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928);
Diana, What is Probation, 51 J. Cinm. L. C. & P. S. 189 (1960); Herlands,
When and How Should a Sentencing Judge Use Probation, 35 F.R.D. 487 (1964).
61 Huggins v. Caldwell, 223 Ky. 468, 3 S.W.2d 1101 (1928). In Huggins,
the Court struck down a 1926 statute which attempted to give circuit courts the
power to parole prisoners. The Court held that this statute was a violation of the
(continued on next page)
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Section 77 further provides that the Governor shall have the power
to remit fines, except that part of a fine which is payable as a fee to
enumerated state officers. 62 Remission, defined as the "annulling of a
fine or penalty," 3 is an adjunct of the pardoning power, and where it
is not expressly vested in the governor, some states have held that it
is inherent in the power to pardon. 4
In Kentucky, probation can be effected either by withholding
entry of judgment 5 or by withholding a directive in the entered judg-
ment to take the defendant to the penitentiary. 6 During the past
term, the Court of Appeals was faced with the novel question of
whether or not a circuit court has the power to "probate a fine." In
Commonwealth v. Ballinger,67 the appellee was found guilty of assault
and battery, and the jury returned a verdict against him providing for
a fine of twelve hundred dollars. The appellee moved for suspension
and probation of the fine. The circuit court, in granting the motion,
first entered judgment against appellee, then probated and suspended
the fine in full. 68 On appeal the Court reversed, holding that the
circuit court lacked authority to remit a fine under the guise of pro-
bation. 9 But the Court further held that a circuit court has the power
to place a convicted party on probation even though his sentence
would be the imposition of a fine.
70
Ballinger presents a novel situation in that its facts are unique. In
most jurisdictions the power to remit fines is vested in the chief
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
separation of powers provisions of the Kentucky Constitution (Sections 27, 28,
and 29) and also violated Section 77 because the Governor is given the exclusive
power to parole, pardon, or remit fines under that section. Id. at 1108.
62 Ky. CoNsT. § 77 provides, in part:
[The Governor] shall have the power to remit fines and forfeitures,
commute sentences, grant reprieves and pardons . ..but he shall have
no power to remit the fees of the Clerk, Sheriff or Commonwealth's
Attorney in penal or criminal cases.
See Commonwealth v. French, 130 Ky. 744, 114 S.W. 255 (1908).
63 76 C.J.S. Remission (1961).
64In re Court of Pardons, 97 N.J. Eq. 555, 129 A. 624 (1925). One court has
held that a pardon is a "remission of guilt." Warren v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. App.
71, 72, 74 S.W.2d 1006, 1008 (1935).
OrKRS § 439.260(1) (1962). See note 76 infra.
0OsKRS § 439.260(2) (1962).
60 412 S.W.2d 576 (Ky. 1967).
68 The pertinent part of the judgment provides as follows:
It is adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted and
is hereby fined the sum of twelve hundred dollars ($1200.00); and it
further appearing that the defendant having heretofore made motion for
probation and suspension of the fine, it is hereby adjudged that said
fine be and the same is hereby probated and suspended in full. 412
S.W.2d at 577.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 578.
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executive;71 in a substantial minority the power is vested, with re-
strictions, in trial courts;72 in a few jurisdictions administrative boards
exercise the power.73
In Ballinger, the circuit court made the error of first entering
judgment on the verdict and then probating and suspending the judg-
ment. In Lovelace v. Commonwealth,74 it was noted that a trial court
lost all power over a defendant once it entered judgment against him.
Thus, in Ballinger, the circuit court infringed upon executive authority
because "probating" the fine was, in effect, a remission of the fine.75
The Court also pointed out that even if the power to probate fines was
vested in the circuit court, there was a substantial noncompliance with
the applicable probation statutes. Specifically, the Court noted that
the circuit court had failed to postpone entry of judgment and imposi-
tion of sentence as required by statute,76 and further, it failed to place
the defendant under the supervision of the Division of Probation and
Parole. 77
Although the probation was improper in this case, the Court con-
sidered generally "It]he power of a circuit court to invoke proba-
tionary procedure where the sentence to be imposed is a fne... "7s
Noting that KRS 439.260 does not define probation, and rejecting the
argument that it means exclusively a substituted sentence "in lieu of
imprisonment,"9 the Court held that sentence as used in the statute
may include either a fine or imprisonment, or both.80 It stipulated that
"since the governing statutes do not limit probation to those cases
where the punishment is imprisonment... the procedure may be in-
voked where the punishment is the imposition of a fine."8 '
This rationale is based primarily on the fact that under KRS
481.140, KRS 441.180, and KRS 441.190, a convicted defendant, unable
to pay his fine, may be subjected to imprisonment. From this fact there
71 See United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928). See generally 86A
CJ.S. Fines § 18 (1961).
72 See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 68 N.Y.S. 738, 82 Misc. 319 (Gen. Sess. N.Y.
County 1900). See generally 86A CJ.S. Fines § 818 (1961).
73 See, e.g., Granat v. Dulbs, 108 Fla. 116, 145 So. 879 (1988). See gen-
erally 86A C.J.S. Fines § 18 (1961).
74285 Ky. 826, 147 S.W.2d 1029 (1941).
75 412 S.W.2d at 577.7 6 KRS § 489.260(1) (1962), which provides that the circuit court may
"postpone the entry of judgment and imposing of sentence and place the de-
fendant on probation. This order shall only be made on motion of such defendant"
77 412 S.W.2d at 577.
78 Id.
79 Id. The Court cited Lovelace v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 826, 147 S.W.2d
1029 (1941), where probation was defined as relating to "action taken before the
prison door is closed. Id. at 1088. (Emphasis added.)
80 412 S.W.2d at 578.
sl Id.
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may arise an "anomalous situation" where an indigent might merit
probation if he received a jail sentence, but if his sentence was a fine
he could not pay, he would go to jail.82 The Court noted that "[i]n-
ferior courts are authorized to place a defendant on probation, and
since the normal sentence in many inferior courts is a fine, this statute
apparently contemplates the possibility of probation where such a
sentence could be imposed."
83
The Court's decision in Ballinger is enlightened, just, and consistent
with the nationwide concern for the rights of indigents in judicial pro-
ceedings.84 As the Court noted, it is repulsive to one's sense of justice
that a situation might exdst where an indigent could not escape im-
prisonment via probation if his punishment were a fine.85 The Court's
decision is consistent with sound reason, and it speaks well of the
Court that it interpreted a vague statute to provide protection for the
indigent criminal defendant.
In Murphy v. Cranfill,8 the Court was called upon to decide the
validity of KRS 489.175. This statute allowed the county judge to
grant convicted misdemeanants parole "under the same terms and
conditions as a parole may be granted for conviction in felony cases." 7
Pursuant to this statute, the Jefferson County judge entered an order
discharging the petitioner "by parole." When the sheriff refused to
honor the order, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus. The
circuit court held the law invalid under Section 27 of the Kentucky
Constitution 8 as "an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power."89
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Allen, Griffin v. Illinois-Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm
L. 1kv, 151 (1957); Tucker, The Supreme Court and the Indigent Defendant,
37 CAL. L. REv. 151 (1964).8
r The problem of imprisonment of indigents for nonpayment of fines is one
of growing concern; see, e.g., Note, 64 MicH. L. REv. 938 (1966) discussing
equal protection questions raised by such imprisonment; Note, 4 HoUSTON L. REv.
695 (1967) discussing such imprisonment under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. See also Davidson, Promiscuous Fines, 8 Cn. L. Q. 74 (1965).
86 416 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. 1967).
87 IJS § 439.175 (1962) states:
(1) Parole shall be granted to persons convicted of a misdemeanor and
sentenced to jail under the same terms and conditions as parole may be
granted for conviction in felony cases.
(2) The power to grant parole shall be vested in the county judge of
the county wherein the misdemeanant may be confined.88 Ky. CONST. § 27 states:
The power of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall
be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them shall be
confined to a separate body of Magistracy, to wit: Those which are
legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those
89 416 S.W.2d at 364.
which are judicial, to another.
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In affirming the invalidity of the law, the Court of Appeals rejected
the reasoning of the lower court. Instead, the Court based its decision
on the statute's "lack of intelligibility."90 This vagueness was caused
by "the difficulty in determining the scope of the power vested in the
county judge...."91 Without citing a specifie constitutional provision,
the Court held that "if the language of the law is so ambiguous as to
defy rational meaning, it is simply in-operative as a law."92
The problem was that after making a constitutionally permissible
delegation of power to the county judge,93 the Legislature failed "to
prescribe the manner of its exercise."94 The county judge was to grant
a parole "under the same terms and conditions as parole may be
granted for conviction in felony cases."9  However, because the county
judge was not equipped to function as a parole board,96 the statute
required "implementation." Therefore, the Court concluded the pur-
pose of the law "cannot be effected under the language used." 7 The
net result of the case is that a misdemeanant serving in a Kentucky
jail cannot be paroled.
The Legislature apparently attempted to legislate by analogizing
the function of the county judge in paroling misdemeanants to the
function of the parole board. However, they failed to provide
machinery to enable the judge to exercise such power.98 To grant a
parole to the misdemeanant "under the same terms and conditions" as
a felon, the proper mechanism must be made available to determine
the "terms" under which a parole will be granted and the "conditions"
which may be placed on the parolee and, if broken, cause revocation
of the parole. Otherwise, it appears that the analogy, and therefore
the statute, must fail for ambiguity.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 365.
921d. at 864. This general proposition normally applies to penal statutes be-
cause they must be sufficiently clear to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to
understand them. See, e.g., Katzman v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 124, 180 S.V.
990 (1910). This proposition has also been applied to strike down a statute where
there was an ambiguous delegation of power to an administrative body. Kerth
v. Hopkins County Bd. of Educ., 846 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1961).
93 Id. at 365, the Court stated by way of dictum that "the legislature could
properly delegate to him, the county judge, as it delegates to the Parole Board
under KRS 489.880, the power of granting parole." To support this the Court
cited Tincher v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 661, 271 S.W. 1066 (1925). That
case held that the county judge "is really the chairman of the executive and legis-
lative body of the county." As a result he may under statutory authorization,
direct payments made by his county to the state auiditor.
94 Id. at 365. For this proposition of law the court cited Kerth v. Hopkins
County Bd. of Educ., 846 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1961).
95KRS § 435.175(1) (1962).
96 See KS § 439.320-.520 (1962), which delegates power to the parole board.
97 416 S.W.2d at 366.
98See KRS § 489.320-.520 (1962).
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The Court admitted that the spirit of the statute was "laudable."99
But the issue was not whether misdemeanants should be paroled, but
whether the statute adequately provided for such parole. Although the
Court must, when possible, resolve ambiguities in statutes,1'0 the
Legislature must at least make the statute "intelligible."' 0 ' Thus, the
Court was correct to void the law at issue here.102
In constructing a new misdemeanant parole law, the Legislature
should follow the guideline established by the Court. The county
judge may be delegated the "power of granting parole," but not the
power to pardon. 03 A delegation of power to the county judge to
parole (as contradistinguished from pardon) misdemeanants and a
mechanism whereby the county judge does not have "absolute discre-
tion" would satisfy the Court.
99 416 S.W.2d at 65.
100 See Folks v. Barren Co., 232 S.W.2d 1010 (Ky. 1950) where the Court
stated:
regard for legislative power, with the consequent reluctance of the judici-
ary to interfere requires that the Court draw all inferences and implica-
tions from the act as a whole and thereby, if possible, sustain the validity
of the act and expound it. It is competent for the Court to resolve to
clearness and to deduce therefrom its constitutionality and freedom
from the objection of indefiniteness urged against it .... It is especially
right and proper for the Court to do this where the statute is but a gen-
eral delegation of power, and prescribes only in general terms a rule of
action for the offices charged with its execution. Id. at 1013.
101 Id., where the Court stated:
where the law making body, in framing the law, has not expressed its
intent intelligibly, or in language that the people upon whom it is
designed to operate or whom it affects can understand, or from which
the courts can deduce the legislative will, the statute will be declared
inoperative and void.102 See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 68 (1953), where it is stated that "a duty im-
posed by statute must be proscribed in terms definite enough to serve as a guide
to those who have such a duty imposed on them." Research revealed no exception
to this general rule.
103 416 S.W.2d at 366. For a distinction between parole and pardon, see
text at notes 58-64 supra.
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X. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In recent years criminal law and procedure have become thorough-
ly entwined with constitutional interpretation. This was not true forty
years ago when the Supreme Court was dominated by jurists whose
view of the Constitution and society militated against federal inter-
vention into areas traditionally reserved to the states. The Court was
reluctant to interpret the Constitution in such a way as to allow that
document to meet the problems of a nation undergoing the stress of
transition to an industrial power. In the decades since 1925, however,
the Supreme Court has approached the Constitution quite differently.
In place of a constrictive interpretation of the fourteenth amendment,
the modem Court has greatly expanded the substantive content of
such vague terms as "due process" and "equal protection" 1 Today the
Supreme Court regards itself as obligated to guard the personal
liberties of the citizen from state and local infringement. It has ex-
tended the scope of the fourteenth amendment to include rights of free
speech and association, freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and right to counsel and fair trial. Thus, it is no longer
realistic to regard criminal procedure and constitutional law as two
separate areas.
A. DouBLE JEoA PDY
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy has not
yet 2 been extended to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
In 1958, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said, "The prohibition against
double jeopardy in Amendment V to the Constitution of the United
States is not a limitation upon state governments in reference to their
own citizens, but is exclusively a restriction of federal power."3 How-
ever, most state constitutions contain a double jeopardy provision, most
of which are interpreted the same as the federal provision. Section 18
of the Kentucky Constitution specifies that "No person shall, for the
same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb... ." Clearly
the prohibition is designed to protect an individual from being sub-
jected to the harassment, expense, and anxiety resulting from repeated
attempts by the state to get a conviction.
1 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Harper v. Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwrigbt, 32 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Brown
v. Board of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).2 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937); Balles v. Harvey, 248 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
3 Blanton v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1958).
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This constitutional protection has rarely been invoked successfully
in Kentucky. In Huff v. Commonwealth,4 however, the Court reasoned
by analogy to double jeopardy and ruled that a motorist who drove
his car from one county to another at a high rate of speed was guilty
of only one act of reckless driving and could not be prosecuted
separately in each county. This was a case of first impression.
Relying on Commonwealth v. Devine,5 the Court said that the
double jeopardy provision of the Kentucky Constitution is inapplicable
in a case not involving loss of life or liberty. Appellants pleading of
double jeopardy was, however, sufficient to raise the constitutional
argument that a second prosecution for the same offense would
amount to unconstitutional harassment and arbitrary treatment.6
This holding was consistent with the rule in other states7 that
where a state law is violated while passing through more than one
county or division of the state, a conviction in one county bars pro-
secutions in other counties. The reasoning underlying the rule is that
there is but one offense committed, a violation of state law.8 Crossing
county boundaries does not create any new offense since counties are
mere subdivisions of the state, units of venue in which prosecution for
the offense against the state may be brought.9
B. PAEJutmxcr Fusucrrr
During the past term, the Court of Appeals considered a motion
under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 11.42, urging excessive
pre-trial publicity as a basis for reversal. In the case, Baldwin v. Com-
monwealth,'0 the defendant attacked his conviction because "the
publicity given his apprehension via the news media, . . . [made it]
impossible for him to receive a fair trial." No facts were set forth by
the petitioner to show the publicity involved. However, the Court held
that the allegation did not lend itself to specificity of pleading and
that this was enough to entitle him to a hearing, citing Estes v. Texas'
2
4406 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1966).
8,396 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1965).0 Ky. CONST. § 2 provides: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives,
liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the
largest majority.' Ky. CONST. § 17 requires that excessive bail or fines not be
required, nor cruel punishment inflicted.
7State v. Licari, 132 Conn. 220, 43 A.2d 450 (1945); Holder v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 155 Mo. App. 664, 135 S.W. 507 (1911); State v. Shimman, 122 Ohio
St. 522, 172 N.E. 367 (1930); Rupert v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 226, 131 P. 713
(1913). But see Hall v. State, 73 Ga. App. 616, 37 S.E.2d 545 (1946).
8 See cases cited supra note 7.
9 State v. Shimman, 122 Ohio St. 533, 172 N.E. 367 (1930).
10406 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1966).
1 Id. at 862.
12 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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and Sheppard v. Maxwell.13 In both Sheppard and Estes it was held
that when there was excessive publicity no actual prejudice need be
shown in order to find a denial of due process. 14 Cases following
Sheppard have stressed that there must be massive publicity15 before
a conviction will be overturned. The general idea is that each case
must be decided on its facts. There is no set standard for determining
excessive publicity.
The Court apparently realized that Baldwin would have difficulty
showing enough publicity to overturn his conviction. Ordinarily, to get
a hearing on an 11.42 motion the petitioner must state facts supporting
allegations made in the motion. 6 This was not done in Baldwin. Yet,
the Court demonstrated a degree of leniency in recognizing that
petitioner bad been in prison and could not obtain facts to support
his allegations. In fact, the Court seemed to base its decision partly
on petitioner's inability to gather the facts.17
On an 11.42 motion, the petitioner should be required to state
some facts to show the type of publicity involved. Otherwise, any
prisoner could assert that he was prejudiced by publicity and thereby
obtain a hearing. With such ease of pleading, this decision could very
well cause a sudden increase in the volume of motions to vacate judg-
ment based on excessive publicity. As it is, the Court of Appeals is
already flooded with 11.42 motions. It would appear that since facts
are required in motions for reversal on other grounds, undue pre-
judice would not result if motions alleging excessive publicity were
also required to state some facts.
C. RIGHTS OF JUVEN1s
In Smith v. Commonwealth,8 the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision which may prove to be a landmark in Kentucky juvenile pro-
cedure. The Court exhibited highly commendable judicial foresight.
However, any enthusiasm is tempered somewhat by the Court's con-
spicuous failure to give any. reasons for its decision. Smith involved a
seventeen year old juvenile who had been charged with armed rob-
bery in 1958 and brought before the juvenile court accompanied only
by his parents. The juvenile court judge waived jurisdiction and
ordered the case to the grand jury. Counsel was not appointed for the
1' 384 U.S. 833 (1966).
14The rule was first enunciated in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
15 United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966); State v. Eldridge,
197 Kan. 694, 421 P.2d 170 (1966).
16jennings v. Commonwealth, 380 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 1964); Oakes v.
Gentry, 380 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1964).
17 406 S.W.2d at 861.
18 412 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. 1966).
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youth until after an indictment had been returned. The boy pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. No appeal was taken
at that time, but in 1966, Smith filed a motion under Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure 11.42 to vacate the judgment on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel.19
Three significant questions were considered in Smith: 1) right to
counsel in a juvenile proceeding, 2) the retroactivity of Kent v. United
States,20 a recent Supreme Court decision, and 3) the allowance of
an RCr 11.42 motion where no appeal was taken from the original de-
cree. In a lengthy discussion of the right to counsel in juvenile pro-
ceedings, the Court relied heavily on Kent. In Kent, a juvenile court
judge, by authority of a District of Columbia Statute,2 ' bad waived
exclusive jurisdiction without a hearing, stating tersely that the
waiver order was based on "full investigation."22 The juvenile had
counsel, but the judge failed to rule on motions that a hearing be held
and that the lawyer be given access to the juvenile's social and pro-
bation records. Kent was subsequently tried in criminal court and
sentenced to a lengthy prison term.
The Supreme Court recognized that juvenile courts have a "sub-
stantial degree of discretion as to factual considerations,"2 3 but stated:
The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in isolation
and without the participation of and representation of the child the
19 Ky. R. Crum. P. 11.42(1) [hereinafter cited as RCR] provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence who claims a right to be released
on the ground that the sentence is subject to collateral attack may at any
time proceed directly by motion in the court which imposed sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct it.
This rule was enacted as a procedural change in habeas corpus remedy cases. To
prevent repeated motions to vacate, RCR 11.42(3) requires the petitioner to state
all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which he has knowledge. See
1965-66 Court of Appeals Review, 55 Ky. L. J. 273, 376 (1966).
20383 U.S. 541 (1966).
21 The relevant part of the statute referred to is: D.C. CODE § 11-1553 (1964),
which provides:
When a child 16 years of age or over is charged with an offense which
if committed by a person 18 years of age or over is punishable by death
or life imprisonment, a judge may, after full investigation, waive juris-
diction and order the child held for trial under the regular procedure of
the court which would have jurisdiction of the offense if committed by
a person 18 years of age or over; or the other court may exercise the
powers conferred upon the Juvenile Court by this chapter and sub-
chapter I of chapter 23 of Title 76 in conducting and disposing of such
cases.
22Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546 (1966). "Full investigation" as
used here means there must be "an inquiry not only into the facts of the alleged
offense but also into the question whether the parens patriae plan of procedure is
desirable and proper in the particular case." Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556,
559 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
23Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546 (1966).
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"critically important" question whether a child will be deprived of the
special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.24
Because the Supreme Court deemed the waiver of jurisdiction a
"critically important" action,2 5 the conviction was reversed. However,
the Court ostensibly limited the application of its decision to the
District of Columbia.26 There was no specific ruling that the right to
counsel in juvenile proceedings was a Constitutional requirement ap-
plicable to states via the fourteenth amendment.27 Indeed, such a
broad holding would have been improper since no state proceedings
were involved. Despite the apparently limited application of Kent,
Justice Fortas raised the implication that right to counsel in juvenile
court was essential to a fair hearing:
The right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a
grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of
justice. Appointment of counsel without affording an opportunity for
hearing on a "critically important" decision is tantamount to denial of
counsel. 28
The Supreme Court further required that the juvenile court con-
duct a hearing before issuing an order of waiver, that the juvenile's
counsel be granted access to the youth's social and probation records,
and that a statement of reasons for waiver be given29 However, it
must be emphasized that all of these requirements were gleaned from
the Court's interpretation of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court
Act.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals considered Kent to be dis-
positive of Smith. Moreover, it made no effort to explain how Kent
24 Id.
2 5 Id: at 556.
26 The Court limited its decision as follows:
This concern, however, does not induce us in this case to accept the
invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable
to adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried
must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with allegations
of law violation. The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit provide an
adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no further. Id.
27 See Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Juveniles being tried in the District of Columbia have the right to either retained
or appointed counsel, which right can be waived. The Shioutakon decision was
not restricted to waiver proceedings, but was extended to all juvenile court pro-
ceedings.
28383 U.S. at 561. See also Comment, 52 IowA L. REv. 139 (1967);
Paquette v. Langlois, 219 A.2d 569 (R.I. 1966); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73,
147 S.E.2d 739 (1966); Dillenberg v. Maxwell, 418 P.2d 940 (Wash. 1966).
29 The Court intimated that in order for an appellate court to review, it
must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating a waiver. Along with
this a waiver hearing must be held due to the "critically important" action that
the waiver involves. Id. at 561.
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applied. Citing Kent, the Court merely stated: "In light of the fore-
going language we think there is no room for debate on the question
whether the present appellant was entitled to counsel in the juvenile
court proceedings." 30 This vague statement offers no clue as to
exactly how Kent required the Court of Appeals to reach the decision
it did. Since the Supreme Court expressly limited the scope of its
decision, Kent could have been no more than persuasive authority to
support a state court decision. However, in the absence of a definitive
statement by the Court of Appeals, the assumption must be made
that Smith somehow absorbed the entire holding of Kent, and future
Kentucky juvenile court waiver proceedings must conform to the
standards announced therein.
Whatever the views of the Court of Appeals concerning Kent, the
Supreme Court subsequently ruled, in In re Gault,31 that the fourteenth
amendment guarantees juveniles the right to counsel, either appointed
or retained, in state juvenile adjudication proceedings. Factually,
Kent and Gault differ slightly in that the youth, in Gault, was before
the juvenile court for the purpose of determining whether he was a
delinquent. Gault held that a juvenile needs the assistance of counsel
to cope with the problems of fact and law and to insist upon regu-
larity in the proceedings. 32 Further, the Court said:
The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him." Just as in Kent v. United States . . . we
indicated our agreement with the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit Court that the assistance of counsel
is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we hold now that
it is equally essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with
it the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institution until the
juvenile reaches the age of 21.3
Thus, there is truly "no room for debate" as to whether a juvenile
defendant has the right to counsel in juvenile adjudication proceedings.
The problem arises in determining whether the right to counsel
extends to waiver proceedings. By direct reference to Kent in Gault,
did the Supreme Court intend to make Kent applicable to the states?
Certainly the above reference34 makes such an assumption arguable.
However, the Court was careful to limit its decision.
We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate
to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a
30 Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1966).
31387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32 Id. at 36.
33 Id.34 See note 33 supra.
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juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged misconduct on his part,
with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution.3 5
In light of the foregoing language, it would appear somewhat tenuous
to argue that the constitutional rulings in Gault apply to waiver pro-
ceedings.
The full impact of Gault will not be known for some time, but the
ruling set forth will clearly engender considerable change in the
juvenile court systems. Henceforth, the fourteenth amendment guar-
antees to juveniles the right to counsel, either appointed or retained,
in delinquency adjudication proceedings.36 Furthermore, both the
child and his parents must be informed of this right since only the
child and parents together may waive the right.37 In addition, a notice
of charges stating with particularity the alleged misconduct must be
furnished to the child's attorney sufficiently in advance of the court
proceedings to permit preparation.38 The constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination was held to be applicable in the case of
juveniles. 39 Finally, "absent a valid confession, a determination of
delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution can-
35In re Gault, 887 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). As a part of the same statement, the
Court said:
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional
provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the
state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile
"delinquents." For example, we are not here concerned with the pro-
cedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the
juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative
or dispositional process.
36387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37 Id. at 27.
38 Id. at 38.
39 Id. at 55. The Court intimates:
We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of
the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be
some differences in technique-but not in principle-depending upon the
age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. . . . If
counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission
was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the ad-
mission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it has not been coerced
or suggested, but also that it is not the product of ignorance of rights or
of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), announced some profound rules to
be followed to protect the individual privilege against self-incrimination. For a
discussion of these rulings, see 1965-66 Court of Appeals Review, 55 Ky. L.J.
346 (1966). It seems logical to infer from the language in Gault that since the
privilege against self-incrimination is the same for juveniles as for adults, then
the same standards must be met in order to protect this privilege. If this is the
case, changes in juvenile court proceedings will cut very deep. For a discussion,
see Comment, 7 SANTA CrAR LAw. 114 (1966).
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not be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the
opportunity for cross-examination... "40
Since the Supreme Court restricted Gault to delinquency adjudi-
cation proceedings and Kent does not apply to the states, there are
still no constitutional due process standards imposed upon state waiver
proceedings. But there is little reason to doubt that Gault will
eventually be extended to waiver proceedings. However, the need for
such extension is not so great in Kentucky because of Smith. By
adopting the standards in Kent, Smith has guaranteed Kentucky
juveniles a right to counsel in waiver proceedings. But Kent (or
Smith) did not involve the privilege against self-incrimination or the
right to confrontation of witnesses, both of which were ruled on in
Gault. Thus, neither of these rights will be imposed upon waiver
proceedings by Smith. Aside from this deviation, juvenile waiver and
delinquency adjudication proceedings must meet essentially the same
standards of due process.
Heretofore, juvenile court proceedings have been regarded as
primarily civil in nature,41 i.e., they were thought to serve a parens
patriae4- function by supposedly caring for and aiding in the re-
habilitation of the child.43 Thus, most courts previously ruled that
application of specific constitutional safeguards was not necessary to
protect the child44 since he was shielded from abuse by the "funda-
mental fairness" concept of due process. 45 The vagueness of this con-
cept has led to much criticism and dissatisfaction concerning its in-
effectiveness in juvenile court proceedings. 46 The Supreme Court in
40887 U.S. at 57.
41 Marlow v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S.W. 1137 (1911). An early
statement of the goals and philosophy of juvenile courts is contained in Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 Hv. L. BlEv. 104 (1909). For a later collection of
statements on the philosophy of juvenile courts, see S. GLUECK, THE P.ROBLEm OF
DELNQUENcy ch. 11 (1959).
42 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 1 (1967). The parens patriae doctrine grew
from the idea that the king, as father of his country, had the duty to look after
and care for those of the kingdom who, due to youth or disability, could not take
care of themselves.
43 31 Am!. Jun. Juvenile Courts and Delinquent, Dependent, and Neglected
Children § 52 (1958).
44 Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959). An appendix at
page 561 of the opinion lists the cases from 51 jurisdictions which have held
juvenile proceedings to be civil in nature. Contra, United States v. Morales, 233
F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964) (held that the requirements of due process and
fundamental fairness required the same safeguards for juveniles as for adults
charged with the same offense); In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955);
In re W., 19 N.Y. 2d 55, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966) (attacked
the juvenile proceeding as at least quasi-criminal in nature).
4 See Haling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961); United
States v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).4 6 See Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A Challenge to
(Continued on next page)
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Gault did not specifically label juvenile proceedings as either civil or
criminal in nature,47 but carefully noted that granting juveniles
specific constitutional rights would not compel the states to relinquish
any substantive benefits of the juvenile process. 48 However, while
Gault does not specifically call for an end to the parens patriae
rationale, one may at least ascertain the beginning of a movement away
from this approach and toward an adversary proceeding.
Although the presence of attorneys will invoke a more formal
atmosphere in juvenile court proceedings, it is doubtful that their role
will be the same as in other courts. It is hoped that attorneys will be
somewhat restrained and will try to aid the juvenile court judge by
recognizing the social objectives and techniques of the juvenile
court.49 Closely related to the right to counsel issue is the privilege
against self-incrimination. It is significant to note that most juvenile
cases involve confessions made at either the custody stage50 or at the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Lawyers, 52 A.B.A.J. 923 (1966); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Ad-
versary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7; Paulsen,
The Juvenile Court and the Whole of the Law, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 597 (1965);
Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLmiM. L. REv. 281
(1967); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 775 (1966); Comment, Criminal Offenders In The
juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171
(1966).
47 383 U.S. at 49. The Court did, however, declare that
juvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may lead to
commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for
purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination .... It would be en-
tirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by
juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to "criminal" involve-
ment ... To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because
of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience which has
been attached to juvenile proceedings. Id.
48 Id. at 30. The hearing need not "conform with all of the requirements
of a criminal trial ... " Furthermore the processing and treatment of juveniles
separately from adults and the classification of offenders as delinquents rather than
criminals are to be retained. Id. at 22, 23.49 Isaacs, The Role of the Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family
Court, 12 BuFFAro L. REv. 501 (1963). The writer states:
He should bring to this task the usual tools of the advocate-familiarity
with the applicable law, the ability to make a thorough investigation and
logical presentation of the pertinent facts and the faculty for forceful
and persuasive exposition of his client's position. The suggestion found
in some writings that "zealous advocacy" is incompatible with the ob-
jective of a Family Court is without merit unless zeal of advocacy is
confused with purposeless obstructionism. Id. at 506.
Proper advocacy would therefore require "intelligent discrimination in the
use of tactics learned in other courts since wholesale importation of techniques
developed in the handling of criminal or civil cases before other tribunals ... will
rarely serve the interest of the minor client." Id.
5oKRS § 208.110 (1962) specifically states that the taking of a child into
custody for a public offense will not be termed an arrest.
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hearing itself.0 ' In spite of this, many courts have held that juveniles
have no right to protection against self-incrimination in juvenile
courts.52 Such decisions were thought justified by the use of the
"civil nature" label on juvenile proceedings. 53
Gault requires the juvenile court judge to advise both the juvenile
and his parents of his right to remain silent. A waiver of the right is
possible only if both the parent and the child agree to it. A problem
arises, however, when the pre-adjudication stages are considered. Can
it be assumed that the juvenile possesses the privilege against self-
incrimination during pre-trial interrogation by police? The Supreme
Court deemed it necessary to say that the "constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination is [as] applicable in the case of juveniles as
it is with respect to adults." 4 However, since the decision was limited
to juvenile adjudication proceedings, it would be presumptious to as-
sume that the privilege against self-incrimination has been extended
to pre-judicial phases. Nevertheless, the general tenor of the decision
indicates that perhaps the privilege may be extended at some future
date.rr Suffice it to say that presently, in Kentucky, the juvenile must
be informed by the juvenile court judge of his right to remain silent at
a delinquency adjudication proceeding.
Notice of the charges against the juvenile is not provided for by
Kentucky law. 6 But Gault emphasized that such notice must be
adequately given to the juvenile. This is logical since the right to
counsel at an adjudication proceeding would be worthless if the minor
and his attorney did not know what the charges were. To insure proper
notice, the Supreme Court required the judge to "set forth the alleged
conduct with particularity."57 This requirement raises a problem. The
Kentucky statutes define delinquency not only in terms of specific acts
but also as a continuous mode of conduct. The juvenile court has
jurisdiction over any child who is habitually disobedient to his
51 Comment, 12 VuL. L. REV. 803, 816 (1967).52 See, e.g., In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 188 P.2d 282 (1947); In re
Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 188 P.2d 503 (1943); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
183 N.E. 353 (1982).
O There is no law in Kentucky which requires advising the juvenile of his
right to remain silent. The conclusion must be drawn that there was no right
against self-incrimination for juveniles in Kentucky prior to Gault. In contrast the
N.Y. Family Court Act § 741 (1962) provides for advising both the juvenile and
the parents of the juvenile's right to remain silent.
5 387 U.S. at 55.
5 If the privilege against self-incrimination were extended to the police
station, the question would remain whether all the rulings of Miranda would be
applicable. See Comment, 12 VIL. L. 11Ev. 803, 818 (1967); ef. note 21 supra.
56 KRS § 208.080 (1962) provides for the summoning of the parent to appear
in court with the child, but no notice of the charges is mentioned.
67387 U.S. at 33.
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parents,58 who is an habitual truant from home or school, 59 or who is
found by the court to be neglected, needy, or abandoned.60 Indeed, it
has been suggested that such language would be unconstitutionally
vague if used for a criminal prosecution,6 1 but since juvenile pro-
ceedings have heretofore been considered civil in nature, no challenge
has been made of this or other similar statutes. However, the Supreme
Court, in Gault, did classify juvenile proceedings as criminal for
purposes of self-incrimination. As a result, the Court might extend the
void-for-vagueness doctrine to such statutes as Kentucky's. It would
be virtually impossible to allege with particularity such things as
habitual disobedience or habitual truancy. Thus, before the notice
requirement of Gault can be fully implemented in Kentucky either the
Legislature or the Court of Appeals must define the generalized
statutes with specificity.
Closely connected with insuring proper notice is the right,
established in Kent and adopted by Smith, of the juvenile's attorney to
inspect the youth's social and probation records. Such a right is neces-
sary for proper preparation of a defense since without this oppor-
tunity, it would be difficult for an attorney to make a forceful argu-
ment against transferring the proceeding to a criminal court.
6 2
Kentucky juvenile proceedings will be substantially affected by the
requirement of sworn testimony subject to cross-examination. 3 Denial
of this right has been based principally on the parens patriae
rationale;64 the courts believing that such formalities hindered ef-
ficiency and that many witnesses in a juvenile proceeding have unique
relationships to the child.65 Gault clearly made such justifications in-
adequate, ruling that a child has the constitutional right of confronta-
tion and cross-examination where there is a possibility that the pro-
ceedings may end in his incarceration. 6 This right is not applicable
where the juvenile has made a valid confession since, in such a case,
the hearing is held only to determine a proper disposition.6 7 In all
other cases, the imposition of this safeguard for the juvenile is neces-
58KRS § 208.020(b) (1962).
59 KRS § 208.020(c) (1962).
60 KRS § 208.020(d) (1962).6 1 Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MnN. L. REv. 547, 556
(1957).62 KRS § 208.170 (1962) provides for waiver at the discretion of the
juvenile court judge if it appears that a felony has been committed.
63 There is no statutory provision in Kentucky for such testimony.64 See note 38 supra.
65 Id.
66 387 U.S. at 56.
67 Id. at 56.
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sary since without it the right to counsel would indeed be insigni-
ficant.
The effect of giving Kentucky juveniles a right of confrontation and
cross-examination is difficult to assess. Certainly there will not be
testimony by witnesses who are not sworn. However, previous prob-
lems have centered on the inability of states to agree on specific
evidentiary rules, e.g., the admission of hearsay in juvenile courts.6 8
Gault remained silent on this point, but obviously, some restrictions
should be placed on the kind of evidence to be heard in juvenile
court, i.e., Kentucky should adopt tangible evidentiary standards for
juvenile proceedings. 69 These standards should be constructed so as
not to hinder the juvenile in the exercise of his constitutional rights.
One major procedural point not involved in Gault, Kent, or Smith
involves appellate review of juvenile court decisions. Kentucky pro-
vides for direct appeal of all juvenile court decisions to the circuit
court of the county in which the juvenile was tried. 70 However, further
appeal to the Court of Appeals is not ordinarily available.71 Neither
Gault nor Smith indicated any change in this procedure.72 While
Gault made no rulings on the desirability of a transcript in juvenile
proceedings, Kentucky does require a transcript for appeal purposes.
73
Kentucky's provisions for a transcript and an appeal to circuit court
will probably remain unchanged. However, if a juvenile can appeal to
08 See Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L.
REy. 281, 335-39 (1967). This is also of great importance in the waiver pro-
ceedings. Throughout the discussion it has been assumed that the right to con-
frontation applies only to adjudication proceedings. However, Smith requires the
juvenile court to grant the child a hearing in a waiver proceeding. During this
bearing, counsel must be allowed to represent the child. Considering these factors,
it would seem that any attorney wvould he handicapped to the point of complete
ineffectiveness without the right to cross-examine any witness who might be sum-
moned to testify.
69 N. Y. Family Court Act § 744(a) (1962) provides for admission of
evidence which is "competent, material, and relevant." The standard has been
interpreted in In re Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 827, 238 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1962).
This is not the only standard set up by a state. See also CAIF. WELFARE AND
INsTrrTniONS CODE § 701 (1966) which requires evidence to be "relevant and
material."
7OKRS § 208.380 (1962).
71 See Tunget v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1959) which held
that under KRS § 208.380, a defendant has no right of appeal from a circuit court
to the Court of Appeals, except where the circuit court erroneously dismissed an
appeal from juvenile session of county court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Under these conditions the Court of Appeals will entertain an appeal because of
violation of fourteenth amendment.
72 Smith, by adopting Kent, requires a statement of the facts considered in a
waiver proceeding as well as a statement of the reasons for waiver. Although this
is for the purpose of appellate review, no assumption can be made that it was
intended to change appellate procedure.
73KRS § 208.380 (1962).
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the circuit court, it is difficult to understand why he cannot then pro-
ceed to the Court of Appeals. Perhaps the Legislature believes that
the Court of Appeals is already overcrowded, or that juveniles do not
need an appeal to the state's highest court. Obviously the remedy for
an overcrowded docket is to change the court system; the rejection
of worthy appeals is no answer. Moreover, little reason can be seen to
ascribe infallibility to the lower courts. Whatever the justification for
this anomaly, the procedure should be changed in order to further pro-
tect the rights of the juvenile.
Other tenuous questions have been left unanswered by Gault, e.g.,
the right to trial by jury in juvenile court,74 the application of consti-
tutional safeguards to the dispositional process in juvenile pro-
ceedings,75 and the pre-judicial procedure to be followed. If cases in-
volving these issues are later raised, it would seem logical to assume
that the Supreme Court will extend further the rights of juveniles.
The second issue in Smith involved the retroactivity of the right
to counsel ruling.76 The Court stated with finality that Kent would not
be applied retroactively to Smith and cited as authority Johnson v.
New Jersey.77 In addition, the Court, attempting to justify its decision,
engaged in a lengthy analysis to show that Smith would not be ad-
versely affected since he was over twenty-one years of age at the time
of his appeal.78 The retroactivity of Kent would seem somewhat ir-
relevant, considering the limitations the Supreme Court put on that
decision.79 The question should simply have involved the retroactivity
of Smith in its own right. Were the question so limited the Court could
have looked to various Supreme Court decisions in order to ascertain
the factors that that Court has considered relevant in a retroactivity
case. However, whether Smith should have been given retroactive ap-
plication is not clear when one looks at what the Supreme Court has
decided on the subject. In Gideon v. Wainwright,0 the Supreme Court
held that an accused had the right to counsel at trial for a felony, and
subsequent cases have shown that this right applied retroactively.8'
But in Johnson v. New Jersey, retroactivity was denied Escobedo v.
Illinois82 which guaranteed the right to counsel during police inter-
74I(F1S § 208.0 60 (1962) provides for a separate hearing wvithout a jury.
Nearly all courts have held that a juvenile cannot demand a jury trial. See Annot.,
100 A.L.R.2d 1048 (1965) fo alsig of cases.
75 note 28 supra for a discussion of this phase.
76 412 S.W.2d at 259.
77 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
78 412 S.W.2d at 260.
79 See note 26 supra.
80 372 U.S. 385 (1963).
81 See Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
823 78 U.S. 436 (1964).
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rogation and Miranda v. Arizonaso which set forth several due process
standards to be followed in implementing the right to counsel and
the privilege against self-incrimination. One should question the ap-
parent disparity in the application of these decisions. It has been sug-
gested that the reason Escobedo was not applied retroactively is that
Escobedo involved right to counsel before trial while Gideon required
counsel at trial.s4 The conclusion can be drawn that the presence of
counsel at trial is essential to prevent a miscarriage of justice, but the
presence of counsel during interrogation is not absolutely necessary to
prevent such injustice since such presence might even lead to supres-
sion of the truth1s This may be a valid distinction between the two
cases. In Johnson the Supreme Court announced that where retro-
activity was involved, a balancing test should be employed."" The
Court stressed that whether the constitutional rule of criminal pro-
cedure affected the fact-finding process at trial was a matter of de-
gree.87 The possibility of disrupting the administration of the law was
also considered by the Court.88 Finally, the Court in Johnson con-
cluded that the failure to apply Escobedo and Miranda retroactively
would not prevent those previously convicted from invoking the safe-
guards announced in those cases as part of an involuntariness claim. 9
When considered in light of Supreme Court decisions, there is
ample support for the retroactive application of Smith. Smith, like
Gideon, is primarily a right to counsel at trial case. There is no other
safeguard which can be invoked by juveniles as was the case in
Miranda and Escobedo. However, any conclusion about retroactive
application must be made in light of the consideration that if Smith
were applied retroactively, a large number of adult and juvenile law-
breakers would be released upon society. This is certainly a strong
consideration to ponder. Perhaps, in view of the apparent disrupting
effects that retroactivity might engender,90 the Court chose the
soundest course.
83384 U.S. 436 (1966).
84 Comment, 64 Mica. L. IRxv. 832 (1966).8s Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MnqmN. L. REv. 47 (1964).8
0See The Supreme Court, 80 HAav. L. REv. 124, 136 (1966).
87 384 U.S. at 728.
88 Id. at 731.
80 Id. at 730.
00 For further discussion, see The Supreme Court, supra note 86. Of course
1ault also raises the question of retroactivity, and the same problems involved in
3mith also apply to Gault. In addition Gault has five different holdings, only one
f which concerns right to counsel. Thus, Gault involves elements common to
gideon, Miiranda, and Escobedo. The retroactive application of Gault would,
herefore, call for a true balancing test, or the case would have to be split into
(Continued on next page)
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A third issue in Smith concerned defendant's failure to appeal his
1958 conviction and his subsequent use of RICR 11.42. Ordinarily, an
11.42 motion cannot be entertained unless all appeals have been
exhausted.91 However, at the time Smith could have appealed there
existed no right to counsel at a waiver hearing.
Realizing Smith's predicament, the Court made an exception to the
rule and allowed him to bring his 11.42 motion. This was a case of
first impression, and although the holding is just, the Court cited no
precedent. However, persuasive authority for its decision might have
been found under cases concerning federal habeas corpus.
92
In habeas corpus93 proceedings the general rule is that a writ will
not issue if all appellate remedies have not been exhausted. However,
in rare and exceptional cases, the writ of habeas corpus may be issued
where an appeal has not been taken. 4 The Supreme Court has ruled
that procedural errors which were so flagrant as to result in an unfair
hearing would render criminal proceedings vulnerable to collateral at-
tack by habeas corpus.95 The denial of counsel to Smith should be con-
sidered such a flagrant error as to result in unfairness to him. Surely,
the denial of a constitutional right justifies such writs even though
appeal remedies were not exhausted.96
D. BaGirr To CoUrsEL
1. Improper Preparation by Appointed Counsel-A right to counsel
question that frequently reaches the appellate level involves the
petitioner's assertion that his counsel did not have time to properly
prepare. The right to be represented by counsel in a felony case con-
templates that the attorney have a reasonable time in which to become
familiar with and prepare the case.97 On the other hand, the court's
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
its different holdings and each of those holdings considered separately for
retroactive applications. Indeed, it is not an easy question, but the question is
almost certain to come before the Supreme Court in the future.
91Thornberry v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied,
885 U.S. 868 (1966); King v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1965).
92 Federalhabeas corpus and RC 11.42 are very similar in operation. See
1965-66 Court of Appeals Review, 55 Ky. L. 3. 376 (1966).
93 In Kentucky, habeas corpus has been almost completely displaced by RCr
11.42. See Ayers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964).
94 25 AM. Jun. Habeas Corpus § 22 (1940).95 In Eagle v. United States, 329 U.S. 304 (1946), a writ of habeas corpus
issued where the petitioner had failed to bring writ of error in the proceeding
against him.96 Note, State Post Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 154, 165 (1965).
97 Davis v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 360, 220 S.W.2d 844 (1949); Chenault
v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 455, 138 S.W.2d 969 (1940); Shelton v. Common-
wealth, 280 Ky. 733, 134 S.W.2d 653 (1939).
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ruling on a motion for continuance is discretionary and except for a
showing of abuse will not be reversed. 98 This conflict was well high-
lighted in two cases where the convicted defendant appealed because
of the trial judge's refusal to grant defense counsel more time for
trial preparation. While the grounds of appeal in both cases were
identical, the Court's analysis of the fact patterns resulted in one re-
versal and one affirmation.
Defendant in the first case, Stumph v. Commonwealth,"9 was in-
dicted for murder. He retained an attorney, but a dispute over fees
resulted in the attorney's dismissal shortly before the trial. Less than
two days prior to the scheduled trial the judge appointed two at-
torneys to the defense, and they immediately moved for a continuance
of one week. This was refused despite the fact that the local docket was
not crowded. The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid reason
for denial. It placed particular emphasis on the fact that the appointed
attorneys were inexperienced, had never tried a jury case before, and
were faced with a capital punishment case.
Moreover, citing Davis v. Commonwealth,'"0 the Court said:
While each must stand upon its own facts there runs throughout the line
of decisions an appreciation of the fact that lawyers appointed to defend
accused persons are often entitled to greater consideration with respect
to time and opportunity for preparation for trial than otherwise. They
ought not, in addition to assuming the grave responsibility without com-
pensation, be compelled to sacrifice the interests of other clients in order
to get ready in an unreasonable time to defend the accused.1' 1
The Court reversed with directions to grant a new trial.
Gibson v. Commonwealth'02 involved appointed attorneys who
were experienced lawyers and had six days to prepare the defense in
a rape case. Although the attorneys were required to appear in court
frequently on other business during the six days, the Court of Appeals
upheld the lower court's refusal to grant a continuance. The Court
believed that the inconvenience of the attorney is not a valid reason
for granting a continuance, particularly where, as here, the prosecuting
witness had been brought from another state to testify. Throughout,
the opinion is a subtle lecture on the responsibility of the experienced
lawyer who finds himself appointed to a criminal case. The briefs for
defendant note that at no time during the six day period did the
9SLusk v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 339, 164 S.W.2d 389 (1942); Rose v.
Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 53, 149 S.W.2d 772 (1941).
OD408 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1966).
100 310 Ky. 360, 220 S.W.2d 844 (1949).
101408 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Ky. 1966).
102 417 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1967).
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defense attorneys either consult with their client or even ask for per-
mission to do so. The Court stated firmly: 'It... was the duty of these
lawyers to bestir themselves to prepare for a trial of which they had
adequate notice."103 While the Court tacitly admits that the attorneys
did not properly "bestir themselves," it affirmed the conviction on the
basis of the nature of the case and the simplicity of the defense. The
Court believed that an allegation of rape supported solely by the
evidence of the prosecutrix and without assertion by the defendant of
any defense other than consent requires a minimum of preparation.
The Court concluded that there had been no showing that delay
would have helped the defendant or his counsel.
An indigent defendant should have no less an opportunity for an
adequate defense than a defendant with retained counsel. This means
that appointed counsel must "bestir themselves" and conduct a
vigorous defense, raising every point the indigent accused is legally
entitled to. Moreover, the pretrial duties and responsibilities of ap-
pointed counsel play such an important role in the effective defense of
a case that they are just as crucial as representation during the trial.
Appointed counsel who are disinterested or unprepared place the
indigent in a precarious position, and he might just as well represent
himself. Such ineffective representation is highly prejudicial and
clearly results in a denial of due process. However, to enforce the re-
quirement of effective counsel the Court must closely scrutinize the
details of the trial. If the Court is not able or does not in fact weight
the factual considerations carefully there will be no due process. Be-
cause judging the adequacy of counsel depends on the close attention
of the Court to the particular facts, there is great risk that unequal
standards will be applied. While the facts of these two cases lead to
the conclusion that the decisions are correct, it seems that the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals should make some effort to spell out the de-
gree of effectiveness and participation, so essential to a fair trial, now
to be expected from appointed counsel.
2. Waiver of Right to Counsel-The appellant in Copeland v. Com-
monwealth'04 was serving a life sentence as a habitual criminal.'0 5
This sentence was imposed in 1946 as a result of Copeland's third
felony conviction. He filed a motion to set aside the habitual criminal
conviction, alleging that in his first two felony convictions he had not
been represented by counsel. The Court, relying on Gayes v. New
103 Id. at 239.
104 415 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1967).
105 On this appeal the prisoner was making a preliminary move toward
setting aside the habitual criminal conviction. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403
S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1966).
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York,'06 ruled that by failing to question the validity of the two prior
convictions at the 1946 trial, the appellant had waived his right to
later challenge them.
The appellant contended that he did not know of his right to
counsel until Gideon v. Wainwright0 7 was decided. The Court, how-
ever, held that Copeland could have challenged his lack of counsel at
the two prior convictions in 1946 through the remedy of coram nobis,'
08
and his court-appointed attorney was "chargeable with knowledge" of
the remedy at that time.
In a previous appeal, 0 9 Copeland had charged that in 1946 he had
insufficient time to prepare his case, and that his attorney was ap-
pointed only five minutes before trial. The Court rejected the con-
tention that this amounted to ineffective counsel since there is a pre-
sumption that a court-appointed attorney is diligent and competent.
A proper means of obtaining relief from an invalid conviction
should be available to an appellant until the penalties from such a con-
viction have ended. The inconvenience that the Court endures from
reviewing a case long past decided seems trivial when compared to the
burden the appellant suffers because of that decision.110
In Gayes v. New York'-" the Supreme Court announced the waiver
rule followed by Copeland. The appellant in Gayes was sixteen years
of age at the time of his first conviction. The youth expressly waived
his right to counsel and pleaded guilty to the offense. When he was
later convicted for a second offense, he was sentenced as a habitual
criminal. In a later appeal, the Supreme Court held that Gayes had
waived his right to challenge lack of counsel in his first conviction
since he had the opportunity to contest that conviction at his second
trial.
The scope of Gayes has been narrowly defined in subsequent
decisions.112 In a state case,113 almost factually identical to Gayes, the
waiver rule was not applied. The state court attempted to distinguish
the cases on the ground that the decision in Gayes referred only to
the waiver of a federal remedy and not necessarily to state remedies.
106 332 U.S. 145 (1947).
107 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon held that under the fourteenth amendment,
indigents were entitled to appointed counsel in felony prosecutions.
108 Coram nobis was used to vacate judgments obtained without due process
of law. This remedy was replaced by RCn 11.42 in 1962.
1o9 Copeland v. Commonwealth, 397 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965).
110 See Note, Post-Release Attacks on Invalid Federal Convictions: Obstacles
to Redress by Coram Nobis, 63 YALE L.J. 115, 122 n.48 (1948).
"'l 332 U.S. 145 (1947).112 See United States v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1957); United
States v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1956) and cases cited therein.113 Bojinoff v. People, 209 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909 (1949).
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Other courts have refused to waive a person's right to challenge a
conviction when the previous opportunity to make such a challenge
occurred in another jurisdiction.114 Still other decisions have suggested
that the waiver rule does not apply in federal courts.115
In Burgett v. Texas16 the Supreme Court has recently stated that
the right to counsel under the fourteenth amendment as established by
Gideon v. Wainwright is not limited to "prospective application The
Supreme Court further stated that using a conviction obtained when
the appellant was not represented by counsel to enhance punishment
for a subsequent offense would erode the principle of Gideon. Thus,
regardless of the efficacy of Gayes concerning the waiver of state
rights, the federal rights as defined by Gideon are not affected. As-
suming Copeland waived his state right to challenge lack of counsel,
he did not waive his fourteenth amendment right to make such a
challenge.
A strong dissent in Gayes stated an unwillingness "to subscribe to
such a doctrine of forfeitures concerning constitutional rights.. ... ,,7
The Gideon and Burgett decisions raise the suggestion that the present
Supreme Court would join the dissent in Gayes and find the "waiver
doctrine" offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fair-
ness.118
E. SEAcH AND SfEIU
The principle that "a man's home is his castle" found constitutional
support in the fourth amendment. However, today the protection
against illegal search and seizure extends far beyond the home. In
1965, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that search of a vehicle
incident to arrest for a minor traffic violation was illegal."19 Moreover,
evidence gained in such illegal search is inadmissible in a trial based on
a charge arising from the search. 120 The Court found that in order to
meet modem problems of the highway it was necessary for police to
114 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 9.
'15 See Haywood v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 485, 488-89 (S.D. N.Y.
1954); Note, supra note 110, at 122-25.
116 886 U.S. 931 (1967). Previous convictions against the defendant were
being used to establish "repetition of offense." The defendant was not represented
by counsel at the time of one of these convictions.
117 332 U.S. 145, 148 (1947).
31
8 Burgett v. Texas, 886 U.S. 931 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
119 Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1965). Appellant was
stopped by a state trooper for improper passing. He had no driver's license and
the car was registered in his wife's name. The trooper arrested him, searched his
person and then searched the car. In the trunk he found several cases of
whiskey which were used to convict defendant of illegal possession of whiskey in
dry territory.
120 Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1960).
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be able to stop motorists on the road. However, the Court warned
that this extension of police power required a corresponding restriction
upon the authority to search without a warrant.121 It specifically stated
that police may not stop a car on the pretext of a traffic violation and
then search the person or the vehicle without good cause to suspect a
crime. But during the past two years the Court has narrowed the ap-
parent sweep of this rule by demanding a strict interpretation of the
"search."
In Noble v. Commonwealth,12 a trooper in dry territory stopped
to investigate an incident of public drunkenness. The driver was
standing beside his truck which was stopped beside the road. The de-
fendant, in response to a reasonable request that he show his driver's
license, opened the door and the trooper saw liquor bottles on the
floor of the truck. The prosecutor introduced this evidence at the de-
fendant's trial for illegal possession of alcoholic beverages, and the
defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals, in affirning, re-
iterated its earlier view that no unauthorized search has been made
where the evidence is clearly visible to the investigating officer.
123
A closely related issue was presented in an unusual fact pattern in
Nichols v. Commonwealth.124 Two local police officers and a federal
narcotics agent had a combination rooming house and beer tavern
under surveillance. The officers stopped one man leaving the building
and asked him for identification. The man volunteered to return to
the building with the officers, saying that the defendant, Nichols,
would "vouch" for his identity. When the police knocked on the door,
they were invited in by the defendant who knew and recognized
them. While inside one of the policemen noticed an open sack on the
table, looked inside it, then reached into the bag and felt the con-
tents. The contents were subsequently identified as marijuana and
admitted in evidence at the defendant's trial.
The defendant was convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial at which the
marijuana and any evidence relating to its discovery and seizure must
be withheld.
This would appear to be a close case, perhaps relying entirely on
such detail as how far the bag was open, how much the officer could
see before reaching into the bag, and how dependent he was upon the
manual exploration for his identification. Noble seems consistent -with
Kentucky law as to the admissibility of evidence obtained without a
121 Love v. Commonwealth, 886 S.W.2d 748, 745 (Ky. 1965).
122 408 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1966).
123 Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 548, 264 S.W. 1078 (1924).
124 408 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1966).
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warrant where the object sought is obvious to anyone within reasonable
viewing distance.125 The word "search" implies a prying for that which
has been concealed or intentionally removed from common view.3 6
Thus, the results in Noble and Nichols were sound and consistent with
past law. In Nichols, it was impossible for the officer, casually ob-
serving the room, to see and identify the marijuana. By peering into
the bag, feeling it, and finally asking the federal agent for assistance,
the character of his observation took on the intrustive character of a
search. Moreover, the facts here were similar to those in Adkins v.
Commonwealth'27 where the police officer saw the neck of a bottle
protruding from a paper sack and had to pull it out of the bag in
order to identify its contents as moonshine whisky. This too was held
as an illegal search.
Complex and varied fact patterns often present close questions as
to the admissibility of evidence taken without a warrant. These two
cases should help to clarify for the Kentucky practitioner the point at
which the Court will find a search has taken place.
F. PRI v-EGE AGAINST SELF-INcaRInMATION
When the United States Supreme Court held, in Escobedo v.
Illinois,128 that statements elicited from an accused after his request
to consult with retained counsel was denied were inadmissible, two
heretofore separate and distinct Constitutional protections were joined,
i.e., coerced confessions under the fifth amendment and right to
counsel under the sixth amendment. However, the "judicial interpreta-
tion and spirited legal debate"129 that Escobedo initiated made it pre-
dictable that a clarifying decision would be forthcoming. The delay
was not prolonged. On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court handed
down the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,130 which held that
a suspect, who is taken into custody or otherwise significantly deprived
of his freedom, must be advised prior to any questioning, unless other
fully effective means are adopted, that: 1) he has a right to remain
silent; 2) anything he says may be used against him in a court of law;
125 Id.
12679 C.J.S. Searches & Seizures § 1 (1952).
127202 Ky. 86, 259 S.W. 32 (1923).
128378 U.S. 478 (1963).
129384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although the decision is usually referred to as
Miranda v. Arizona, the case was actually a consolidation of the appeals of four
separate defendants, Miranda, Virgnera, Westover, and Stewart. Each case in-
volved a confession that was introduced at trial over the defendant's objection. In
the Miranda cases there were no charges of mental or physical coercion, only that
each defendant had not been adequately advised of his constitutional rights.
150 Id. at 440.
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8) he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and 4) if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed prior to any questioning if
he so desires.131
An opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded the ac-
cused throughout the interrogation. 3 2 By including a right to counsel
and self-incrimination warning among a suspect's rights during inter-
rogation, the Court in Miranda further entwined the fifth and sixth
amendment protections:
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity [to exercise
these rights] afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or to make a state-
ment. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated
by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interroga-
tion can be used against him. (Emphasis added.)133
The implications are clear, both in holding and dictum. The
Supreme Court specifically held that before the prosecution may in-
troduce a confession or statement of the defendant into evidence, they
must demonstrate that at the time of his interrogation the accused was
given the four part warning'34 and that he knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights. However, the dictum is far more inclusive; it is not
merely limited to statements and confessions. The Court said that "no
evidence obtained as a result of the [unlawful135] interrogation can
be used."13 6 The import of these words is clear-the "fruit of this
poisonous tree" will be inadmissible.
137
Self-incrimination is the keystone of Miranda.138 If the police are
131 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966). See Warden, Miranda: Some History, Some
Observations, and Some Questions, 20 VA~N. L. REv. 39, 41 (1966).
132 384 U.S. at 479.
133 Id. Thus, the Court has clearly put the burden of proof upon the
prosecution to show that the accused voluntarily divulged any information obtained
during any phase of the interrogation. While such a burden does lessen the
possibility of direct evidence being obtained against the person being questioned,
the usefulness of interrogation as an aid to criminal investigation is not totally
eliminated.
134See note 5 supra.1 3 5 An "unlawful interrogation is one that is conducted by the authorities
without giving such a person an opportunity to exercise the rights of the warning
as required by Miranda.
136 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
137 Arthur, Questioning by the Police Since Miranda, 4 WnajA1mr= L. J.
105, 141 (1966).
13sWhile two constitutional rights are involved in Miranda, i.e., the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, the Court makes it
clear that it is using the right to counsel as a means of insuring the protection of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Certiorari was granted in Miranda
in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed
[by Escobedo], of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-
custody interrogation, and to give concrete Constitutional guidelines for
law enforcement agencies and courts to follow. 384 U.S. at 441.
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allowed to do indirectly what is forbidden directly, the safeguards of
Miranda protect against nothing. Evidence gained because of informa-
tion obtained by an illegal arrest, 3 9 an illegal detention, 40 or an un-
lawful search and seizure14' has been held inadmissible as the "fruit
of the poisonous tree." It is highly unrealistic to believe that the Court
will allow facts and leads, uncovered by an unlawful interrogation, to
be used in a court of law.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals was faced squarely with this
problem in Shockley v. Commonwealth.142 The defendant had been
convicted of dwelling house breaking, and it was argued on appeal
that he had not been "informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, to confer with an attorney and to have an attorney present with
him at any interrogation."143 Ignoring the patent implications of
Miranda, the Court of Appeals held that "Miranda stands for the
principle that warnings are required in connection with the use by
the prosecution of statements or confessions. No statement or con-
fession was used at the trial"; 44 therefore, no inquiry should be made
into whether or not the four part warning was given to the accused
prior to his interrogation.
Realizing its possible error, the Court of Appeals held that even if
the defendant's Constitutional rights had been violated, he was not
prejudiced. 145 To support this latter contention, a 1935 case, Matthews
v. Commonwealth, was cited.146 Matthews held that the accused was
not entitled to a new trial where the police had allegedly obtained his
confession "by quizzing him while arrested and in their custody and
by threats of violence,"147 and such confession was not introduced into
evidence. However, it should be noted that the facts and the date148
of the case limit its applicability. The accused pleaded self-defense and
readily admitted killing the decedent. The fact that while under
alleged duress he had admitted the killing may be overlooked since
he admitted the same on the witness stand.
In Shockley there existed a different situation. The trial court had
1
39 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
14
0 Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
141 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); see generally L. HALL & Y.
KAzms", MODERN CnmvNAu PROCEDURaE 108-10 (2d ed. 1966).
142 415 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1967).
'43 Id. at 868.
144 Id. at 869.
145 Id.
146 261 Ky. 484, 88 S.W.2d 8 (1935).
147 Id. at 487, 88 S.W.2d at 10.
' 48 A state court, before perfunctorily relying on a criminal procedure case
which was decided before 1962, ought to compare that decision with the recent
criminal procedure cases of the United States Supreme Court.
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no way of knowing what information the defendant had given to the
police during his unlawful interrogation-it may have been negligible
or substantial. Our system, in such a case, normally resolves the un-
certainty in favor of the accused. Where the police violate Consti-
tutional procedures, it should be incumbent upon the Commonwealth
to show that the defendant's rights were, in fact, not violated.1
49
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, like other state courts which have
passed on this question since Miranda,10 had an opportunity to make
the safeguards of that decision meaningful, i.e., to place upon the
police the "burden of establishing that '[the] evidence is not tainted
by establishing that they [the police] had an independent, legitimate
source for the disputed evidence.'"151 The Court of Appeals elected,
as have the other state courts,0 2 to ignore the inevitable and let the
Supreme Court of the United States remain the primary protector of
the criminal defendant. This is unfortunate.
The Supreme Court held in Johnson v. New Jersey'53 that Miranda
would apply only to those cases in which the trial began after the date
of Miranda, i.e., June 13, 1966. In a pre-Miranda decision with
Miranda overtones, McDowell v. Commonwealth, 54 the Court of Ap-
peals held that the "State is not, and should not be, charged with any
undue influence, pressure, sweating, or inducement exercised by a
private citizen, acting on his own, not in concert with the officers of
the State."r 0 While this is the generally accepted rule,156 the facts of
the McDowell case and the subsequent rendering of Miranda require
a re-evaluation of the case.
McDowell, at the time of his confession, was confined in a cell
awaiting bond. He signed the prepared confession only after a bonds-
man insisted that bond would not be issued until the defendant told
the truth. The Commonwealth, in a situation where "private" citizens
are permitted to coerce a confession from a defendant in its presence,
149 "A heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the de-
fendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel." 884 U.S. at 475.
150 Oughton v. State, 420 P.2d 452 (Alaska 1966); Nebraska v. Silvacarvaiho,
145 N.W.2d 447 (Neb. 1966); People v. Duhard, 52 Misc. 2d 244, 275 N.Y.S.2d
275 (1966). See also Taylor v. Boles, 258 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. W.Va. 1966).
151 Rothblatt & Piter, Police Interrogation: Warnings and Waiver-Where Do
We Go from Here?, 42 Nom DAmE LAw. 479, 489 (1967).
152 Cases cited note 22 supra.
153 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
154 415 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1967).
155 Id. at 856.
150 People v. Cradtree, 289 Cal. App. 2d 789, 49 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1966);
People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1966). See generally Note,
Confessions Obtained through Interrogations Conducted by Private Persons, In-
vestigators, and Security Agents, 4 WLLAM m-rr L. J. 262 (1966).
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should be required to show that the Miranda warning was given and
effectively waived if it intends to use the confession. 1 7 Otherwise, this
practice could be used as an indirect method of circumventing the
Miranda safeguards.
In Wilson v. Commonwealth,158 the defendant had been convicted
of knowingly receiving stolen property. The facts indicated that he
had been questioned at the scene of the alleged crime,15 9 but he was
not informed of his constitutional rights at any time during the
questioning. His answers were introduced at the trial over the defense
attorney's objections. Of particular importance to the prosecution was
the officer's allegation that defendant admitted to a belief that he paid
a low price because the goods were stolen.
In affirming the conviction, the Court held that appellant had made
the statement voluntarily to the police before being taken into
custody. The Court summarily dismissed the implications of Escobedo
and Miranda, asserting that neither was applicable in this case.
The Court's interpretation of the facts in Wilson is less than
realistic. More importantly, the Court fails to take an honest view of
Miranda. Miranda clearly says:
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be
given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is
first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is
at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings com-
mences .... 160 (Emphasis added.)
157 Even without Miranda, the admissibility of a confession obtained under
the circumstances existing in McDowell is subject to question under existing Ken-
tucky law. KRS § 422.110 states that:
(1) No peace officer, or other person having lawful custody of any person
charged with a crime, shall attempt to obtain information from the
accused concerning his connection with or knowledge of crime by plying
him with questions or extort information.. . by threats or other wrong-
ful means, nor shall the person having custody of the accused permit any
other person to do so.
(2) A confession obtained by methods prohibited by subsection (1) is
not admissible as evidence of guilt in any court. (Emphasis added.)
This is a partial abrogation of the general rule enunciated by the Court that a
State will not be responsible for the coercive acts of a private citizen. The statute
clearly requires that if such acts occur while the accused is in custody, as was
the case in McDowell, the confession should not be admitted into evidence.
Miranda simply supplies Constitutional grounds for denying the Commonwealth
the use of this type of confession.
158411 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1967).
159 The defendant was working in a Louisville restaurant when an officer
arrived to investigate a report that some boys were carrying property into the
building. There was disputed testimony that defendant himself had alerted the
police. The patrolman observed the items in the storeroom at the restaurant and
then questioned the defendant, also in the storeroom, as to the source of the items
and the price paid for them.
160 384 U.S. at 477.
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The fundamental issue in Wilson is whether a suspect not yet formally
arrested but being questioned by police is "deprived of his freedom in
any significant way." Under Escobedo, the crucial stage was reached
when the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an un-
solved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect. Miranda
specifically explained the Escobedo doctrine in terms of this loss of
freedom.' 0 ' The Supreme Court has not yet specifically ruled whether
Miranda will be applied where the police question a suspect in his
home or place of business and arrest him only after he has made
damaging admissions. However, it can be speculated that the Supreme
Court would agree that questioning a suspect in his home before a
relative or friend may be coercive even though there had been no
actual arrest.1 2 Likewise, questioning a person at his place of business
may also be coercive.
The Supreme Court seems to be moving closer to an assertion that
an accused may not be convicted from his own mouth, regardless of
how the admission is obtained.0 3 This observation is reinforced by the
Court's description of the Miranda warnings as protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Over the years the Supreme Court
has
constantly re-examined the multiplicity of interests-individual, social and
governmental-visible in the process of in-custody interrogation. Its per-
sistent use of the twin terms "voluntary" and "involuntary" however,
tended to obscure much of the evolution in this area. Originally, the Court
excluded only inculpatory statements made under circumstances where an
innocent man of reasonable firmness might have given a false confession;
all other statements are acceptable. Then the list of acceptable statements
was narrowed to give the courts more effective control over police proce-
dure. The focus centered upon the accused, seen not as an innocent man
forced into an untrue confession but as an individual who was also a citi-
zen and, as such, entitled to certain basic rights without regard to guilt
or innocence. Primarily in an effort to discover why the accused chose
not to exercise these rights, the Court asked whether he even knew that
they existed. The age, experience and intelligence of the accused became
the dominant considerations. With the decision in Miranda, however, the
Court has again shifted its perspective. The focus is now not on the
man alone, but on the man in his environment . . . [t]he Court asks
161 Id. at 440.
162 Id. at 478 n.46:
The distinction [between in-custody interrogation and on-the-scene
questioning] and its significance has been aptly described in the opinion
of a Scottish court:
In former times such questioning, if undertaken, would be conducted
by police officers visiting the house or place of business of the suspect
and there questioning him, probably in the presence of a relation or
friend. However convenient the modem practice may be, it must
normally create a situation very unfavorable to the suspect.
163 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 n.5 (1967).
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whether there was an intelligent waiver in an environment that would
permit and honor nonwaiver. There is less concern with the fact of
waiver and more concern with the accused's awareness and under-
standing of the other alternatives available to him.104
The problem in Wilson arises because police investigation allegedly
produced "admissions" which were introduced in the courtroom as
evidence. This would seem to fall squarely within the Miranda pro-
tection and the Kentucky Court should have reversed the conviction.
364 Warden, supra note 181, at 47.
XI. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
A. AcE OF MAJOmTy
In 1965, when Kentucky changed the statutory age of majority from
twenty-one to eighteen, the problems which could arise from the modi-
fication seemed few. The language of KRS 2.015 is a deceptively lucid
expression of legislative intent: "for all purposes" eighteen years of age
shall be the age of majority. Even the enumerated exceptions to the
statute involved no complexities.' Yet, since its inception this statute,
due to its apparent ambiguity in the minds of judges and its inter-
ference with other statutory language, has failed to stand the test of
consistent interpretation or understanding. "It is readily apparent that
there is a broad and fertile area of future litigation arising out of the
vague and sweeping terminology of this statutory effort to simplify
something that is not simple."
2
The Court faced two domestic relation's cases this term involving
the age of majority statute. Wilcox v. Wilcox3 concerned an attempt by
a divorced father to terminate child maintenance payments when his
daughter reached eighteen. When the divorce was granted in 1951,
the appellee was ordered by the court to tender a certain amount
until his child reached the age of majority or became self-supporting.
The change in the statutory age of majority, he argued, should end
his payments when his daughter reached eighteen and the trial court
so held. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that since the age of
majority was twenty-one when the parties entered into the contract,
the father was obligated to support the child until she reached twenty-
one or became self-supporting.
In reaching its decision, the Court summarily dismissed the new
age of majority statute. It reasoned that the real question presented was
one of contract, and as such, the intention of the parties had to be dis-
covered in order to "ascertain how they meant the agreement to operate
at the time they entered into it."4 Since they meant, in 1951, for the
word "majority" to represent age twenty-one, that intention governed
the settlement contract despite the lowering of the statutory age after
the date of the contract.
1 KRS § 2.015 (1964) reads as follows:
Persons of the age of eighteen years are of the age of majority for all
purposes in this Commonwealth except for the purchase of alcoholic
beverages and for purposes of care and treatment of handicapped
children, for which twenty-one is the age of majority.
2 Commonwealth v. Hallahan 391 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Ky. 1965).
a 406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 19661.
4 Id. at 153.
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"It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional
and statutory provisions in effect at the time a contract is made be-
come a part of the contract."5 This is a widely accepted view, and a
decision based on such grounds seems reasonable. It also seems to be
a continuation of the policy argument alluded to in Commonwealth v.
Hallahan6 that there are certain situations in which an eighteen year
old is simply not capable of assuming adult status. Hallahan concerned
the consent needed by an eighteen year old to marry. Perhaps, as in
Hallahan, the Court in Wilcox was of the opinion that eighteen is too
young an age to set an individual out on his own without any aid
from his natural parents.7
In Young v. Young,8 the Court met the statutory age issue squarely
and, unlike Wilcox, seemed to refute the Hallahan policy. In this case,
as in Wilcox, a divorced father sought to discontinue support payments
when his children reached eighteen. However, this litigation did not
involve a contract, court order which dictated payments, or an
"intended" termination date. Rather, the father had made support pay-
ments on his own accord, and he simply quit paying them. His ex-wife
brought suit to have him continue the payments until the children
reached twenty-one, and the trial court so ordered. The Court re-
versed, holding that in the absence of a contract, the legal obligation
of a father to support his children terminated when they reached
eighteen, the age of majority.
By statute, fathers in Kentucky are "primarily liable for the nurture
and education of [their] minor children."9 In Young the Court in-
terpreted this statute to mean that "a parent [has] no legal obligation
to support his child after it [reaches] its majority."10 Therefore, since
the contract did not specify when the payments would end, KRS
2.015 would require that they end when the child reached eighteen.
The Court seemed quite reluctant to decide the case as it did, almost
as if it were backed into a corner where neither a separate field of law
such as contract, nor a policy argument would allow avoidance of the
statute. Thus, the "for all purposes" language of the statute prevailed.
Even the policy argument of "unripe an age"1' was not serviceable be-
5 Whitaker v. Louisville Transit Co., 274 S.W.2d 391, 894 (Ky. 1954).
0 391 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1965).
7 See 1965-66 Court of Appeals Review, 55 Ky. L. J. 391, 392 (1966).
8413 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1967).
9 KRS § 405.020(1) (1962).
10 413 S.W.2d at 888. See Central Kentucky Asylum for Insane v. Knighton,
113 Ky. 156, 67 S.W. 366 (1902). This ruling has been relaxed only when the
adult child is so mentally or physically weak as to be incapable of caring for
itself. Brewer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S.W. 541 (1925).
11 Comment, 55 Ky. L. J. 182 (1966).
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cause it was precisely in such a situation as this that the Legislature
deemed the age of eighteen an advantageous dividing line.'2
The Court has been caught up in the dilemma caused by the am-
biguity of the statute, and its decisions reflect the confusion. Literally
interpreted, Young is inconsistent with Hallahan since in Young the
statute was read according to its plain meaning; in Hallahan it was
not. There is no conflict between the cases, however, if the Court's
reasoning in Hallahan is to be taken at face value. In that case, the
Court stated that the age of majority statute applied only to "lower
the age to eighteen whenever the statute in question refers to the age of
majority or infancy without a specific age."13 Therefore the Hallahan
decision should be considered affirmed by Young since in the former
the age "twenty-one" was stated in the applicable statute, but in the
latter only the term "minor" was used.
It is questionable, however, whether the Court actually placed
much faith in the Hallahan rationale. That rationale seemed to be a
temporary test to use until the General Assembly defined or further
amended the statute. However, the 1966 General Assembly failed to
aid the Court. An amendment was proposed and passed in the Senate
which added to the end of KRS 2.015 the words "all other statutes not-
withstanding."14 The Bill also specifically amended several statutes in
which the age twenty-one was used.'5 Unfortunately, the proposal was
tabled in the House,' allowing perplexity to remain the order of the
day. The Legislature would do well to settle this confusion once and
for all.
After almost three years and two Court terms, KRS 2.015 still
presents an unsolved issue. As evidenced by the abortive legislative
attempt, it is certainly not incapable of solution. The Attorney
General's Office has assumed a consistent position in its opinions and
adheres to a strict interpretation of the statute.'7
12 The Court is powerless to act contrary to a valid act of the Legislature.
See Owens v. Clemons, 408 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ky. 1966), where the Court said:
It is beyond the province of a court to vitiate an act of the legislature
on the ground that public policy therein promulgated is contrary to what
the court considers to be in the public interest. It is the prerogative of
the legislature to declare what acts constitute a violation of public policy
and the consequences of such violation.
13 Wbiteside, Ten Years of Kentucky Domestic Relations Law, 1955-1965,
54 Ky. L.J. 206, 207 (1966).
14 297, 1966 FinAL LEGir .TE REcorm 14.
15 It is interesting to note that one of the amended statutes has been KRS §
402.210, the effect being to overrule Halahan.
16 1966 FnAL LEGIsr.ATIVE REcoRn 28, 30.
17 Op. A'r'Y GEN. 52 (1966) (Maintenance of a child by a divorced father
ends when the child reaches eighteen unless a divorce decree specifically states
(Continued on next page)
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It is submitted that although KRS 2.015 is an imperfect statement
of legislative intent, the General Assembly in fact intended to make
eighteen the age of majority "for all purposes."18 Thus, regardless of
whether the Court thinks this sound, it is the law, and as such, should
be applied uniformly.
B. CUSTODY
One of the most perplexing problems of divorce is the inability of
society to effectuate complete severance of a marriage when there is
a child. The child is an indivisible part of the marriage, seldom a
contributing factor in the divorce, and loved by both parties. Courts,
primarily concerned with the interest and welfare of the child, are
forced to award it to one parent.19 However, this does not completely
eliminate the other parent's access to the child. In Kentucky the other
parent has an absolute right to see the child at reasonable times and
convenient places.20 This is equitable since the purpose of divorce is to
separate husband and wife, not parent and child. However, because of
visitation rights, the custodian parent's freedom of movement is
restricted.
In Brumleve v. Brumleve,21 the wife, who had been awarded
custody of three minor children in a prior action, requested permission
to leave Kentucky for a job in Texas. Her former husband, protesting
the move, was able to show that his ex-wife did not have a job in
Texas; she had been interviewed but not hired. The commissioner
terminated the hearing and would not permit the father to present
evidence that the proposed trip would be detrimental to the children's
best interests. The Court of Appeals reversed the commissioner, holding
that the appellant should be permitted to show that the trip proposed
by his ex-wife was not necessary to her welfare and was not in the
best interest of the children.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
an ending age; at which point, modification would be at the court's discretion.);
Op. ATr'y GEN. 505 (1965) (An eighteen year old unwed mother can bring an
action for termination of parental rights.); Op. ATT'y GEN. 67 (1965) (An
eighteen year old can give consent for surgery without the necessity of parental
collaboration.); Op. ATr'Y GEN. 41 (1965) (A guardian may settle accounts with
his ward when the ward reaches eighteen.). Cf. Op. Ar'TY GEN. 176 (1965) (A
nonresident over eighteen but less than twenty-one can give his consent to surgery
only if the surgeon or hospital assumes the risk of legal action elsewhere.).
18 The standard policy argument favoring majority for eighteen year olds
is: Since they can vote, be drafted, and hold a job, they should have the other
privileges of adult status.
19 KRS § 403.070 (1962).20 Tackett v. Tackett, 302 Ky. 611, 194 S.W.2d 832 (1946). Tackett held
that reasonable times and places were "such times and places as may be con-
venient to the parties concerned." Id. at 615, 194 S.W.2d at 884.
21416 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1967).
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The decision is sound, and cannot be disputed on its facts. As with
so many aspects of domestic relations law, judgment is at the discretion
of the trial court.22 However, the Court of Appeals stated that since
this was a judicial proceeding and the husband was asserting a legal
right, he should have been heard on the issues and given an op-
portunity to present proof.2 Mere custody or prior record should not
preclude reexamination of the status quo since the trial court may
reverse any part of the original custody order.24 Although the case
offered no decision by which to judge "sufficient reason" for moving,
the Court again indicated that the fundamental problems to be con-
sidered are freedom of movement from state to state, rights of custody
and visitation, and rights of the child to develop with the normal ad-
vantages of life.
In cases of this nature, permission will normally be granted to re-
move the child from the jurisdiction if sufficient reason can be shown.
Thus, if the divorce proceeding scandalized the mother and resulted in
too much friction in which to raise the child, the mother would be
allowed to leave 25 In most jurisdictions, if the mother has remarried
and seeks permission to take the children to the new husband's resi-
dence, permission will be granted.2 6 However, unless there is a "force
compelling" the mother to leave the state, and the interests of the
child will be served as well within the state as without, permission
will be denied.
27
Brumleve is clearly consistent with these principles. The mother
may have had no valid reason to move to Texas, and such a move
might not have been in the children's best interests. The husband
should have been permitted to offer proof to this effect.
Depriving children of a normal home life is perhaps the greatest
tragedy of divorce. This is vividly revealed in the Eilers cases.28
These cases are a testimonial of the failure of divorced parents to
recognize their parental responsibility. However, the cases are an
even greater monument to the inability of the judicial system to pro-
vide for the welfare of the children of broken homes. Since 1963, when
22 Spencer v. Spencer, 312 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1958).
23 Cupp v. Cupp, 302 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1957). There, the Court stated:
"Appellant is asserting a legal right, and as in any other judicial proceeding,
he should be given the opportunity to present proof, to cross-examine witnesses
of opposing parties, and otherwise to be heard on his claim." Id. at 872.4 KRS § 403.070 (1962).
25Duncan v. Duncan, 293 Ky. 762, 170 S.W.2d 22 (1943).2 6 Alcorn v. Alcorn, 388 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1965); Byers v. Byers, 370
S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1963); Bowman v. Bowman, 813 Ky. 806, 233 S.W.2d 1020
(1950).2 7 See generallt 24 Am. Jun. 2d Divorce and Separation § 798 (1966).28 Eilers v. Eflers 412 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1967); Eilers v. Carpenter, 406
S.W.2d 830 (Ky. 19665.
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the Eilers' divorce was granted, there have been many judicial and
administrative actions to determine the custody of the children.
The divorce was granted in January, 1963, on the grounds of cruel
and inhuman treatment by the father. At that time the mother had
custody of the children, but no formal award of custody had been
made. In January, 1964, Mrs. Eilers, a Caucasian, married a Negro in
Illinois. Thereafter, Mr. Eilers filed a supplemental pleading to the
divorce action seeking custody. In September, 1964, the Jefferson
County Circuit Court responded by removing custody from the mother,
stating that "rearing these children in a racially mixed atmosphere will
per se indoctrinate them with a psychology of inferiority... Subjecting
these children to such a hazard would be in negation of their 'best
interests."' 2 9 However, the trial court found the father unfit for custody,
and the children, often separated, were placed in one children's home
after another. The juvenile court later gave each parent custody of some
of the children, but again the Chancellor ordered custody removed
from the parents and given to the Jefferson County Children's Home.
Mrs. Eilers' appeal from this order was denied as untimely.30
Mrs. Eflers then filed a habeas corpus action against the Children's
Home alleging that the September, 1964, court action was premised
solely on the grounds of racial discrimination and void under the
fourteenth amendment. The appeal was dismissed because the home
had transferred the children, making the issue moot.31 In July, 1966, in
a supplemental action on the grounds of changed circumstances,
custody was awarded to the father. The present appeal, the third in this
drama, ensued from this judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that certain evidence of the parents' fitness had been er-
roneously excluded. The Court said, "we are not able to adjudicate the
case upon the merits in the present appeal," because "absent the
proffered testimony . . . a reviewing court has no means by which it
may adjudicate the propriety of the ruling."32 Custody remained with
the father pending final outcome. It was the dissents opinion that the
Court should disregard technical considerations, and rule in favor of
Mrs. Eflers, asserting that she "has been deprived of her lawful right
to her children solely on the fallacious argument that she has married
a member of the Negro race."3 3
29 Eflers v. Eilers, 412 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Ky. 1967).
30 Dismissed without opinion January 14, 1966.81 Eilers v. Carpenter, 406 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. 1966). During the pendency
of the appeal, the Jefferson Circuit Court awarded the custody of the children
to their father, who presently has custody82 Eilers v. Eilers, 412 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1967).
88 Id. at 873.
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The Court was on solid judicial ground in ruling that there was
error in the admission of evidence, but as the dissent points out,
omission is the Court's sin. The record contains no evidence of unfit-
ness of the mother nor her Negro husband.34 Mrs. Eilers was deprived
custody in 1964 solely because of the "racially mixed atmosphere" of
her home.3 5 This atmosphere is still present and it appears that any
subsequent determination of her rights will also be predicated largely
upon this factor. The Court, therefore, should have ruled that the
racial atmosphere and its effect upon the development of the children
is but one factor in determining their best interest. Other jurisdictions
have held that race alone should not be allowed to defeat a custody
award that would otherwise benefit the children.36
Denial of custody to the mother on a racial basis is a denial of
equal protection of the laws 37 and an interference with the sanctity of
the home and marriage relationship. 38 In a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, which made laws prohibiting interracial
marriages unconstitutional, 39 the Court said that "distinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."40 This
policy would likewise seem to prevent custody of children from being
determined on a racial basis. As parens patriae of minor children, the
State has a duty to provide for their welfare. These children have been
shifted from pillar to post, home to home, and parent to parent for
over three years. The judiciary has been remiss in failing to expedi-
tiously place the children in a permanent home based on the fitness of
the parent and the home. The Court of Appeals should have decided
the case on its merits or, at the very least, strongly indicated that fit-
34Id. There is some indication that Mrs. Eilers' Negro husband left marks
on some of the children in attempting to correct them.
35 Id. at 873.
36 See In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Foun-
taine v. Fountaine, 9 III. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956); Portnor v.
Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952). But see Painter v. Bannister
140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), where the court refused custody to a "Bohemian'
father. See also Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1410 (1959) (religion as a factor in cus-
tody); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 675 (1958) (race as a factor in child custody);
Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 909 (1957) (race as a factor in adoption).37 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of
Education, 374 U.S. 483 (1958); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
38 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 9 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). "Marriage is a social relation sub-
ject to the State's police power, but such a power is limited by the commands of
the Fourteenth Amendment .... The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrim-
ination in the states." Id. at 7. Loving has made unconstitutional KRS § 402.020-
.990 (1962). The legality of the racial marriage in Eilers is not an issue since
it was legally performed in Illinois.4
0 Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See also Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
KENTucKy LAw JouAL
ness of the parents cannot be determined by racial considerations
repugnant to the Constitution.
C. ADoPTON
In Williams v. Neuman,41 the Court was confronted with a situation
in which a child's natural mother, four days after that child's birth, had
placed the infant in another's care, stating that she "never wanted to
see [the child] again."42 The mother signed consent to adoption
papers and did not see the child again for about a year. Appellants
raised the child in their home and provided for all her needs. Ap-
pellant-husband was seventy-three, and his wife was fifty-one when
they filed adoption proceedings. The child's mother and alleged natural
father, married after the child's birth and both about twenty-five years
of age, contested the adoption. The trial court awarded custody to
the natural mother on the basis of the recommendation of a social
worker that appellants were too old to adopt a child. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that it was error to refuse the adoption
since the appellants were qualified despite their ages.
The Court was primarily concerned with the advanced ages of the
appellants as compared to the relative youth of the appellees.43 How-
ever, the Court indicated that where investigation reveals that an
adoption is clearly justified, the age of those proposing the adoption
should not "influence the court in the determination of the case"44
Appellant-husband was retired, but his wife earned enough to provide
them comfortable living. Furthermore, appellants had raised the child
since birth, and to place her with the appellees, whom she had never
seen, would impair her welfare. "She cannot be suddenly transplanted
like a dogwood tree without running serious and dangerous risk of
frustration and bewilderment."45 Thus, even the desire of the natural
41405 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1966).
42 Id. at 557.
43 Shortly after Williams, another case was decided involving an adoption
dispute between an aged couple and the natural mother. In that case, however
the elderly couple were the natural grandparents, and the mother had neglected
and not properly fed the children. The Court affirmed the circuit court in granting
adoption by the grandparents. Roark v. Yarbrough, 411 S.W.2d 916 (1967). An
interesting issue in that case was the constitutional question of whether the natural
mother, who signed the consent for custody was denied due process of law be-
cause she was not represented by counsel. The Court held that she was not.44 Williams v. Neuman 405 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Ky. 1966). The Court was
quoting Lee v. Thomas, 291 Ky. 858, 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944). In Lee the Court
was confronted with a factual situation similar to that in Williams with regard to
the age of the adopting parties, but there the natural mother was "not as well
suited for custody as the mother in [Williams]. 405 S.W.2d at 558.
45 405 S.W.2d at 557.
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mother to "bring the "brood' together under one roof"46 would not
compel the Court to take her from the appellants.
Another issue to which the Court alluded in the statement of the
facts concerned a claim that the natural mother had not realized the
full import of the consent to adoption papers. The Court either gave
no weight to this point, or chose to ignore it.4 7 Prior Kentucky decisions
indicate that only if the natural mother shows "sufficient reason,"48
such as a lack of understanding of what she was doing,49 can she in-
validate consent to adoption papers. 0
Although Williams does not represent a landmark decision in
domestic relations, it does point out once again that the "welfare of
the child is the paramount question."51 The Court was not bound by
the natural mother's desire to bring her disassembled family together
when such a measure could jeopardize the child's security.5 2 The
Court soundly recognizes that psychological values such as love and
stability, found in most family relationships, have important effects on
46 Id.
47This was mentioned only in the facts, when the Court stated:
Wanda stated that she was "not sure" what she said about adoption at
the signing of consent for adoption on May 16, 1963; but she stated,
"The only thing that I do know is that I said that I did want this child
back if anything happened to them [sic]." Further along in her testimony
Wanda stated "she couldn't have her to keep." Id.
48 Skaggs v. Cannon, 293 Ky. 795, 170 S.W.2d 12 (1943).49 Wsh v. Young, 240 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1951).
0 A similar issue was presented in Commonwealth v. Helton, 411 S.W.2d
932 (Ky. 1967) in which the Court upheld a decision terminating the natural
mother's parental rights, stating:
Occasions do arise when parents realize the unhappy necessity of their
surrendering parental rights, sometimes involuntarily. . ., and sometimes
voluntarily. . . .The entire adoption program would be utterly frus-
trated if judgments terminating parental rights were to be lightly re-
garded. The prospective adoptive parents, the Department [of Child
Welfare], and indeed the parents whose rights have been terminated
would have no assurance of when or if an adoption could be effected
if the termination were regarded as revocable. That this condition would
militate against the best interests of the child and the public at large
hardly needs elaboration. Id. at 934.
51405 S.W.2d at 557.52 See B. War, TrE ABNoP.Ai- PERsoNraLr 223 (3d ed. 1964), where
it states:
The infant experiences need satisfaction chiefly from his mother ...
The presence of the mother or nurse is soon learned to be the best guar-
antee of security. Separation from the mother can thus easily become a
serious danger signal. At the outbreak of the Second World War, with
the threat of large-scale bombing of cities, much fear was felt con-
cerning the shattering effects of air raids on children's feeling of security.
Experience showed that for small children, at any rate, the danger of
separation from the family circle had a far more devastating effect than
the bombings.
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a child's development. Other jurisdictions have chosen to follow a like
path when confronted with similar situations,5 3 and it is a course that
must always be kept uppermost in mind if adoption proceedings are
to share in the twentieth-century enlightenment process.
53 See In re Duke, 95 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1957); In re Brown, 85 So. 2d 617
(Fla. 1956); Mcowen v. McGowen, 364 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
XII. INSURANCE
A. AuTomoBE INSURANCE
"By far the greatest amount of liability insurance today ... covers
the risks arising from automobile accidents."1 This is a fact best ex-
plained by Lewis Mumford's view that "the current American way of
life is founded . . .on the religion of the motor car."2 In 1964, in-
surance companies collected more than seven and one half billion
dollars in premiums on automobile insurance policies, and paid
losses that totaled almost five billion dollars.3
Motorists are so heavily insured that many losses are covered by
more than one policy. Court battles are often fought between hvo in-
surers, either of which might be found liable, depending on the fancy
of the court and the facts of the case. Often, the law in these situations
is undefined, perhaps undefinable, and characterized by intricate
judicial jargon which often conceals the actual issue. Last term, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals decided cases in two of these areas-the
"other insurance dilemma" and the "loading and unloading problem."
1. Other Insurance-Most automobile insurance policies cover the
insured vehicle when driven by the owner and when driven by others
with the owner's consent. By the same token, most policies cover the
insured driver when driving the insured vehicle and when driving
another vehicle not owned by him. Thus, when an insured driver is
driving an insured car not owned by him, he is covered by his own
policy and the owner's policy. This situation arises quite frequently
when a car is borrowed or rented. When an accident occurs, the
question becomes: which insurer should pay?
Insurers have long anticipated such situations and have recognized
that by skillfully drafting their policies, they can reduce liablility or
escape it altogether. Such policy provisions are known as "other in-
surance' clauses, and four types are commonly used:4 1) the "pro
rata" clause provides that the insurers will share the loss up to the
limits of their policies; 2) the "standard escape" clause provides that
the policy affords no coverage at all when there is other valid and col-
I W. PnossEa, TORTS 563 (3d ed. 1964).
2L. MxiFrow, THE HIGHWAY AND THE CITy 176 (rev. ed. 1964).
3 Premiums paid for automobile liability insurance against personal injury
totaled $8,612,000,000, and losses amounted to $2,266 000,000. Premiums paid for
automobile liability insurance against damage to other persons' property were
$1,418,000,000, and losses totaled $940,000,000. Premiums paid for policies cov-
ering the insured's automobile (collision insurance) were $2,552,000,000 and
losses were $1,581,000,000. U.S. BUREAU OF ru CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTAcT
OF TE UNrrED STATES 474 (87th. ed. 1966).
4 See generally Note Concurrent Coverage in Automobile Liability Insurance,
65 COLUm. L. REv. 319 (1965); 29A Aivr. Jun. Insurance § 1716 (1960).
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lectible insurance; 3) the "excess" clause provides that the insurer
shall only be liable for the amount by which the loss exceeds the
coverage of all other valid and collectible insurance, up to the policy
limit; and 4) the "excess-escape" clause provides that the policy
affords no coverage at all when there is other valid and collectible in-
surance, either primary or excess.
To resolve conflicts between these clauses, most courts have
established a "pecking order" much like the child's game of rock, paper,
and scissors: "rock breaks scissors, scissors cut paper, paper covers
rock." The rules of the game are:5
1) Where only one policy has an other insurance clause, that clause
will be given effect according to its provisions.6
2) Where the two policies contain identical other insurance clauses, the
loss is shared by the two insurers. 7 In no case shall the two clauses
serve to allow both insurers to escape liability.8
3) Where the two policies have different other insurance clauses, the
following hierarchy controls liability: 9
Excess-escape (Strongest)
Excess
Escape
Pro rata (Weakest)
The rationale for this hierarchy is that the insurer anticipated the
possibility of other insurance and expressly stated the conditions under
which it would be liable. Since the general rule is that insurance
policies, like all contracts, should be construed according to the mean-
ing of their terms and the intention of the parties,10 the courts give
effect to these clauses. For example an "escape" clause affords no
coverage against a "pro rata" clause since the "escape" policy is not
"other valid and collectible insurance" under the terms of the "pro
rata" policy. When matched with an "excess" policy, however, an
5 See Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d (1961); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1960); Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1956).6 See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.
1951); Penn v. National Union Indem. Co., 68 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1934).
7 See, e.g., Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. American Employees Ins. Co.,
209 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1954); Hancock v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 154 F. Supp.
164 (E.D. Ky. 1957).8 See 8 J. A.'PI.anAN, INsURANCE LAw & PAcrrcE § 4913 (2d ed. 1962).
9 See, e.g., Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co., 369 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1966)
(pro rata v. excess) (applying Kentucky law); McFarland v. Chicago Express,
Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952) (pro rata v. escape); Zurich Gen. Accident &
Life Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941) (escape v. excess); All-
state Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967)
(excess v. excess-escape); General Ins. of America v. Rocky Mountain Fire &
Cas. Co.. ........ Wash. 2d ....... 423 P.2d 537 (1967) (pro rata v. excess-
escape). The Kentucky Court had dealt with the problem only once before last
term in a case involving an escape clause against an excess clause. The Court
followed the majority rule, finding the policy with the escape clause covered
the loss. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 292 Ky. 22, 165 S.W.2d 838 (1942).
10 Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Burke, 258 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1953).
[Vol. 56,
COURT OF APPEALs REvIEW
"escape" policy covers the loss since it is "other valid and collectible in-
surance" under the terms of the "excess" clause.
To Oregon and other courts comprising a small minority, this word-
magic has seemed to be "circular reasoning."" These courts have
adopted the minority rule that all "other insurance" clauses are
mutually repugnant and therefore void. Thus, whenever two policies
are available, the two insurers share the loss automatically without
regard to their policy provisions.
Last term, the "other insurance dilemma" was presented to the
Court of Appeals in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Globe
Indemnity Co.12 There, the driver's policy contained an "excess"
clause, and the owner's policy contained an "excess-escape" clause.
13
The Court applied the majority rule and held the driver's insurer liable,
stating: "[T]he owner's insurer anticipated the possibility of the
existence of an 'excess insurance' clause in the driver's insurance
policy, and expressly contracted against liability in that situation....
[T]he clause was a valid, express condition against liability."
4
This approach to the "other insurance" problem is satisfactory in
that it provides a definite, predictable test that may be relied upon by
insurers. It is in accordance with the general principle that parties
should be free to include or exclude any provisions they desire, so
long as these provisions are consistent with public policy. As long as
insurers continue to use only the four types of other insurance pro-
visions discussed supra, conflicts can be easily resolved, perhaps with-
out resort to the courts. However, it may be expected that most in-
surers will ultimately adopt the strongest (excess-escape) clause, and
more policies will contain identical terms. Thus, proration will result
automatically, as under the minority rule.
On the other hand, it may also be expected that insurance com-
panies will continue their efforts to escape liablility in "other insurance"
cases. As adroit policy drafters shrewdly devise new provisions, courts
11 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange . ....... Ore...... 420 P.2d
66 (1966); Firemens Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 243 Ore. 10,
411 P.2d 271 (1966); Lamb-Weston Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore.
110, 341 P.2d 110, modified, 219 Ore. 129, 346 P.2d 643 (1959). See also Oregon
Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir.
1952) (applying Oregon law). One division of the Illinois Appellate Court fol-
lowed the minority rule in several cases. For a discussion of the problem, see
Watson, Illinois Resolves the Other Insurance Dilemma, 55 ILL. B.J. 228 (1966).
Louisiana has arrived at the same result as Oregon in at least one case, though
it is not clear whether the minority rule was actually adopted. See State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d 750 (La. 1966).
12 415 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967).
13 Id.
'4 Id. at 582. The Court relied primarily on Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes,
74 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1954) for a statement of the majority rule in the excess-
escape v. excess situation.
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will be called upon to determine their places in the pecking order. For
this reason, the minority rule may be more desirable insofar as its
automatic proration formula prevents litigation and discourages new
schemes for limiting liability. However, even if proration is the better
rule, it will no doubt require a legislative enactment since the majority
rule is firmly entrenched.
2. Loading and Unloading-Legal writers have long considered
liability insurance a means of spreading the cost of accidents to society
as a whole.15 This view has gradually been adopted by the courts,'0
causing development of a judicial doctrine which favors finding an
insurer liable whenever possible. This theory is never expressly
verbalized, but it is the rationale behind such declarations as "in-
surance policies should be construed against the insurer who drafts
them."1
7
The 'loading and unloading" clause of the standard automobile
liability policy is one device courts use to implement this theory. Most
policies cover losses arising from automobile "use" which is defined as
including 'loading and unloading." 8 Courts originally adopted a
limited interpretation of loading and unloading, termed the "coming
to rest doctrine."'9 Under this rule, loading began at the time the
material was physically placed in the vehicle and unloading ended
when the material came to rest at its destination. But as the courts
began to adopt the more liberal view of the function of insurance,
they expanded their construction of "loading and unloading" clauses
to include the "complete operation" of loading and unloading.20 Just
what is included in a "complete operation" is, of course, impossible to
predict and depends entirely on the particular facts in a case and the
court's own inclinations. 2'
15 See, e.g., L. GREEN, TnAc Vicnmis: TORT LAw & INsuRAxcE 103
(1958).
16 W. PRossER, supra note 1 at 562. One indication of this trend is a com-
parison between losses paid and premiums received. In 1950, insurance com-
panies paid back only 40.7% of the premiums collected; in 1964 this figure was
63.1%. Thus, insurers are paying back almost two-thirds of premiums collected.
U.S. BurxAu OF THE CENSUS, supra note 3, at 474.
17American Employees Inc. v. Brock, 215 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948).
I 8 See Risjord, Loading and Unloading, 13 VAND. L. REv. 903 (1960);
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1964); Annot., 160 A.L.R. 1259 (1945).
19 See Risjord supra note 18, at 904.
20 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 190 F. Supp. 893 (D.C. Mich. 1961).2 1 In Wagman v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., a consignor was watching a
shipment being loaded onto a truck by the trucker's employees. As the consignor
turned to enter his store, a passer-by tripped over the consignor's feet and was
injured. The court held that the consignor was engaged in the complete operation
of loading the truck even though he was not carrying anything, and therefore
the truckers insurance covered the loss. 201 Misc. 325, 108 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup.
(Continued on next page)
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In defining "loading and unloading" courts did not consider the
status of the negligent actor. The standard policy defines "insured" as
the named insured and "any other person using the automobile, pro-
vided the actual use thereof is with the permission of the named in-
sured."22 Thus, courts found liability under "loading and unloading"
clauses regardless of whether the accident was caused by the owner,
his employee, or a third person with no legal relationship to the in-
sured.
23
However, recent years have witnessed a trend away from the
liberal rule. Ohio was the first jurisdiction to depart and it seized upon
the actor's status as its basis. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Buckeye
Union Casualty Co.,24 the driver of a truck was injured when an em-
ployee of Gulf Oil negligently loaded diesel fuel into the truck. Gulf
argued that the trucker's policy covered the loss since their employee
was "using" the truck at the time of the accident. The court rejected
this argument, reasoning:
[Wihere as here the injury is caused by a third party who is not
connected with the truck, who has no legal relationship to the named
insured, and who under normal circumstances would not be using the
truck... it must first appear ... that such third party was in the actual
use of the truck. ... [Tuhe equipment used by Gulfs employee was
exclusively owned by Gulf and the acts performed by ... [him] related
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Ct. 1951), aft'd, 279 App. Div. 993, 112 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1952), af'd, 304 N.Y.
490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952).
In Lamberti v. Anaco Equip. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 121, 226 N.Y.S.2d
70 (1962), a truck emptied its load of concrete into the bucket of a crane, and the
crane operator negligently let the concrete spill, injuring some workers on the
ground. The truckers insurer was held liable. In two similar cases, the entire
crane collapsed after the concrete truck had unloaded causing several deaths
and injuries. Despite proof that the crane owner had negligently maintained
the equipment, the court found the truck insurer liable under the "loading and
unloading" clause. Travelers Ins. Co. v. W. F. Saunders & Sons, 18 App. Div.
2d 126, 288 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1963); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employees Cas. Co., 380
S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1964).
See also, Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Mach. Co., 90 So. 2d 417 (La. 1956)
(consignor's employee negligently injured trucker while tagging grader blades
preparatory to placing them on loading ramp); State Auto. & Cas. Underwriters
v. Casualty Underwriters, Inc., 266 Minn. 536, 124 N.W.2d 185 (1963) (con-
signee's employees opened sidewalk trapdoor injuring passerby before truck be-
gan to unload); London Guar. & Accident Co. v. C. B. White & Bros., 188 Va.
195, 49 S.E.2d 254 (1948) (pedestrian tripped on piece of coal from pile beingshoveled into bin from street after truck unloaded and left).
For a case that found no "loading or unloading" see Pavlik v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1961) (construction employee hurt
when washing dragline bucket with hose from concrete truck, after concrete was
unloaded and deposited in forms).22 See Risjord, supra note 18.
237 Am Jun. 2d Automobile Insurance 89 (1963); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d
1122, 1125, (1964).
24 172 Ohio St. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792 (1961). See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1114
(1964).
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exclusively to his own employment. The insured truck was still under
the control of... [the driver].
25
The court further stated that the trucker did not pay premiums with
the intention that the insurer protect third parties against his claims. 26
Three recent cases from other jurisdictions indicate that this approach
is gaining favor.
2 7
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, applying Michigan
law, criticized this rule in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Huitt:28
To the extent that it would impose special restrictions upon persons not
bearing a legal relationship to the named insured ...[the Ohio court]
appears to have read conditions into the definition of the insured not
contained in the policy. The policy in defining "the insured" makes no
distinction between employees of the named insured and strangers.
29
The Kentucky Court of Appeals faced this problem last term in
Kentucky Water Service Co. v. Selective Insurance Go.30 In that case,
the insured trucker was getting a load of water at the Water Service,
helped by an employee of the Service. The overhead water pipe became
unfastened and fell, knocking the trucker to the ground and injuring
him. The trucker sued the water company and its employee. The
defendants then attempted to get the truck insurer to defend the
action on the grounds that the employee was "using" the truck at the
time of the accident and that it was immaterial whether the negligence
was that of the trucker or the employee.31 The lower court rejected this
argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Following the Ohio rule,
the Court reasoned:
[T] he truck was clearly operated by . . . the named insured. It was
exclusively under his control. . . .There is no suggestion that . . . [the
employee of the water service] had any other function than to turn, as
he did, the water valve .... It would seem evident that .. . [his act]
in turning the valve did not constitute using the truck within the meaning
of the policy and that it was not such coverage as was within the con-
25 172 Ohio St. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792, 796-97 (1961).
26 Id. at ......... 178 N.E.2d at 798. See also Buckeye Union Gas. Co. v.
Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co 2 Ohio St. 2d 59, 206 N.E.2d 209 (1965), where the Ohio
court affirmed its rufe in Travelers: "We can never arrive at a finding that an
insured may be a claimant against a company which has computed a risk to
protect the insured only against the claims of others." 2 Ohio St. 2d at ................
206 N.E.2d at 211.27 San Fernando Valley Crane Serv. v. Travelers Ins. Go., 229 Cal. App. 2d
229, 40 Cal. Rep. 165 (1966); Rogers v. Continental Gas. Co., 155 So. 2d 641
(La. 1963); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Backus, 243 Md. 121, 220
A.2d 189 (1966).
28886 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964).
29 Id. at 48.
30 406 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1966).
31 Brief for Appellant at 9, Kentucky Water Serv. Go. v. Selective Ins. Co.,
406 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1966).
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templation of the ... [parties] when the policy was issued. We cannot
escape the view that . . . [the insured] did not pay premiums to
Selective so that it would insure third parties against his claim for
damages.
8 2
Whether the Court's decision in this case is wise depends on one's
vantage point. Insurers will no doubt welcome it as a sound limitation
on their liability, but those who frequently load and unload vehicles
belonging to others will criticize it as too severe. Where a negligent
third party is covered by his own liability policy, it seems reasonable
to require his insurer to suffer the loss rather than the insurer of the
innocent truck or automobile owner. Where, however, the injured
party is faced with an uninsured, judgment proof defendant, he may
be delighted for his own insurer to indemnify him. However, the rule
in Kentucky Water makes no such distinction. Thus, the case seems
to strike a blow at the more liberal view of insurance as a loss-spread-
ing device.
It remains to be seen whether the Court will follow this rule
absolutely and hold that third parties are never covered under the
loading and unloading clause if they have no legal relationship to the
insured. Such an absolute rule would be too severe since the nature of
the third party's acts may vary considerably, and at least some third
party use of the insured vehicle is no doubt contemplated by the
parties at the time the insurance policy is issued.
3. Financial Responsibility Law-Although the Kentucky Financial
Responsibility Law33 was enacted almost two decades ago, until last
term the Court of Appeals had never made a definitive statement of
its purpose. In cases arising under the statute, the Court would
merely state that the law provided "added protection to the public and
better [assured] the safety of our highways."3 4
In Tharp v. Security Insurance Co.35 the Court provided a clear
statement of the legislative intent and policy underlying the statute.
There, the appellant was injured in an automobile accident caused by
a driver insured by the appellee insurance company. The driver had
been convicted in 1958 of driving while intoxicated, and consequently,
his driver's license was revoked. In 1959, after his license was reissued,
he applied for an operator's policy which, under the Kentucky Auto-
mobile Assigned Risk Plan,36 covers the insured driver only while
32406 S.W.2d at 387.
33 KRS § 187.290-.990 (1962).34 See e.g., Ballow v. Reeves 238 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Ky. 1951).
35 405 S.W.2d 760 (Ky. 1966).36KRS § 187.490(3) (1962) provides that an operators policy "shall insure
the . . . insured . . . for damages arising out of the use by him of any motor
vehicle not owned by him."
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driving a vehicle not owned by him. Pursuant to the Financial Re-
sponsibility Law, the liability risk was assigned to the appellee in-
surance company. The policy did not cover "any automobile owned by
the named insured or a member of the same household,"37 and it was
valid from July, 1959, to July, 1962.
In 1961, the insured purchased an automobile but had title and
registration placed in his mother's name. Appellant was injured in
September, 1961, and brought suit against the driver and appellee. The
insurance company refused to defend the action, asserting that the
driver owned the automobile. The appellant received judgment
against the driver, but when it appeared that the driver had no
property, the appellant sued the insurance company. The lower court
ruled that the insured "owned" the car even though legal title and
registration were in his mother's name. Thus, the car was excluded
from coverage. On appeal, the Court reversed and ordered appellee
to pay the judgment.
The insurer first argued that automobiles owned by the insured
and members of his household were expressly excluded from the
policy, and that, therefore, even if the car were owned by the insured's
mother, it would not be covered. The Court rejected this contention on
the grounds that the Financial Responsibility Law is read into and
becomes a part of every policy issued under the assigned risk plan.38
Any policy provisions contrary to the law are null and void.39 Be-
cause the statute does not allow exclusion of automobiles owned by a
member of the insured's household, any policy provision providing
otherwise would be inoperative.40
The insurer also attempted to establish that the insured was the
"owner" of the car even though title and registration were in his
mother's name.41 The statute, however, defines "owner" as "a person
87405 S.W.2d at 762.
38KRS § 187.490(6)(d) (1962).
39 Id.
40 405 S.W.2d at 763.
4 1 Appellee relied upon two Kentucky cases holding that "paper title" is not
essential to have 'legal title." Crawley v. Mackey, 283 Ky. 717, 143 S.W.2d
171 (1940); Turner v. Bowens, 180 Ky. 755, 203 S.W. 749 (1918). The Court
answered with this statement:
Words such as owner and ownership are consistently used with reliance
upon their assumed concreteness and ability to express in all situations
the same concepts. Unfortunately, their apparent synonimity often is
illusory.... In Campbell County Bd. of Education v. Boulevard Enter-
prises, Inc., 360 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Ky. 1962) we said "tihe word owner
invokes many images. It is elastic and its color changes to match the con-
text...." Counsel have cited decisions of this court defining the word
"owner" with regard to its technical meaning within the lav of real and
personal property. . . .The concern of the court in this case is to de-
(Continued on next page)
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who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle,"4 and the Court, applying
the plain-meaning rule, refused to accept this argument:
For the purposes of the Kentucky Financial Responsibility Law, the
owner of a motor vehicle, having legal title to it, is the person in whose
name the vehicle is registered. . . The objective of the Financial
Responsibility Law . . . would be defeated by permitting an insurer
under the law to deny coverage on the basis of interests of ownership not
of public record. There would be no certainty in fixing legal responsibility
and the law would be incapable of administration. . . 43 (Emphasis
added.)
The Court vent further and defined the "objective" of the law and
provided a clear statement of its policy:
The Financial Responsibility Law is remedial in nature and should be
broadly construed. The purpose of the law is fundamentally to provide
compensation for persons injured through faulty operation of motor
vehicles. The Commonwealth has a valid interest in promoting safety
on the highways. . . . As between the insurer and an innocent mem-
ber of the general public, the risk is on the insurer.44 (Emphasis added.)
This decision will no doubt meet with great disapproval from in-
surance companies, but it seems consistent with the policy of the
Legislature.4" In any event, the Court has provided a clear statement
of "legislative intent" which should be helpful to counsel in cases
arising under the statute.
B. FnoPEnTY INSuBANcE
In order to recover on a fire insurance policy, the insured must
have an "insurable interest" in the property. Insurable interest is
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
termine what was intended by the legislature by the use of the word
"owner" in the Kentucky Financial Responsibility Law.
As if to further demonstrate the elasticity of the word, the Court again last term
held that 'legal title" and "paper title" are not synonymous. In Motors Ins. Co. v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 412 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1967) the dispute was between two in-
surance companies, one of which had insured the seller of a car; the other had
insured the purchaser. Though "paper title" was still in the seller, the Court
held that the purchaser's insurer was liable, relying on KRS § 355.2-401 (1962).
42KRS § 187.290(9) (1962).
43405 S.W.2d at 766. The Court continued: "Therefore KRS 187.490(3)
means that an operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person named
as insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law for
damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle not registered in
his name."
44 Id. at 764-66.
4r The Court relied on the statute itself as authority for its decision: "The
liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by the
. . . [Financial Responsibility Law] shall become absolute whenever injury or
damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs ... " (Emphasis
added.) KRS § 187.490(6)(a) (1962). This decision follows those in other
jurisdictions with similar Financial Responsibility Laws. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d
995 (1963); Annot, 83 A.L.R.2d 1104 (1962).
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"that interest in the property by virtue of which the person insured
will derive pecuniary benefit or advantage from its preservation, or
will suffer pecuniary loss or damage from its destruction or injury by
the happening of the event insured against." 0 There is a disagreement
among American jurisdictions regarding insurable interest where
property has been sold but legal title has not passed. The majority,
including Kentucky, hold that when "equitable title" passes to the
vendee, the vendor no longer has an insurable interest, even though
the vendor still holds 'legal title" and may be in possession.47 The
minority rule is that the vendor retains an insurable interest until title
passes. 4
8
Where the vendee is the government, taking under the right of
eminent domain, the rule is somewhat complicated because of the
government's right to abandon condemnation proceedings. 49 The Ken-
tucky rule is that the condemnor may abandon a proceeding at any
time, even after judgment, so long as possession has not been taken or
the award paid. 0
Last term, the Court faced this problem in Patrick v. Kentucky
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.51 The appellant had an insurance
policy with the appellee, covering loss from fire up to four thousand
dollars. In May, 1962, the Commonwealth instituted condemnation
proceedings against the property, and on July 3, the county court
entered an order allowing the Commonwealth to take possession of
the land upon paying the reported value of $7,500. The Commonwealth
paid the money into court, and on July 7, the clerk paid it to the ap-
pellant. On July 22, after both parties had appealed the amount of
the award to the circuit court, the property was destroyed by fire.
The appellant sued on the policy, but the lower court found that he
had no insurable interest and denied recovery.
On appeal, the appellant argued that he had an insurable interest
since he had legal title and the Commonwealth could abandon the
proceedings any time before the final judgment of the circuit court.
46 Crabb v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 225 S.W.2d 990 (Ky. 1953).
47 Cooks Adm'r v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 224 Ky. 360, 6 S.W.2d 477 (1928).
The basis for the rule is that the vendor suffers no loss from the destruction of
the property since the vendee is obligated to pay the purchase price. To permit
an insured to keep the proceeds of both the sale and the insurance policy offends
public policy since that policy frowns upon placing an insured in a position to
profit by a loss which he may be tempted to cause himself or be careless in
failing to prevent.48 See, e.g., Heidisch v. Globe Republic Ins. Co. of America, 368 Pa. 602,
84 A.2d 566 (1951).
49 See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 888 (1953).
50 See, e.g., Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Fultz, 860 S.W.2d 216
(Ky. 1962).
51 413 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967).
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The Commonwealth was not named a party to the action but filed an
amicus curiae brief asserting its right to abandon the proceeding. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, holding that appellant had
no insurable interest. Although it acknowledged that under the con-
demnation statutes the appellant still held legal title,52 the Court
reaffirmed its rule that legal title is not conclusive of insurable in-
terest
3
Turning to the appellant's contention that the Commonwealth could
abandon the proceeding, the Court reaffirmed its rule that the con-
demnor may abandon at any time before possession is taken or the
award paid:
5 4
[T]he pending appeal to the circuit court was confined only to the issue
of the amount of compensation to be paid for the taking, and the right
of the condemnor to pay the . .. award and take possession of the
property was unaffected by this appeal . .. [Aippellant was assured
by operation of law that she would receive a judicially determined
amount of money representing the fair market value of the property in-
sured.... [O]nce the condemnor pays, its right to abandon the con-
demnation proceeding ceases .. .and the risk of the destruction of...
[the property is] on the condemnor." 55
In its amicus brief, the Commonwealth argued that if it had no
right to abandon the proceedings, it was entitled to the proceeds of
the policy and it should be joined in this action as an indispensible
party. 0 The Court sidestepped this issue, holding that the Common-
wealth was not an indispensible party to the action since it was not
a named party to the insurance contract.5 7 In a cryptic parting word,
however, the opinion hinted that in a suit against the insurer, the
Commonwealth might prevail: "[A] s the Commonwealth was not a
party to this action, it is not bound by the judgment herein nor are its
rights prejudiced."58 (Emphasis added.) The Court seems to indicate
by this phrase that in a suit between the Commonwealth and the in-
surance company, perhaps the Commonwealth could successfully as-
sert a right to the policy proceeds.59
2 KRS § 177.087(6) (1962) authorizes conveyance of the title by action
of the circuit court after the appeal.
53 413 S.W.2d at 342.
54 Id. at 343.
55 Id. at 343-44.
5Brief for Kentucky Department of Highways as Amicus Curiae at 8,
Patrick v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 413 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1967).
57 413 S.W.2d at 344.
58 Id.
59 This problem is beyond the scope of this comment and it was not an issue
in the case. However, there is some authority to the effect that a condemnor
acqures the rights of the owner to the proceeds of the policy. See Heidisch v.
Globe Republic Ins. Co. of America, 368 Pa. 602, 84 A.2d 566 (1951). The
(Continued on next page)
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This decision serves to clarify the Commonwealth's right to
abandon condemnation proceedings, and it serves to further establish
the point at which the condemnee's insurable interest ceases. By this
holding, insurers will be protected from the "moral hazard" that owners
of condemned property will destroy the property to collect the in-
surance and be entitled to condemnation damages also.60
This decision should provide guidelines for future condemnation-
insurable interest problems, and such problems may be expected to
increase as the number of state and federal highway and urban re-
newal projects expand.
C. LiFE INSURANCE
In 1965, life insurance in force in the United States totaled over
nine hundred billion dollars6' or more than $4,500 for every American
citizen. The combined assets of the two largest life insurance com-
panies exceeded the combined assets of the two largest industrial
corporations. 62 With this vast amount of insurance in force, a myriad
of legal problems arise and life insurance cases account for a sub-
stantial portion of litigated insurance disputes. Last term, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals decided two significant life insurance cases
dealing in turn with the mental capacity of a person killing an insured,
and the proof of loss requirement.
1. "Intentionalr Killing-Most life insurance policies expressly
exclude from coverage, deaths resulting from an intentional act, and
courts generally consider this exclusion a valid limitation of liability.
Where, however, the death of the insured is caused by an "insane
person," the death is not considered intentional, and the beneficiary is
entitled to the proceeds of the policy. 63 South Carolina has been the
only jurisdiction in the United States to hold that the mental capacity
of the killer has no bearing on the question of intent.64 In all other
jurisdictions, the mental capacity of the actor is a question of fact, and
upon a jury finding of insanity, the insurer is held liable.
Until last term, Kentucky appeared to follow the majority rule,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Kentucky Court has never ruled on this point but has generally favored the
Commonwealth in similar situations. Cf. Commonwealth v. Fultz, 360 S.W.2d
216 (Ky. 1962).6 0 See note 47 supra.
61 U.S. BUREAU OF T CENsus, STATISTiCAL ABSTnACr OF THE UNITED
STATES 474 (87th ed. 1966).62 
INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 594 (1965).
63 See generally 29A Am. Jun. Insurance § 1199 (1960); 1A J. APPLEr. AN,
INSURAxcE. LAw & PRACrCE 482 (2d ed. 1962); 45 C.J.S. Insurance 772 (1946);
C. Couch, INsURANcE 41:667 (2d ed. 1962); Annot., 55 A.L.R. 688 (1928).
64Deloache v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 223 S.C. 341, 104 S.E.2d 875 (1958).
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though the Court had never actually decided a case in which the in-
sured was killed by an alleged insane person. The Court had, however,
followed the majority in suicide cases, holding that "if the insured did
not realize the consequences of his act" the insurer was liable.65 In
two suicide cases, the insurance policy excluded coverage where the in-
sured committed suicide, and expressly stated that whether he was
sane or insane was of no consequence. Ignoring these provisions, the
Court held the insurer liable, stating "the insured... [was] so insane
that he did not know he was taking his own life or that his act would
probably result in death."6 Apparently interpreting these cases to
mean that Kentucky subscribed to the majority rule, a federal court, in
a case where the insured was killed by an insane person, held that
"an intentional injury policy does not preclude recovery where the in-
sured is killed by an insane person incapable of forming a rational
intent!"67
The Court of Appeals considered this problem last term in Wagner
v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co.68 The insured was killed in
1960, and his killer was convicted of voluntary manslaughter over an
insanity defense. The appellee insurer refused to pay on the decedents
policy, standing on the exclusion for intentional injury or death.69 The
decedents wife, who was his beneficiary, sued for the proceeds, con-
tending that the man who killed her husband was insane at the time
of the killing.70 The jury found for the beneficiary and the insurer ap-
pealed.
Initially, the Court reversed, 71 holding:
A person may be excused from penalty if he is insane at the time he
commits a criminal act... [even though] he may do the act with every
intention of consummating it. The absence of punishment, however, does
65New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 226 Ky. 597, 11 S.W.2d 417 (1928);
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 207 Ky. 524, 269 S.W. 736 (1925); Vicars
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 Ky. 1, 164 S.W. 106 (1914). The U.S. Supreme Court
has also approved this rule. See American Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U.S.
527 (1887).66 Intersouthem Life Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 124 S.W. 333 (Ky. 1910); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 770, 106 S.W. 1175 (1908).
6 Corley v. Travelers Protective Ass'n, 105 F. 854, 46 C.C.A. 278 (1901).
08408 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. 1966).
69The policy contained the standard provision excluding coverage when
death is caused by "injuries intentionally inflicted upon the insured by another
person." Id.
7oThere was testimony that Shockley the killer, had "spells where he did
not know what he was doing." Shockley himself testified that he "just had not
control" of his actions, though he also testified that he had "intentionally" killed
Wagner. Appellant relied primarily on the testimony of a psychologist who had
examined Shockley. The expert testified that Shockley was "not ca ale of having
a rational intention to do what he did" although he was not "insane" by legal
standards. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 380 S.W.2d 224, 225-26
(Ky. 1964).71 Coonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 380 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1964).
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not retrospectively expunge the original intention .... [U]nder the terms
of the policy, the act was intentional and therefore specifically excluded
from coverage.
7 2
In that appeal the Court cited none of the relevant Kentucky cases
or any "majority" cases, but instead followed the South Carolina,
minority-of-one rule. 3 The case was remanded to circuit court for a
new trial with an instruction that if the evidence were substantially the
same, a directed verdict for the appellee insurer should be given. On
remand, the insurance company moved for summary judgment. In
response to this motion, the appellant filed a psychologist's affidavit
stating that the man who had killed the insured was "temporarily in-
sane" at the time of the act and therefore not mentally capable of dis-
tinguishing between "right and wrong."7 4 The lower court sustained
the insurer's motion for summary judgment and the beneficiary ap-
pealed.
On this second appeal, appellant argued that an injury inflicted
upon another by an insane person cannot be held as a matter of law
to be intentional but should be a jury question. The Court summarily
dismissed this argument, holding: "Irrespective of whether . . . [the
killer] was insane, the gunshot wounds which caused the death of the
assured were 'intentionally inflicted' as the term is used in the
policy."
7 5
It is difficult to understand why the Court would reject the majority
rule and follow a rule adhered to by only South Carolina.7 6 It is also
difficult to understand why the Court would do so without expressly
stating that there were Kentucky cases suggesting a contrary result
and either distinguishing these cases or overruling them. The Court
did not, in either opinion, cite or mention any cases other than those of
South Carolina.
The majority rule, i.e., the test for mental responsibility under the
intentional death clause of insurance policies is the same as the test for
72 Id. at 226.
73 See note 66 supra, and accompanying text.
74 408 S.W.2d at 612.
75 Id.7 6 Colonial Life is a South Carolina corporation, and it is safe to assume that
the policy was drawn up by South Carolina lawyers accustomed to the law in
that state. Perhaps the Kentucky Court felt somewhat bound by South Carolina
law, though there were no policy provisions to that effect. At any rate, the Court
did not indicate in either opinion that they were bound by South Carolina law.
See Brief for Appellee at 11, Colonial Life & Acident Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 380
S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1964). Another possible explanation for the decision is that the
Court felt Shockley's conviction for voluntary manslaughter in spite of his in-
sanity defense had settled the question. In that case, however, it would not have
been necessary to rule, that killing by an insane person was "intentional' as a
matter of law.
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mental responsibility in the criminal law,77 is clearly the better rule.
In 1968, Kentucky joined the small group of progressive states that
have adopted a more enlightened test of criminal responsibility. Under
Terry v. Commonwealth,78 the M'Naghten "right or wrong" test was
discarded in favor of a test allowing courts to take full advantage of
advances in the psychological and psychiatric sciences so as to more
effectively detect and deal with the mentally irresponsible.79 To
follow Terry four years later with a decision ignoring mental re-
sponsibility in life insurance cases seems, at best, inconsistent 80
This is not to suggest that "insanity" should always render the
intentional injury clause inoperative since an insurer should be free to
include in his policies any specific exclusions consistent with public
policy.8' If the insurer expressly excludes "intentional injuries by any
person, sane or insane," a result such as that in Wagner might be
justified. But if such a clause is not included, the capacity of the actor
should be a relevant question of fact for the jury. At the very minimum,
the Court, if it wishes to rule as a matter of law that insanity is no de-
fense, should expressly state its reasons and justify its departure from
the vast majority of other jurisdictions and similar Kentucky cases.
2. Proof of Loss-Most life insurance policies state that, in order to
receive the proceeds, the beneficiary must provide the insurer with
"proof of loss" within a specified time. "The purpose of a provision for
notice and proof of loss is to allow the insurer to form an intelligent
estimate of its rights and liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for in-
vestigation, and to prevent fraud and imposition upon it." 2 Courts
have generally recognized these interests as valid and have given
effect to proof of loss requirements. Courts have also recognized, how-
ever, that the requirement often serves as an escape clause for insurers
7 7 See, e.g., National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hannon, 212 Ala. 184, 101
So. 892 (1924). See also G. CoucH, supra note 68, at 41:667.
78371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1968).
7s h Terri test finds the accused insane if "at the time he committed the
act, be did not have substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct, or, if he did understand it, to resist the impulse to violate the law, but
in either case, the conduct must be the result of a mental disease or defect not
including abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct." Terry v. Commonwealth, 871 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. 1968).
80 "Afoolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has nothing
to do.."(Ralph Waldo Emerson). Perhaps courts as well as "great souls,~
need not be consistent, but courts, in the business o? providing guides for the
solution of future controversies, should never fail to explain their inconsistencies.81 See Borneman v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 289 N.Y. 295, 45 N.E.2d
452 (1942 , where the policy excluded "injuries intentionally inficted by any
person whie sane or insane. " But cf. note 57 supra, for Kentucky cases in which
such express policy Provisions were not given effect:' Such clauses still pose the
problem of defining "intentional" and determining whether the actor is capable
of forming an intent.
82 29A Am. Jun. Insurance § 1874 (1960).
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when beneficiaries neglect to comply. Thus, most courts have been
quick to find that the insurer has "waived" the requirement or that it
has been "estopped" by some action or inaction.83 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals has joined the majority in showing reluctance to require
compliance with proof of loss provisions whenever some basis for
"waiver" or "estoppel" can be found.s4
The Court of Appeals construed such a provision in Commercial
Travelers Mutual Accident Association v. Witte.85 The appellant issued
a life insurance policy to James Witte in 1953, with appellee named
as beneficiary.The policy required that proof of loss be filed with the
company within ninety days after the loss.86 Witte died on November
18, 1958, as a result of injuries inflicted by his wife during a domestic
altercation. Mrs. Witte was subsequently indicted for voluntary man-
slaughter. In December, Witte's brother gave the policy to his attorney,
who notified the company of Witte's death and requested proof of
loss forms. In their response, the company pointed out that the named
beneficiary was Mrs. Witte, not the estate. Nevertheless, they enclosed
the requested forms. At this point, Mrs. Witte was unaware of the
policy's existence. However, neither the attorney nor the company
sent Mrs. Witte the forms, and the attorney did not notify her that he
had them.
In the latter part of December, the insurer hired a detective to in-
vestigate the death. He spent some time in the investigation, but he
did not interview Mrs. Witte. She did not become aware of the policy
until mid-January, 1959, when the attorney informed her that she was
the beneficiary.87 She apparently did not read the policy or note the
83See G. CoucH, supra note 63, at 49:872. Perhaps this tendency to find
for the insured can be explained, in part at least, by the rule of construction that
insurance policies are construed against the insurer.84 See Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Gregory, 387 S.W.2d 287
(Ky. 1965).
85406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966).
86 The policy contained the following provisions with regard to proof of loss:
The Association upon receipt of such notice will furnish to the claimant
such forms as are usually furnished by it for filing proofs of loss. If such
forms are not so furnished within fifteen days after the receipt of such
notice, the claimant shall be deemed to have complied with the require-
ments of this certificate as to proof of loss upon submitting within the
time fixed in the certificate for filing proof of loss written proof covering
the occurrence, character and extent of the loss for which claim is made.
Affirmative proof of loss must be furnished to the Association at its said
office . . . within ninety days after the date of such loss. Id. at 146.
87 One of the partners of the attorney was representing Mrs. Witte in the
criminal trial. She was informed of the policy at a meeting attended by the three
of them. This caused counsel for the insurer to remark: "It seems that a complete
mockery is made of the law when partners in the same law firm have a proof
of loss within their file and one partner represents the insured and the insured
(Continued on next page)
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proof of loss requirement because she left the policy with the attorney
but did not then employ him to handle her claim.
In late April, Mrs. Witte was found guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter, an offense classified as an unintentional killing.8 8 Shortly
thereafter, she employed the attorney to claim the proceeds of the
policy, and be submitted proof of loss late in May. The company re-
jected the claim and suit followed. The lower court ruled in favor of
Mrs. Witte, and the insurer appealed, arguing that her claim was de-
feated by failure to fie proof of loss within ninety days.
By a policy provision and stipulation of the parties, the Court was
bound by New York law. The New York cases, somewhat contrary to
the general rule, hold that the proof of loss requirement is to be
strictly construed.8 9 Mrs. Witte, however, relied on a New York statute
which provides that policies must contain a clause extending the
ninety day period where compliance is not "reasonably possible."90
She argued that since she was in poor health from the time of her
husband's death until after the criminal trial and was unaware of the
policy requirements, it had not been "reasonably possible" for her to
file proof of loss within the required period.91 In response, the insurer
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
is aware of the fact that she is beneficiary of the policy within the time pre-
scribed for the filing of that proof of loss . . . but . ..we must believe that no
one in this same firm of lawyers advised her that they had a proof of loss."
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 7, Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident
Ass'n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1966).
ssThe insurer also argued that Mrs. Witte was not entitled to the policy
proceeds since she "intentionally" killed her husband. The Court dismissed this
argument, however stating: "We do not find any authority ...suggesting that
the policy of law forbidding one who had intentionally killed another to collect
the insurance on his life applies to an unintentional homicide. 406 S.W.2d
at 149.
89 MacKay v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co 281 N.Y. 42, 22 N.E.2d 154 (1939).
Relying on this case the Court originally decided in favor of the insurer. This
opinion was written by Judge Montgomery for a unanimous Court. The decision
has not been reported but may be found in the Appendix to the Appellee's Peti-
tion for Rehearing, filed January 3, 1966 with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
Rehearing was granted and the Court reversed their original decision with Chief
Justice Palmore writing for the majority. The Court was split 5 to 2, Montgomery
and Hill, J.J., dissenting.
90N.y. INsunRAc LAw § 164(3)(A)(7) (McKinney 1951) provides:
Failure to furnish such proof within the time required shall not invalidate
nor reduce any claim if it was not reasonably possible to give proof
within such time, provided such proof is furnished as soon as is reason-
ably possible and in no event, except in the absence of legal capacity,
later than one year from the time proof is otherwise required.
9' The "Findings of Fact" in the lower court stated: "That in any event
proof of loss was furnished by the plaintiff as soon as was reasonably possible and
that all conditions precedent required of said contract were fully performed."
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 7. This finding was based on evidence in-
troduced at the trial which showed that Mrs. Witte suffered severe emotional
shock, required hospitalization, was unable to care for herself, and required
continuous medical attention. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 6-7.
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cited another section of the same statute which provides a five year
period in which policies not containing the "reasonably possible" clause
could still be used.92 Since the policy issued to Witte came within this
period, the company argued that the "reasonably possible" clause did
not apply.9
3
The Court sidestepped this issue entirely, however, and, applying
Kentucky law, found a waiver:
It is not necessary ...that we decide the question of whether Mrs.
Witte's proof of loss was timely submitted, because it is our conclusion
that under the circumstances of the case, the requirement should be
considered as having been waived by the company... [I]t is our view
that the company's deliberate failure to send the necessary forms to
Mrs. Witte94 coupled with its promptly causing an independent in-
vestigation to be made on its behalf, did amount to an implied waiver
of the requirement, or if not technically a waiver, an estoppel.95
One's view of this case depends largely on his view of the proper
role of insurance in society and of the Court in insurance disputes.
Those who are "result" oriented will find the decision in Commercial
Travelers consistent with the principle that policies should be con-
92Ch. 680, § 7 [19511 New York Acts (expired 1956) provided:
This act shall take effect July 1, 1951. A policy . . .which could have
been lawfully used . . .immediately before the effective date of this act
may be used . . .during five years after the effective date of this act
without being subject to the (reasonably possible) provisions of sub-
sections two or three of section 164.
93 In his first opinion in this case, Judge Palmore stated: "We cannot believe
that the legislature of New York intended to permit new policies not in con-
formity with the requirements of the 1951 Act to be issued for a period of five
years thereafter." This statement was deleted from the final opinion but may be
found in the opinion printed in the Appendix to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing,
Pled July 29, 1966 with the Clerk of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The reason
-,r the deletion may also lie in this Appendix i.e., Commercial Travelers pro-
duced two documents, certified by the New York Superintendent of Insurance,
which demonstrated conclusively that the New York Legislature did in fact
intend to permit new policies not in conformity with the statute to be issued for
a period of five years. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, Appendix at 23-28.
94 The proof of loss provisions make it clear that the claimant is required to
provide proof regardless of whether the insurer provides the necessary forms;
thus, it is difficult to see how such failure could constitute a waiver of the
requirement. See note 86 supra.
95 406 S.W.2d at 148-49. As authority for this holding the Court cited
Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Gregory, 887 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1965).
That case held that the actions of an adjuster could estop the insurer from denying
coverage because of failure to file proof of loss, even though the adjuster was not
authorized to waive the requirement. The Court went on to suggest in Com-
mercial Travelers that "an investigation alone, quite apart from a failure to furnish
proof of loss forms, may be sufficient to constitute a waiver," citing 14 G. CoucH,
supra note 68, at 49:872. It is interesting to note that although the Court was
bond by New York law, it cites no New York cases to support this "waiver"
theory. Couch cites no New York cases to support his statement, though some
states have apparently held that an investigation will estop the insurer from
denying coverage.
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strued against the insurer. This allows insurance to function as an
effective loss-spreading device. Those whose sympathies lie with the
insurance companies may agree with the appellant that this decision is
a "complete mockery of the law ... a complete travesty of justice."96
Beyond these individual biases, however, there is one criticism
which must be made: the Court failed to provide a clear justification
for its result and thereby failed to provide guidelines for future litiga-
tion. The Court acknowledged that it was bound by New York law.
Yet in deciding the case on the waiver/estoppel theory, it cited no New
York cases and relied entirely on one Kentucky case and "some
authority" from a treatise on insurance. As is noted in the dissent and
the appellant's petition for rehearing, 9 such secondary authority is not
controlling since the New York courts have ruled on this point. In
Bland v. Trevvett,99 the beneficiary cooperated fully with an agent of
the insurer during an investigation of the claim. The company had
complete knowledge of the accident, but the beneficiary did not
comply with the proof of loss requirement; the court rejected her
argument that the company was estopped to deny that proof of loss
was timely furnished: "Neither the doctrine of estoppel nor the public
policy of liberal construction can be invoked in support ... [of this]
position."99 One is inclined to agree with the appellant: "It is a com-
plete travesty of justice to rewrite the law of New York without any
New York authority or case law. ... "100
The refusal to apply New York law might be explained by the
"public policy" of liberal construction in favor of the beneficiary. Yet
when Commercial Travelers is contrasted with Colonial Life & Ac-
cident Insurance v. Wagner,101 the inconsistency is apparent. On the
one band the Court stretched the law to find for the beneficiary, on
the other it stretched the law to find against the beneficiary. From a
policy standpoint, the innocent beneficiary in Wagner would seem
to deserve more protection than the beneficiary in Commercial Travel-
ers. Again turning to the appellant's petition, "[C]ertainly neither
equity nor justice compel this Court to protect a woman who ldlled
her husband."
1 0 2
The dissent suggests the underlying reason for the Court's de-
cision:
9 6 Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 7-8.
97 406 S.W.2d at 149-51; Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 6.
9823 App. Div. 2d 534, 256 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1965).
99 Id. at ....... 256 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
100 Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 7-8.
101 380 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1964). This case is discussed in depth, see text
at notes 70-81 supra.
102 Id.
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Evidence that . . . [Mrs. Witte] was the beneficiary of a $10,000 in-
surance policy on the life of the man whom she was charged with killing
would have been evidence of a motive and would have been condemning.
* . . The further significance of this is that there was a serious question
whether... [Mrs. Witte] could have collected as beneficiary under the
policy if she had been convicted of the felony [voluntary manslaughter].
* . . This accounts for the delay for which (the insurer] should not be
charged and which is not justified under the New York law.'
0 3
Thus, the decision in this case may be interpreted as indicating
the Court thinks it was reasonable to delay filing proof of loss until
the outcome of the criminal trial was known. This is a debatable point,
on which the minds of reasonable men may, and obviously do, differ.
The point is, however, that the Court should explain its reasons for
decisions such as Commercial Travelers and Wagner. The debate
should be set out in the opinion and should not be left to conjecture.
The legal profession needs to know not only what was decided, but
how and why. Only through a straight-forward presentation of issues,
answers, and reasons can a realistic, effective legal structure for
resolving conflicts and contributing to the progress of society be
established.
103 406 S.W.2d at 150.
XIII. LABOR LAW
The major labor cases decided last year by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals fell into a discernable pattern. Though the specific fact situa-
tions differed, the common theme was that individuals were attempting
to secure legal protection of job status against "economic invasions of
personality."' Individual job status is crucial to an employee's economic,
social, and personal standing in the community, and the broad statu-
tory framework of our labor laws places upon the courts a duty to
define in concrete cases how that job status will be protected. This is
accomplished by expanding or narrowing the duties of employers and
labor unions to the individual worker.
Some of our labor laws, such as the minimum wage acts, deal
directly with the employer-employee relationship. These place duties
on the employer which he cannot contract away. Other labor laws,
such as the Labor Management Relations Act2 [hereinafter referred to
as Taft-Hartley Act], introduce a third party, the labor union, into the
employment relationship. The employer and the union largely define
by contract the duties of the employer and the rights of the individual.
While the union represents a large group of workers, the courts have
placed a broad general duty of fair representation on the union to
protect the individual. Since the individual is not a party to the
collective bargaining contract, courts have a theoretical difficulty
justifying the protection of individual rights, especially when these
rights have been bargained away. In struggling with the employer-
employee-union relationship, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has been
unable to add any protection to individual status. However, the Court
has had little difficulty expanding such protection when only the
employer-employee relationship exists.
A brief survey of the labor movement will place the struggle for
individual rights recently appearing before the Court of Appeals in
its proper perspective. Nineteenth century America was characterized
by individual action. People carved out their own rights and duties
through contract, with courts generally limited to interpreting and en-
forcing this private law-making. 3 When it became apparent that the
equal bargaining power between employers and employees had dis-
1 Affeldt, The Right of Associations and Labor Law, 7 VILL. L. REv. 27
(1961). "Status" describes a body of rights, disciplines, and immunities governing
individual workers by virtue of their membership in or representation by labor
unions (or other collective groups). F. TAINNENBAUm, A Pnmosopy oF LABOR
140 (1951).
229 U.S.C. § 141 (1947).
a Statutory limitations were sometimes placed on one party. See, e.g., Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
KENTU Y LAW JOURNAL
appeared, Congress, to promote industrial peace and stability, adopted
the group balance of power concept as a method of protecting in-
dividuals.4 Status was given by law to a group spokesman, the labor
union,5 and this power unit was given the right to assert its own group
interest. Although the individual has a strong personal and vested
interest in his job,6 necessity caused individual rights to become sub-
servient to the group interest represented exclusively by the union.7
The majority interest was found superior to the individual's job status,
even though a basic purpose of the new labor legislation was to protect
individual job status.
Thus, the union movement helped create a Twentieth century based
upon status protected by law, while destroying a society based on in-
dividual contract. One authority has compared this "relationally
organized society" to the feudal system of the middle ages, where
everyone was "economically interdependent" and all had reciprocal
duties.8 However, this collective society is imperfect. Imperfection
exists in the conflict of rights within the employer-employee-union
relationship. One outgrowth of this conflict is to propagate poverty
status and its accompanying government subsidy.9 There are certain
legally defined duties and rights, e.g., welfare, attached to poverty
status. When a person relinquishes this status he necessarily gives up
the accompanying rights. When he assumes a job status, however, he
gains duties and rights which are poorly defined, and on which he
cannot depend. Therefore, many people would prefer to remain in
poverty status where there is greater security. To eliminate this condi-
tion, collective job status must be defined by the courts to provide con-
crete, dependable duties and rights.
In spite of the predominant position the group interest occupies,
there are some individual rights still available to union members. 10
The individual employee has a statutorily vested right to present his
grievances to his employer for determination when the union declines
4 Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947).
5 Blumrosen, Group Interest in Labor Law, 18 RUTGERs L. REv. 432 (1959).
6 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAnv. L. REv. 601, 630 (1956).
7 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1947). See also J. J. Case Co. v. NLBE, 321 U.S. 332
(1944). Pound said, "we are not held to stress individual free self-assertion at the
expense of all other aspects of human life." Pound, The New Feudalism, 16
A.B.A.J. 553 (1930).8 Pound, supra note 7.
9 For other examples of collective status, see Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L. J. 732 (1964).
10 It has been suggested that the combined power of unions and employers,
cooperating to pass on the cost of agreement to consumers, is so great that
future legislation limiting that power may be politically impracticable. Wirtz,
Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REv. 440 (1953).
[Vol. 56,
CouRT OF AIPEAs REVIV
to pursue his complaint." However, the employee must first attempt
to process his grievance through the procedure established by the col-
lective bargaining contract.' The complainant, if he alleges a breach
of the contract and not a mere grievance, may also sue the union
pursuant to the Taft-Hartley Act.13 Before the individual has a cause
of action against the union, however, it must have breached a repre-
sentative duty. Since the union is the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive, it has a duty to exercise the power conferred on it fairly and with-
out discrimination. 14 Thus, the union is not barred from making a con-
tract which might have unfavorable effects on some members, but the
variation in treatment must be based on such relevant factors as group
welfare, the merits of the claim, and the future implications of the
settlement.15 It is believed that this duty of fair representation is the
most workable standard of control over union action toward its mem-
bers because it allows flexibility and self-determination.'
6
Kentucky examined the duty of fair representation in Ball v.
Eastern Coal Corp.,17 to decide whether the union acted in good faith
when it made an agreement with management affecting employee's
seniority rights. Eastern operated two adjacent mines independently
of each other, and the employees of each mine had their own United
Mine Workers local [hereinafter referred to as UMW]. Eastern sub-
sequently connected the two mines by underground haulway and
operated them as one. Since the union constitution prohibited two
locals in one mine, one of the locals was incorporated into the other.
The UMW determined that seniority of the men of both locals would
depend on their hiring date, and that the men of the dissolved local
would not be treated as "new men." The men of the old, surviving
local protested and appealed to higher authority in the union, but
they received no relief.
When Eastern was forced to lay off workers, some of the employees
from the original local were layed off before some of the employees
of the dissolved local. These employees requested the UMW to file a
grievance for violation of their seniority rights, but the UMW refused
11Donnelly v. United Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963). But see
Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 835, 813 F.2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962).
12Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
13 Smith v. Evening News Assn, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
14 Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
15 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953).
10 Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViLL. L. RFv. 151 (1957); Cox,
Rights Under a Labor Agreement, supra note 6, at 601.
17415 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1967).
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to recognize the grievance. Suit was brought against Eastern for
breach of contract regarding seniority rights. The UMW was also sued
for breach of its fiduciary duty to present grievances. The Court held
that dovetailing the seniority rights was neither a violation of the
union's fiduciary duty nor the contract:
There being neither fraud nor bad faith, as bargaining representatives
for its members, the union had the right and power to resolve this purely
intra-union problem and in the course of so doing, to effect an agreement
with Eastern either interpreting or amending the contract accordingly.' 8
Since the employer agreed, no grievance proceeding was required.
Moreover, the Court found, "it is quite clear that the union did not
in any sense fail in its duty of fair representation."' 9
This decision adds little substantive content to the union's general
duty, and it leaves the employee less secure and certain of the nature
and extent of his rights. The Court relied heavily on Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 20 where provisions of a contract were altered by the union
so as to give seniority greater than the plaintiff's to certain employees,
even though they were employed at Ford after he was. The newer em-
ployees were credited with seniority based on their prior military
service. The United States Supreme Court held that
the complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be ex-
pected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory
bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always
to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion. 21
The Supreme Court did not define what specific conduct constituted
"good faith" and "honesty of purpose." As to the issue of fair repre-
sentation, Humphrey v. Moore 22 was cited as controlling. In that case
two employee groups were merged as a result of the merger of two
employers, and the Supreme Court said:
18 Id. at 626. A bargaining representative may alter or amend seniority rights
secured both by contract and statute. Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-man, 345 U.S. 330
(1953).
19 415 S.W.2d at 626.
203 45 U.S. 330 (1953).
21 Id. at 338. See also Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under
Labor Contracts, 73 YALE L.J. 1215 (1964), where it was stated:
Yet it may be questioned whether the group representative is suited by
temperament or design to strike the balance between individual or group
interests, for the bargaining representative has a concern for solutions
most beneficial to the majority of the union members, and beyond that
a concern for the institutional interests of the union.
22375 U.S. 345 (1964). Before it was reversed by the Supreme Court, the
Kentucky Court decided Humphrey by placing a duty on the group. Moore v.
Local Union No. 89, 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962). The Kentucky Moore decision
was contrary to this case and in line with policy in the minimum wage cases.
See notes 30, 36, and 39 infra.
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We are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining agent's
duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position contrary to that
of some individuals whom it represents nor in supporting the position of
one group of employees against that of another. . . . Just as a union
must be free to sift out wholly frivolous grievances which would only
clog the grievance process, so it must be free to take a position on the
not so frivolous disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue is
chiefly between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees repre-
sented by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union
in these cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining and griev-
ance process.23
The real argument in Ball as to preferred seniority rights is between
the union and its members. The Court of Appeals refused protection of
individual job "rights" and supported the group's right to alter the
status of minority group members- thus, denying seniority "rights" of
some while advancing the seniority "rights" of others. Therefore, the
job "rights" of the individual depend on the amount of political pres-
sure or status he can generate within the union.2 4 His rights are pro-
tected only if he belongs to the most powerful group within the union.
Hence, within the union, the member's status is gained by the old
freedom of contract method, and the protections afforded by collective
bargaining are not available. Nor is there adequate statutory protection
placed upon the union by the vague general duty of fair representation.
In Ball the Court made no attempt to define more concretely the
reciprocal duties and rights of the parties. It can be argued that, be-
cause mobility of labor, no less than mobility of capital, is a necessary
condition of an expanding economy,25 this was not the proper case
to place content in the duty of fair representation. However, seniority
is a socio-economic problem to be determined by the employer, union,
and employee, each having a protectable status. It is up to the Court
to define the status and protect the individual without weakening the
collective power. This could have been accomplished by the Court
holding that dovetailing seniority is the only acceptable method of
protection of vested job rights when there is merger. The union should
23 375 U.S. 345, 349 (1964). Seniority rights acquire a legal status of their
own, and may be enforced even after expiration of the agreements which created
them. Zdonok v. Glidden, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); see Note, Seniority Rights in
Mergers, 52 IowA L. REv. 95 (1966).24 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); J. J. Case Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 332 (1944); Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration:
Still Another Look At The Problem, 24 MD. L. REv. 233 (1964).25 Pound, supra note 7. It has been said "the very concept of seniority is
doomed to extinction, because the economic system upon which it is based is even
now in the process of fundamental and irrevocable change.... The rapidity of
technological change strongly suggests that the average employee in the immediate
future will have to change jobs at least several times during his working life."
Aron, Reflections On The Legal Nature And Enforceability of Seniority Rights,
75 HAv. L. REv. 1532 (1962).
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never be allowed the opportunity of capriciously and arbitrarily
"horse trading" vested job rights under the guise of fairly adjusting
the interests of competing groups within the union.
In Armco Corp. v. Perkins26 a minority group of individuals, dis-
satisfied with union protection of their interests, attempted self-help
by picketing the employer. This was in violation of a no-strike clause
in the collective bargaining agreement, and the Court enjoined the
picketing. The right of concerted action given employees by the Taft-
Hartley Act 27 was taken from the minority by contract. The Court
found a duty to submit to the group interest, but once again no cor-
responding duty of the group to the individual was defined.
Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Manufacturing Co.28 provides a novel re-
action by an individual caught in the power struggle between the col-
lective powers. The case was a suit for invasion of privacy against the
employer who published the plaintiffs pay check in an effort to show
other workers that they did not need the union to earn high wages.
The Court held this was not such a disclosure of private facts as to be
unwarranted and unreasonable to the ordinarily sensitive person since
the matter was of interest to the group in selecting a group repre-
sentative. 29 This case might indicate that most individual rights must
succumb to the efficiency of our modern collective society.
In three cases certain statutory duties were attached to the status
of the employer in order to protect the employee's job status. They
involved no third party collective representative to establish duties
by contract. Hence, there was no conflict between individual status
rights and group status rights. Status was directly given and protected
by statute. In Owens v. Clemons" a waitress sued her employer for
wages under a mandatory wage order issued by the Commissioner of
Labor.31 There was an arrangement by which the employer had agreed
to furnish the employee free meals, but it was not in writing as re-
quired by the wage order. The Court refused to allow the employer
to add the value of the meals to the compensation paid in determining
the extent of underpayment even though the meals were considerd a
form of compensation. Such an unwritten agreement is "exactly what..
26 411 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1967).
279,. U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
28415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967).
29 This case is also discussed infra section XVII, at notes 76-88.
30 408 S.W.2d 642 (Ky. 1966).
313 Ky. ADMN. RE., Labor 41 (1966). KRS § 337.270 (1962): "Persistent
nonobservance... is a threat to the maintenance of fair minimun wage standards
in any occupation ... the commissioner may make . .. the order or any part of
it mandatory."
[Vol. 56,
CouRT oF APPEALS Rxvmw
the Minimum Wage Order expressly prohibited."32 This decision is
consistent with the policy of the statute and prevents the employer
from contracting out his statutory duties.
A secondary issue in Owens was the constitutionality of a statute
allowing the plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee.33 This statute was
upheld because "the general assembly was justified in prescribing
special working conditions and protective provisions for this class of
workers." 34 Ordinarily, economic regulations are voided only if they
are "so lacking in justification as to constitute an arbitrary exercise of
legislative power or to deprive the employer of his property without
due process of law."35 However, the Court found that social purposes
were served by allowing the successful claimant to recover an at-
torney's fee in this type of case. In this case the Court expanded the
scope of the employer's duties by specific definition and protected job
rights, thus, giving specific content to a general statutory duty.
In Cabe v. Kitchenr6 the issue was whether the Commissioner of
Labor could require production of existing payroll records for in-
spection when, by statute, employment records for women or minors
need only "be kept on fie at least one year after entry."37 The Court
held that the "at least one year" limitation was a "minimum standard,"
which did not limit voluntary retention beyond the period, and,
"therefore, could not be a limitation upon [the Commissioner's] right
of inspection." 8 Therefore, if the records are in existence they will
have to be produced. There is no statute of limitations on the right
to sue for violations, so why limit to one year the principal means of
proving a violation, i.e., inspection of records. The Court expanded
the scope of the employer's duty when it might have strictly con-
strued the statute just as easily.
Cabe v. Eubanks"9 held that when an audit by the labor depart-
ment to ascertain compliance with the minimum wage order reflects
indebtedness to past and present employees, the department may not
be enjoined from holding a hearing and subpoenaing employees as
witnesses, even though it causes the employer some inconvenience.
The Commissioner has "the statutory right to hold the hearings, and
32 Owens v. Clemons, 408 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ky. 1966).
33KRS § 337.360 (1962).
34W. W. Mac Co. v. Teague, 180 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Ky. 1944). KRS §
337.360 was amended in 1966 to cover "all employees."
31 408 S.W.2d at 646. See Burns v. Shepherd, 264 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1954)
for violation of the constitution.
3 415 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1967).
37 KRS § 337.320 (1962).3 8 Cabe v. Kitchen, 415 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1967).
39 411 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1967).
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the completion of the audit did not constitute an exhaustion of his
statutory prerogatives."40 In any event, the extraordinary remedy of
injunction was not warranted. No irreparable damage would have
resulted from the employees missing work for the hearing, and the
right of appeal furnished an adequate remedy at law. The Court
found the employment duty superseded the property rights of the
employer.
The Court protected the individual in the minimum wage cases
against arbitrary economic power by restricting that power through
legally imposed duties. However, when faced with the collective
representation status, the Court allowed the economic power to con-
tractually establish its own rights and duties, and then, refused to pro-
tect the individual against abuse of the contractual power. Only by
placing more concrete duties on the collective representative will job
status be appealing to potential workers and protective to present
workers.
40 Id. at 335.
XIV. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
A. ANNExA-ToN
Included among the statutory requirements for annexation' is a
remedy whereby residents and freeholders of territory to be annexed
can protest the proposed action. This remedy is a remonstrance pro-
ceeding,2 and it culminates in a jury trial affording an aggrieved party
the usual avenues of appeal. Briefly, the format for perfecting a
remonstrance proceeding is as follows: Within thirty days after a city
has enacted an ordinance proposing to annex certain territory,3 one
or more residents of that territory may file a protest petition with the
county's circuit court setting forth the reasons why the land should not
be annexed. Once the petition has been filed and the city has been
given an opportunity to answer, a jury trial will be held to determine
whether the proposed annexation should be approved. Should it be
proven that seventy-five per cent of the area's residents protest,4 an-
nexation will be denied unless the evidence indicates that a failure to
annex will materially retard the city's prosperity.5
Last term's decision in City of St. Matthews v. ArterburiO in-
volved a unique fact situation. Most appeals by aggrieved remon-
strants contain an allegation that the annexing city failed to adhere to
a statutory requirement. However, in City of St. Matthews, the alleged
violation by the City involved circumstances not touched upon by
legislation.
St. Matthews is located in a county containing a first class city, and
because of this, it must give notice to the county's fiscal court of any
ordinance proposing the annexation of property.7 By the terms of the
statute, failure to give the required notice renders the ordinance void."
St. Matthews mailed a letter to the Jefferson Fiscal Court giving notice
I Provisions for annexations are found in KRS §§ 81.100-.290 (1962).
2 A remonstrance proceeding is defined as "a representation made to a court
or legislative body wherein certain persons unite in urging that a contemplated
measure be not adopted or passed.' BLAcg's LAw DICTIONARY 1459 (4th ed.
1951). The word "remonstrate" is also specifically mentioned in KRS § 81.110
(1962).
3 KRS § 81.100 (1962) specifically declares that a city must first enact a
proposing ordinance before the annexation ordinance is passed.
4 The percentage of protesting residents needed to void a municipality's
annexation proceedings varies according to the class of city attempting annexation.
While KRS § 81.100 (1962) (authorizing annexation for first class cities) requires
seventy-five per cent, only f-one per cent of the residents need to protest under
KRS § 81.140 (1962) (authorization for annexation by cities of the second
class%?KRS § 81.110 (1962). In essence this is the manner in which protesting
residents or freeholders may remonstrate.
0 419 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1967).
7KRS § 81.290(1) (1962).
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of the proposing ordinance in 1961, but it waited five and one-half
years before the ordinance to annex was executed. The remonstrance
proceeding was initiated with the remonstrants claiming that the delay
was unreasonable since the composition of the fiscal court in 1960 and
1965 could vary, and, if so, the present court might not have had
notice of the proceedings. 9
The trial court dismissed the city's petition for annexation on
grounds that the lapse of five and one-half years constituted an un-
reasonable delay. On appeal, the Court reversed, finding error in the
dismissal of the city's petition without a hearing at which either the
city would have the opportunity to explain the delay, or the remon-
strants could demonstrate why they were prejudiced by the lapse of
time.'0 The Court indicated that in the absence of a statute fixing a
time limitation, it is not empowered to legislate by imposing an
arbitrary time limit." It stated that the rule required only that an-
nexation proceedings be accomplished within a reasonable time."-
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Osborne found no reason to disturb
the findings of the lower court. In declaring that St. Matthews' pro-
posing ordinance was void without a hearing, he declared that courts
should consider a municipality's continuity of action, reasoning that
any delay which is so geared that public attention to the proceeding
is lost, defeats the purpose of public notice and is unreasonable. Os-
borne stated:
The public has a right to know when action is to be taken upon an
ordinance. Accordingly, where an ordinance is unduly stayed in its pro-
gress to final passage, as in the case of a failure to take action on it at
the time to which it has been continued, it dies. Continuity is broken
when a measure is considered at a regular meeting to which it has pre-
viously been laid over and where the adoption of the measure is deferred
at such regular meeting, which adjourns, without the measure being con-
tinued over to a fixed day.' 3
He concluded by stating that the delay of five and one-half years be-
9 Although the Jefferson County Fiscal Court is named an appellee along
with the remonstrant, Arterburn, it is evident that the Fiscal Court did not protest
the annexation by St. Matthews. 419 S.W.2d at 731.
'O Id. at 732.
1"Id., citing 2 E. McQuImLEN, Mumcm.AL ConmonRAXoN § 7.28 (3d ed.
1966).
12 1d., citing McClain v. City of Independence, 851 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1961),
where a lapse of two years between the enactment of a proposing ordinance and
an annexing ordinance was held not to void the annexation.
In his dissent, Judge Osborne attacks the credibility of this case because no
authority was cited by the Court. A reading of Mclain indicates that the re-
monstrants made no effort to supply the Court with any authority that a two year
lapse was unreasonable. McClain v. City of Independence, supra, at 513.
1419 S.W.2d at 734, citing 5 E. McQuImL, supra note 11, at § 16.73.
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tween the notice to enact and the enactment defeated public notice
and voided the proceedings.
While the dissenting opinion is the more appealing position at first
glance, careful analysis of Judge Osborne's reasoning indicates that he
has failed to meet the issue squarely. He would void the entire an-
nexation without the aid of a hearing. But how can a circuit court
determine whether public attention to an annexation proceeding has
been lost when there has been no hearing at which this evidence can
be gathered? Distilled of any surplusage, then, Judge Osborne seems
to indicate that a delay of five and one-half years is unreasonable per
se.1
4
While the majority is doubtless correct in refusing to impose an
arbitrary time limit in the absence of a hearing, this does not mean,
however, that the dissenting opinion is without merit. Indeed, the dis-
sent has supplied valuable and objective criteria for future courts to
apply in determining, at a hearing, whether a delay such as that
presented here is reasonable.15
Here the facts were somewhat simple: only one person owned the
entire land to be annexed. In the future, however, the circumstances
may be more involved. It is not difficult to envision a tract of territory
occupied by many persons, with innumerable conveyances among
hundreds of parties. This state of facts would undoubtedly prejudice
the new purchasers' right to know of pending annexation proceedings.
In such an instance, Judge Osborne's dissent can be of real value at
the hearing. The objective criteria applied at hearings in other juris-
dictions"0 should be valid considerations for future courts to follow.
B. FRANCMSE
Kentucky cities today are faced with the acute problem of pro-
viding satisfactory ambulance service for their citizens. It is presently
as essential as any public utility, but, in recent years, many cities have
been plagued with inadequate service. In the past, funeral establish-
14While the dissent does not specifically state that a delay of five and
one-half years is unreasonable per se, the following portion is indicative of
Osborne's position:
It is my opinion that municipal councils should follow a certain continuity
of action so that the public can be continually apprised of the pro-
ceedings before it [sic]. A delay of 5V years in the enactment of an
ordinance from notice of its initial introduction seems to me unreasonable.
Id. at 734.
15 See text supra, at notes 12-14, for a discussion of Judge Osborne's criteria.
10 419 S.W.2d at 733, citing Bass v. City of Chicago, 195 Il. 109, 62 N.E.
913 (1902); DeVincenzo v. Town of West New York, 120 N.J.L. 541, 1 A.2d
36 (1938); Farish v. Linwood City, 12 N.J.L. 285, 170 A. 249 (1934).
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ments were capable of supplying ambulance service at a profit. To-
day, many factors, including the high cost of the vehicle, its
specialized equipment, and insurance, have combined to make it un-
profitable for them to maintain adequate service. High cost of opera-
tion may also cause severe competition for business, often leading to
nefarious practices such as collusion by ambulance services with
wrecker services. The end product of these cutthroat practices may
be one surviving ambulance business, offering whatever type of
service it chooses.
At least one Kentucky city has taken steps to alleviate the problem.
The city of Owensboro, in 1964, adopted an ordinance requiring a
franchise for the operation of an ambulance service within the city.17
A franchise was duly awarded to the highest bidder, Community
Ambulance Service.
In Ray v. City of Owensboro,18 Al's Ambulance Service, an un-
licensed corporation, tested the franchise. After delivering a patient
to an Owensboro hospital, the owner of the service was arrested and
fined twenty-five dollars. The Service then sought to enjoin Owensboro
from enforcing the ordinance, but the injunction was denied by the
Daviess County Circuit Court and appeal was taken. The Service
alleged that the city had no constitutional or legislative authority to
enact the ordinance because the operation of an ambulance service was
not a proper subject for franchise by a governmental authority. The
Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the circuit court and held that
sufficient authority existed in the Constitution alone to uphold the
ordinance.
Franchises have long been a means by which urban communities
have controlled businesses.' 9 The Court pointed out that the right of
17 Owensboro ordinance No. 6-64 as cited in Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Ray
v. City of Owensboro, 415 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1967), states as follows:
Section 1
From and after the effective date of this Ordinance it shall be un-
lawful for any person, partnership, corporation, firm or other legal entity
to operate an ambulance service in the City of Owensboro, Kentucky,
either as a single enterprise or in connection with the operation of
another business without first obtaining a franchise from the City of
Owensboro, to operate such ambulance service.
Section 2
Any person, partership... violating this ordinance shall be fined not
less than [$25.00] nor more than [$50.00], or be subject to imprisonment
for not less than [30] days, or to both such fine and imprisonment. Each
day of violation of this ordinance shall constitute a separate offense.
18415 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1967).
19 12 E. McQun-nT, supra note 11, at § 34.03:
Under the early English law Blackstone defines a franchise as a "royal
(Continued on next page)
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a Kentucky city to grant a franchise emanates from the Kentucky
Constitution,2" and although ambulances are not therein specifically
enumerated as being a proper subject of franchise, the interpretation
which the Court has given the Constitution renders this possible.
21
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
privilege or branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of
a subject." . . . In American law, a franchise is defined as a special
privilege conferred by the government on individuals or corporations and
which does not belong to the citizens of a country generally by common
right. It is immaterial whether the grant is made directly by the legisla-
ture or by a municipality to whom the power is delegated. The term
"franchise" includes the term "privileges," but a privilege is not neces-
sarily a franchise. The municipal corporation in granting such privileges
acts as the agent of the state, in this way, representing the state's
sovereign power. When granted, a franchise becomes property in the
legal sense of the word by virtue of a contractual right and is termed
an incorporeal hereditament, both separate and distinct from the
property necessary in its use and exercise.
20 Ky. CONST. § 163:
No street, railway, gas, water, steam heating, telephone or electric
light company, within a city or town, shall be permitted or authorized to
construct its tracks, lay its pipes or mains, or erect its poles, posts or
other apparatus along, over, under or across the streets, alleys of public
grounds of a city or town, without the consent of the proper legislative
bodies or boards of such city or town being first obtained; but when
charters have been heretofore granted conferring such rights and work in
good faith has been begun thereunder, the provisions of this section
shall not apply.
Ky. CoNST. § 164:
No county, city, town, taxing district or other municipality shall be
authorized or permitted to grant any franchise or privilege, or make any
contract in reference thereto, for any term exceeding 20 years. Before
granting such franchise or privilege for a term of years, such municipality
shall first, after due advertisement, receive bids therefor publicly and
award same to the highest and best bidder; but it shall have the right
to reject any or all bids. This section shall not apply to a trunk railway.
21 In People's Transit Co. v. Louisville By., 220 Ky. 728, 295 S.W. 1055
(1927), the Court liberally construed Section 164 of the Constitution to in-
clude a bus company although busses were not specifically mentioned. In that
case, the Court held:
[We are convinced that the all-inclusive language of Section 164 of
the Constitution is not only broad enough to, but that its terms do in-
clude all intra-urban franchises conferring the right of an extraordinary
or privileged use of the streets or other public ways of the city, regard-
less of the means employed in rendering the service, provided such user
is one of the permanent nature contemplated by that section. Id. at 735,
295 S.W. at 1058.
In many other cases involving the interpretation of Sections 163 and 164, the
Court has adopted a liberal approach as to what may be the subject of a
franchise. See City of Bowling Green v. Davis, 313 Ky. 203, 230 S.W.2d 909
(1950) (garbage collection); Adams v. Burke, 308 Ky. 722, 215 S.W.2d 531
1948) (taxicabs); Willis v. Boyd, 224 Ky. 732, 7 S.W.2d 216 (1928) (extraction
of sand and gravel from river bed); Irvine Toll Bridge Co. v. Estill Co., 210
Ky. 170, 275 S.W. 634 (1925) (toll bridge).
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The precise issue in this case, whether a private ambulance service
may be the subject of a franchise, has little case precedent.22 How-
ever, in several cases cited by the Court it has been held that where
the public streets are used for transporting persons for a fee, the
state has a right to exert control over those parties so engaged.
23
Ambulances clearly fall within this category.
Cities have a responsibility to their citizens to see that they are
provided with services adequate to meet their needs. Thus, if city
officials deem it necessary to franchise ambulance service in order to
insure the quality of that service, the city is justified in doing so. By
issuing an ambulance franchise, the city can guarantee that the service
provided will be qualified, efficient, and reasonable.24 Arguments that
such action by the city prohibits competition and is bad for the free
enterprise system should not prevail.25 One of the reasons why
ambulance service is often inefficient, unqualified, and unreasonable26
is that excessive competition has resulted in poor, and in some cases,
22 The only other reported case involving the franchising of ambulance
services is Macon Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Snow Properties, Inc., 218 Ga. 262,
127 S.E.2d 498 (1962), wherein the court held that under Georgia law, the
city was properly enjoined from enforcing a franchise ordinance to the extent that
it purported to grant an exclusive franchise to operate ambulances within thecity. In the case at bar, the appellant alleged that the Community Ambulance
Service had an exclusive franchise. The city responded by stating that the appel-
lant had made no application for franchise. Since the appellant apparently had
not applied for a franchise, there was no occasion for the Court to rule on the
constitutionality of an exclusive one.
23In Adams v. Burke, 308 Ky. 722, 723-24, 215 S.W.2d 531, 532 (1948),
the Court stated:
[I]t must be conceded that the utilization of streets in the transporta-
tion of persons for hire is not an ordinary use to which all members of
the public have a common right, but is an extraordinary use subject to
regulation by the controlling public authority.
In Slusher v. Safety Coach Transit Co., 229 Ky. 731, 733, 17 S.W.2d 1012, 1013
(1929), the Court declared that:
[H]ighways belong to the public, but are primarily for the use of the
public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of private gain is
special and extraordinary and, in general, may be restrained, prohibited,
or conditioned as the legislative power may prescribe.
See generally 25 Ar. Jxm. Highways § 193 (1941).24 In Ray v. City of Owensboro, the Court described the franchise issued to
Community Ambulance Service, Inc. as follows:
The said Community Ambulance Service, Inc., shall at all times
during the franchise period have a minimum of two ambulances available
for service, together with the necessary qualified personnel to operate
same. Reasonable charges only may be made for such ambulance service
and no person shall be reasonably refused such service. 415 S.W.2d at 78.
25This was one of the appellant's arguments. He contended that the
franchise issued by the city was exclusive and that the city would not issue him
a franchise to operate therein. The city responded by asserting that he had made
no application.26 See note 24 supra.
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no service. As recognized by the Court, regulation by the cities is the
proper remedy for this problem.
C. ZONING
Control of billboards has long concerned state, county, and muni-
cipal governments. Prior to 1958, the federal government did not play
a major role in billboard regulation, leaving the matter primarily to
the states. The states responded by enacting regulatory measures
aimed at providing greater highway safety.27 But in the mid-1950's
there was a general opinion in Congress that something should be done
to control outdoor advertising along the interstate highway system.
Since the interstate network was essentially national in character, the
federal government took the lead in encouraging uniform regulations
designed to promote the safety, beauty, and maximum usefulness of
the system.
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 195828 was passed, offering
financial incentive to states which chose to regulate billboards in ac-
cordance with prescribed standards.29 In order to take advantage of
this fund, Kentucky passed its own Billboard Act in 1960.30
However, those persons with vested interests in commercial ad-
vertising strongly resisted such regulation, and litigation over the
constitutionality of many statutes passed pursuant to the federal act
was prolonged. 31 As a result, the Federal-Aid Highway Act did not
27 These laws would often forbid the imitation of official signs such as those
designating railroad crossings. Other signs proscribed included those placed on
the right-of-way of public roads, signs placed on private property without per-
mission of the owner, and signs obstructing the view of any portion of a public
road. Additional requirements were the licensing of billboards, the issuance of
permits and space regulations. Many states had distance limits along public high-
ways, within which billboards coul not be erected.
For further information regarding the history of billboard regulation prior to
1958, see HIGHwAY RESEARCH BoARD, SPECIAL REPORT No. 41, OurDoon AD-
VERTisiN ALONG I-IGHWAYS (1958); and ILINoIs LEGISLATIVE CoUNc1L,
PUBLICATION No. 133, IGHWAY BILLBOARD CONTROL (1958).
28 72 Stat. 904 (1959).
20 The standards prohibited signs visible from the road and within 660 feet
of the edge of the right-of-way. There were exceptions, however, for signs ad-
vertising the sale of property, official directional signs, signs providing in-
formation to the traveling public, and other similar signs. See Comment, 46 CALIF.
L. REv. 796 (1958) for a complete discussion of the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1958.
30 KRS §§ 177.880-.890 (1962) was patterned after the Federal Aid High-
way Act and delegated power to the Commissioner of Highways to adopt regula-
tions providing certain standards for billboard control. The Commissioner was
authorized under KRS § 177.890 to enter into agreements with the United States
Secretary of Commerce for the regulation of billboards.
31 Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964). In this case the Court of
Appeals upheld the Billboard Act as a constitutional exercise of state police
power.
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achieve the anticipated benefits. Very few billboards were removed
and little money was paid to the states under the bonus arrange-
ments.3
2
The Highway Beautification Act of 1965 was an attempt by
Congress to alleviate the shortcomings of the 1958 Act.33 Although
the previous statute was repealed, virtually the same zoning controls
were retained.34 The important difference in the present statute is the
method of obtaining the states' cooperation. Instead of offering a
bonus to those states adopting their own regulations, the Highway
Beautification Act provides that if a state has not exercised effective
control by 1970, its federal allocation for highway construction will
be reduced by ten per cent.35
32 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Roads of the Senate Comm.
on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1965).
3323 U.S.C. § 131 (1964), as amended (Supt. 1, 1965).
34 Id. Off-premise advertising signs still must be 660 feet from the edge of
the right-of-way.3
5U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. Nzws 3712 (1965), citing 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965):
Effective January 1, 1968, if a state has not acted according to the de-
termination of the Secretary, to effectively control the erection and main-
tenance along the Interstate System and the primary system of outdoor
advertising signs displays and devices within 660 feet of the nearest edge
of the right-of-way and visible from the main traveled way of the system,
then that state's next annual apportionment of highway construction
funds under Title 23 of the U.S. Code will be reduced by an amount
equal to 10% of the amounts which otherwise would be apportioned to
the State. This includes the State's apportionment not only for the inter-
state and primary systems, but for the secondary system and the urban
extensions thereon as well. Any amount which is withheld from ap-
portionment to a State under this section must be reapportioned to the
other states. Thus from the date of the enactment of this legislation until
January 1, 1968, the states will have slightly more than 2 years to enact
whatever legislation is necessary to amend their laws (including basic
organic law) to make it possible for them to conform to this Act.
There is good reason to believe that enforcement may not be as strict as this
interpretation would indicate. Shortly after passage of the Highway Beautification
Act, the Bureau of Public Roads issued suggested enforcement standards that
would have required the removal of 50,000 signs in commercial areas by 1970
and an additional 128,000 by 1973. Some states, including Kentucky, misinterpreted
this "discussion draft" as a proposed unilateral regulation, and moved quickly
to enact a strict law delegating wide zoning power to the Commissioner of
Highways. See Tippy, Roads and Recreation, 55 Ky. L.J. 814-15 (1967) for a
discussion of Kentucky's statute.
Soon after these suggested standards were issued, angry protest from bill-
board lobbyists were heard. Under threat of rewriting the legislation, the House
and Senate Public Works Committee forced the Secretary of Transportation to
disregard the standards issued by the Bureau as a basis for negotiating agreements
with the states. In essence, this means that states will be free to adopt whatever
zoning laws they wish and the Transportation Department will be unable to
question their decisions.
Kentucky, having already passed a "tough" billboard zoning law, is placed
in an interesting position. Certainly the federal government is satisfied with this
(Continued on next page)
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Moreover, the Federal-Aid Highway Act, as amended in 1959, had
provided explicitly that the agreements entered into between the
Secretary of Commerce and the State Highway Departments for bill-
board regulation would not apply to incorporated municipalities which
were subject to municipal control.36 But the new Act provides that
states shall have full authority to zone areas for commercial and in-
dustrial purposes.37 Thus, the states apparently are given the op-
portunity to effect billboard regulations superseding those of a muni-
cipality. In addition, the Act granted the states power to impose
stricter limitations regarding billboard control than those imposed by
the federal act.
38
Against this background, the Kentucky Legislature enacted the
Billboard Act of 1966.39 This statute, amending the 1960 version, con-
tinued to delegate to the Commissioner of Highways the power to
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
state's enactment, but commercial advertisers are apt to be very disenchanted in
view of concessions made by the Secretary of Transportation. However, since the
federal act specifically permits stricter limitations than those imposed in the
federal legislation (see 23 U.S.C § 131 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1, 1965), the
state statute may remain as it was enacted. The answer probably will lie in the
strength of the billboard lobby in the Kentucky Legislature. See Louisville
Courier-Journal, Oct. 2, 1967 at 10, col. 1-2.
3673 Stat. 612, amending 72 Stat. 904 (Supp. 3, 1959-61) provides:
Agreements entered into between the Secretary of Commerce and State
highway departments under this section shall not apply to those segments
of the Interstate System which traverse commercial or industrial zones
within the presently existing boundaries of incorporated municipalities
wherein the use of real property adjacent to the Interstate System is sub-
ject to municipal regulation or control, or which traverse other areas
where the land use, as of the date and approval of the Act, is clearly
established as industrial or commercial.
3723 U.S.C. § 131 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1, 1965). Section (d)
now provides:
In order to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective display of
outdoor advertising while remaining consistent with the purposes of this
section, signs, displays and devices whose size, lighting and spacing,
consistent with customary use is to be determined by agreement between
the several states and the Secretary, may be erected and maintained with-
in six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way
within areas adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems which are
zoned industrial or commercial under authority of State law, or in un-
zoned commercial or industrial areas as may be determined by agreement
between the several States and the Secretary. The States shall have full
authority under their own zoning laws to zone areas for commercial or
industrial purposes, and the actions of the States in this regard will be
accepted for the purposes of this Act....
3828 U.S.C. § 131(k) (1964), as amended (Supp. 1, 1965), provides:
Nothing in this section shall prohibit a State from establishing stand-
ards imposing stricter limitations with respect to signs, displays, and de-
vices on the Federal-Aid highway systems than those established under
this section.
39KRS §§ 177.830-.890 (1966).
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adopt billboard regulations governing the interstate highway system.
The significant feature of this statute, however, is that the Commis-
sioner is given the power to enforce these regulations within in-
corporated municipalities, a right previously withheld. 40 Pursuant to
this Act, the Department of Highways enacted regulations which de-
fined a commercially or industrially developed area for the purpose
of billboard control.41
Southeastern Displays, Inc. v. Ward42 was the first case to reach the
Court under the newly enacted version of the Billboard Act. This case
involved a billboard erected in an area zoned industrial by the city of
Louisville and adjacent to an interstate highway. The Department of
Highways determined that the billboard was in an area which did not
conform to its definition of an industrially or commercially developed
area, and ordered it removed. The commercial advertiser prosecuted
this appeal.
The main contention in Southeastern Displays was that the state
could not contravene the action of the city in zoning an area in-
dustrial or commercial. The Court met this argument squarely and
asserted that the power of the city to zone is derived solely from ex-
press authority conferred on it by the Legislature. 43 The Court also
cited several decisions holding that where the Legislature delegates
40KRS § 177.860 (1962) provides:
The Commissioner of Highways shall prescribe by regulations reason-
able standards for the advertising devices hereinafter enumerated...
(4) Advertising devices which otherwise comply with the applicable
zoning ordinances and regulations of any county or city, and which are
to be located in a commercially or industrially developed area, in which
the Commissioner of Highways determines, in exercise of his sound
discretion, that the location of such advertising devices is compatible
with the safety and convenience of the traveling public. (Emphasis
added.)
41The Department of Highways defined a commercially or industrially
developed area as follows:
Any area within 100 feet of, and including, any area where there
are located within the protected area at least ten (10) separate com-
mercial or industrial enterprises, not one of the structures from which one
of such enterprises is being conducted is located at a distance greater
than 1620 feet from any other structure from which one of the other
enterprises is being conducted....
8 Ky. ADmiN. REG. HIWA 1 (1967.
42414 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967).
4s In Jones v. Russell, 224 Ky. 390, 395-96, 6 S.W.2d 460, 462 (1928), the
Court stated:
It is clear from our decisions that the various municipalities of the state
possess police power to the extent it may be delegated to them by the
General Assembly ... It appears obvious that the Legislature could it-
self exercise in the first instance any power it could delegate to that end
in the cities. Plainly it could enact directly for cities and towns any law
(Continued on next page)
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authority to a state agency, its power is superior to that of a munici-
pality.44 Thus, there seems little doubt the state could delegate power
to regulate billboards to the Department of Highways, and the Depart-
ment could enact regulations which would supersede city zoning
ordinances.
An analogous situation where the state has found it necessary to
delegate certain zoning power to a state agency is in the field of air-
port regulation.45 Before the establishment of the Kentucky Airport
Zoning Commission, airports were regulated solely by local govern-
mental bodies. As in the cases of local billboard regulation, this often
led to a wide variety of ineffective zoning enforcement. In order to
assure the greatest possible safety for air travel, the state gave the
Commission jurisdiction of airport zoning "insofar as it pertained to
the safe and proper maneuvering of aircraft and the safe and proper
use of the airport involved."46
The purpose of delegating zoning powers to the Department of
Highways is almost the same as in delegating airport zoning. The
predominant consideration is the safety of the people who use the high-
ways or airports.47 Certainly, few would contend that such a purpose
IFootnote continued from preceding page)
that it could indirectly enact by delegating to them the power to pass
it.
In City of Somerset v. Weise, 263 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1954), the Court held:
"The power of a municipality to place in force a zoning plan is not inherent but
is derived solely from the express authority conferred in it by the Legislature."
Id. at 922. On the subject of municipal authority to zone, see also 58 Am. Jur.
Zoning § 948 (1948).
44 In O'Brien v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 806 Ky. 238,
242, 206 S.W.2d 941, 943 (1947), the Court held:
The Legislature in its discretion having chosen the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Board as its agency, and having delegated to it the power to
control and regulate, we conclude that it was the legislative intent that
the Board has a superior right to control.
See alo Deckert v. Levy, 308 Ky. 67, 213 S.W.2d 431 (1948).
15 KRS § 183.865 (1966) states the function of this commission:
(1) All of the powers, provisions and duties relating to the zoning
and use of land, structures and air space within and around public air-
ports within the state are hereby conferred upon, delegated to and rested
in the commission. The commission shall also exercise all powers, pro-
visions and duties relating to the use of navigable air space within the
state.
See also Note, Zoning-The Airport and the Land Surrounding it in the
Jet Age, 48 Ky. L.J. 273 (1960).
46 KS § 183.867 (1964).
47 Legislative findings which preceded the delegation of authority to the
Airport Zoning Commission are found in KRS § 183.866 (1962):
It is hereby found and declared that an airport hazard endangers the
lives and property of users of the airport and the occupants of land in the
vicinity, and in effect reduces the size of the area available for landing,
(Continued on next page)
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does not authorize delegation of zoning power to the agency best
equipped to provide overall regulation.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
taking off and maneuvering of aircraft, thus tending to destroy or impair
the utility of the airport and public investment therein, and therefore
such hazards are not in the interest of the public health, public safety or
general welfare.
The purposes of the Billboard Act are found in KRS § 177.850 (1966):
(1) To provide for maximum visibility along interstate highways,
limited-access highways...
(2) To prevent unreasonable distraction of operators of motor ve-
hicles;
(3) To prevent confusion with regard to traffic lights, signs or signals
or otherwise interfere with the effectiveness of trafc regulations;
(4) To preserve and enhance the natural scenic beauty or the
aesthetic features of the aforementioned interstate highways ....
XV. PROPERTY
A. ADOpTnON
In Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,1 the Court was
presented with the vexing problem of whether the adoption of an
adult under KRS 405.3902 makes the adopted person an heir, allowing
him to inherit from and through his adopting "parent."
In an earlier case, Bedinger 1). Graybilrs Executor & Trustees the
testatrix had established a testamentary trust for her son for life, and
after his death, the remaining portion of the trust was to "be paid over
and distributed by the trustee to the heirs at law of [the] son ...
according to the Law of Descent and Distribution in force in Kentucky
at the time of his death."4 In the event the son died without heirs,
there was a gift over to two charities. The son, having no issue, adopted
his wife, and on his death, the Court held that since the adoption was
authorized by statute, the wife was an heir by operation of law and
should be permitted to inherit the remainder.5
Similarly, the testatrix in Minary created a trust for her husband
and three sons during their lives, and with termination of the trust
upon the death of the last beneficiary, "the remaining portion of the
Trust Fund [was to] be distributed to [her] then surviving heirs, ac-
cording to the laws of descent and distribution then in force in Ken-
tucky. .".."- (Emphasis added.) One son adopted his wife/ and on
his death, the problem confronting the Court was whether this
adoption made the wife eligible to share in the remaining portion of
the trust. Answering this question in the negative, the Court con-
cluded that while Bedinger could be distinguished on the basis of the
language used, no useful purpose would be served by so doing. View-
ing the adoption of an adult for the sole purpose of making that
person an heir under the terms of a pre-existing testamentary in-
strument as an "act of subterfuge," the Court was confronted with a
choice between carrying out the intent of the testator or giving a strict
1 419 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1967).
2 KRS § 405.890 (1962) provides: "An adult person over eighteen years of
age may be adopted in the same manner as provided by law for the adoption of
a child and with the same legal effect, except that his consent alone to such
adoption shall be required."
3 802 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1957).
4 Id. at 596.
GId. at 600.
6 Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Ky.
1967).
7 This adoption also resulted in litigation. See Minary v. Minary, 395 S.W.2d
588 (Ky. 1966).
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interpretation to the adoption statute.8 The Court indicated that the
right to pass property at death to those persons representing the
natural objects of a testator's bounty was of primary importance, and
since a literal reading of the statute would interfere with that intent,
adoption which frustrated that intent would no longer be tolerated.9
The decision is important in that the cardinal principle of carry-
ing out the testator's intent remains the controlling factor in the con-
struction of a will. To provide for a situation like that presented in
Minary probably never occurs to persons drafting wills. A fortiori it
is more reasonable to conclude that the "natural objects of their
bounty" does not include adopted adults than to conclude the reverse.
Thus, the Court's conclusion that such schemes will no longer be
successful is to be commended.
Yet other aspects of the case are troublesome. As the Court de-
clared, this case could be distinguished from Bedinger. In Bedinger,
the devise was to the heirs at law of the testatrix's son, while in
Minary, the devise was to the surviving heirs of the testatrix.'0 For
the wife to be a beneficiary under the will in Minary, she had to
inherit not directly from her "parent" but through him, i.e., not from
a will of the parent, but from a will devising property to the heirs of
the parent. This area has been one of great confusion. As late as 1945,
the Court of Appeals held that the terms heirs, issue, or children, when
used in a will, did not refer to adopted children but only to natural
blood relations." This rule was eroded somewhat when adopted
children were included in the terms "heirs at law"12 and "children." 3
However, Wilson v. Johnson14 held that when a testator other than
the parent made use of the word "children," he intended the term
to carry its commonly accepted meaning, i.e., persons who were
actually born of the parent, or if adopted, were adopted as children.
8KRS § 199.520(2) (1962) provides:
From and after the date of he judgment the child shall be deemed the
child of petitioners and shall be considered for purposes of inheritance
and succession and for all other legal considerations, the natural, legiti-
mate child of the parents adopting it the same as if born of their
bodies....
9 319 S.W.2d at 344.
'0 Bedinger v. Graybill's Ex'r & Trustee, 302 S.W.2d 594, 599 (Ky. 1967).
11 Copeland v. State Bank & Trust Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W.2d 1017
(1945).
2 Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
' Edmands v. Tice, 324 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1959).
14 389 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1965). In the course of the Wilson opinion, the
Court acknowledged the fact that an adult may be adopted in the same manner
as a child, but that he "does not ipso facto become a child." Id. at 636. For a
general discussion in this area, see Note, Inheritance Rights of the Adopted Child
in Kentucky, 55 Ky. L.J. 874 (1967).
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On the basis of these holdings, Minary declared that, but for the rule
as to adopted adults, the phrase "My then surviving heirs" included
adopted children.15
Another tenuous aspect of the decision relates to statutory in-
terpretation. While appearing to recognize the problem, the Court
ignores it without setting forth valid reasons. In Bedinger, the Court
held it was bound by the statutory law and could not write an excep-
tion into the statute.16 Since KRS 199.520 plainly provides that an
adopted child shall be deemed for all purposes of inheritance and
succession the natural child of the adopting parent, it would seem that
the Court could not rule otherwise because the person adopted was
an adult.' 7 However, the Court created an exception, and circum-
vented the statute because it conflicted with the intent of the testator.
On what basis can a court prefer a well-established rule of construction
over an express statutory rule? It would seem that this question is one
for the Legislature, and the Court should give effect to the statute
until there is a legislative pronouncement to the contrary.
B. DowEm
Dower and curtesy are defined by KRS 892.020.18 This statute pro-
vides that a surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of all property,
real and personal, remaining in a deceased spouse's estate after funeral
expenses, administration expenses, and all other debts are paid.'9 Com-
mon law dower, i.e., a life estate in one-third of realty, exists only with
regard to property owned during coverture but disposed of before
death without relinquishment of dower.
15 819 S.W.2d at 342.
16 302 S.W.2d at 599.
'7 See note 8 supra.
18KRS § 392.020 (1962) provides:
After the death of the husband or wife intestate, the survivor slall have
an estate in fee of one-half of the surplus real estate of which the other
spouse or anyone for the use of the other spouse was seized of an estate
in fee simple at the time of death, and shall have an estate for his or
her life in one-third of any real estate of which the other spouse or any-
one for the use of the other spouse, was seized of an estate in fee
simple during coveture but not at the time of death, unless the survivors's
right to such interest has been barred, forfeited, or relinquished. The
survivor shall also have an absolute estate in one-half of the surplus
personalty left by the decedent. Unless the context otherwise requires,
any reference in the statutes of this state to "dower" or "curtesy" shall
be deemed to refer to the surviving spouse's interest created by this
section.
19The statute says the wife is entitled to one-half of the "surplus" real and
personal property. The interpretation given in the text to the word "surplus" is
the accepted one in Kentucky. Towery v. McGaw, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 155, 56 S.W.
727 (1900).
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In McMurray v. McMurray,20 a wife's dower interest in realty was
in issue. The husband had borrowed money from his father for a down
payment on land. The vendor conveyed the land, without the father's
knowledge, to the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. Later,
the husband borrowed again from his father, who was still unaware of
the manner of the conveyance, to extinguish the vendor's lien securing
payment of the balance. On each occasion the money was given as a
simple loan with neither a mortgage nor a promissory note taken by
the father.
-After the son's death, the father brought suit under KRS 378.02021
to set aside as fraudulent the conveyance of an interest in the realty
to the wife. The Court held that this conveyance, having been made
by the husband's procurement, was the same as if made directly from
the husband to his wife. Hence, since there was no consideration, it
was voidable to the extent of the husband's existing debts, totalling
$12,200.2
Although the conveyance was fraudulent, the Court indicated that
the wife was not without interest in the property, i.e., her dower
interest. This aspect of the case was not mentioned in the lower court's
judgment or in the briefs of the parties, but the Court thought a de-
termination of this issue was indispensable to a proper disposition of
the case. The view adopted by some courts is that where the con-
veyance being voided did not come directly from the husband, there
was never any estate in the husband from which dower could arise.23
However, this rule did not recommend itself to the Court since, in its
view
[t]he purpose of the fraudulent conveyance statute . . . is to put the
husband's creditors (as of the time of the conveyance) in the same posi-
20 410 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1966).
21 KRS § 878.020 (1962) provides:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer, or charge made by a
debtor, of or upon any of his estate without valuable consideration there-
for, shall be void as to all his then existing creditors, but shall not, on that
account be void as to creditors whose claims are thereafter contracted, nor
as to purchasers from the debtor with notice of the voluntary alienation
or charge.2 2 McMurray v. McMurray, 410 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Ky. 1966). A point
necessary for the disposition of the case was the loan of ten thousand dollars
made after the conveyance. The wife contended that since this debt did not
exist at the time of conveyance, then according to the statute, it could not be en-
forced. The Court, relying on Pierce v. J.B. Pierce's Estate in Bankruptcy, 258
Ky. 495, 38 S.W.2d 254 (1931), held that when the money was used to in-
crease the salable value of the property by reducing or discharging a lien against
it, the debt would be protected. For authority treating a conveyance of an interest
to the wife the same as if made directly from the husband to the wife, see Kin-
kead v. Brown's Estate, 262 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1953).
23 See McMurray v. McMurray, 410 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Ky. 1966).
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tion they would have enjoyed had the title remained or been taken in
the name of the husband. Had the title been so vested, the wife's in-
choate dower would have attached.
24
In other words, the creditor, although able to set aside the conveyance
and levy against the property, takes subject to the wife's inchoate
dower as of the time the fraudulent conveyance was made.
The case was remanded with directions to the lower court to secure
the wife's dower consistent with the Court's opinion. However, a con-
troversy arose as to what the Court had said the wife's dower interest
was, and the case was again brought before the Court of Appeals.
25
The Court merely reiterated what it had said in the previous opinion,
indicating that the commuted value of the wife's life estate must be
subtracted from the value of the property before the creditor can be
satisfied. Any proceeds remaining would go to the wife since the con-
veyance would not have been fraudulent to this extent.
However, the Court, in spite of two opinions on the dower issue,
has not completely cleared up the issue. It would seem unquestioned
that prior to the passage of the present version of KRS 392.020 in
1956, a spouse's inchoate dower was a life estate in one-third of all
realty and that this dower could not be defeated by a conveyance by
the spouse or by the spouse's creditors levying on the property.26 The
Court purported to decide this case under the 1956 dower statute, and,
thus, it would appear that inchoate dower is exactly the same today
as it was before the statute. The flaw in the Court's reasoning stems
from the fact that by ruling that the conveyance was invalid, the
creditor was placed in the position he enjoyed before the voidable
conveyance, i.e., 1954. Thus, the case should not have been decided
under the 1956 statute, a point which evidently escaped the Court.
This may well be a minor point and of little concern in future
cases. The Court clearly indicated that the 1956 statute required the
same result as would have been reached under the previous statute.27
Thus, there would seem little doubt that it will adhere to this position
in future cases.
241d. This does not mean that a vendor's lien would be subject to dower.
In McMurray, the Court expressly recognized the superiority of a vendor's lien
over dower. 410 S.W.2d at 142, citing Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702, 165 S.W.2d
584 (1942). This is true because the husband acquires his title subject to the
lien. Where no lien for the purchase money exists, the wife's dower right is not
affected by the fact that the original consideration has not been paid. McClure v.
Harris, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 261 (1851).2 5 Mattingly v. Gentry, 419 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1967).
26 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lewis, 276 Ky. 268, 124 S.W.2d 48 (1939) (at-
tachment by spouse's creditor); Redmond's Adm'x v. Redmond, 112 Ky. 760, 66
S.W. 745 (1902) (conveyance by spouse).
27 The predecessor to KRS § 892.020 was KRS § 892.020 (1958) and provided
simply that dower was a life estate in one-third of all realty.
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C. FuTuRE INTEREsTs
The most important and by far the most complex future interest
case decided by the Court was Atkinson v. Kish.28 There, the testator
devised his real property to his wife for life, and subject to certain re-
strictions, the property then went to his four children with substitution
of the issue of any child who predeceased his brothers and sisters. If
any child died without issue, his share would pass to the survivors of
the class. The property so devised was subject to the condition that
neither the testator's children nor their beneficiaries could sell, en-
cumber, lease, or charge against or upon the property until twenty-
one years and ten months after the death of the last survivor of the
testator's children.29 Further, the will restrained the anticipatory dis-
posal of any interest prior to its receipt pursuant to the terms of the
devise, i.e., for twenty-one years and ten months after the death of the
last survivor.
By 1927, the testator's widow had died; in addition, two children
had died leaving no issue. In that year, the remaining two children,
Robert and Fannie, entered into an agreement to divide the property
equally, Fannie taking the upper portion and Robert the lower. The
agreement provided for a survey and exchange of formal conveyances,
but these were never carried out. A fence was erected, and each party
lived by and respected the agreement.
The present controversy was instituted in 1957 by the children of
the now-deceased Robert against Fannie and her children, asking to
be declared the owners of the lower portion of the property as divided
in 1927, or if such relief could not be granted that the entire property
be divided pursuant to K.RS 381.136.30 This statute provides for parti-
28 420 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1967).2 9 The Kentucky perpetuities rule, formerly KRS § 381.200, (repealed 1960),
provided: "The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a period longer than during the continuance
of a life or lives in being at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years and
ten months thereafter. Thus, Atkinson did not involve a perpetuities prob-
lem.
3OKRS § 881.136 (1962) provides:
Where the land is held under a deed or will vesting a life estate in two
or more persons or in trust for their benefit, with remainder as to the
share of each to his or her children or descendants, it shall be lawful for
a court of equity, on the petition of one of such life tenants and his or
her children or descendants who would then be entitled to such re-
mainder, all persons having interests in such lands being made parties,
to partition such land so as to set apart to such life tenants and children
or descendants so much of said land to which they shall be entitled in
severalty; and to that alone shall attach the title or interest of after-born
children or descendants in whom, by the terms of said deed or will, such
remainder would vest.
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tion of land held by life tenants whose children will take the remainder
on the petition of one of the life tenants.
The circuit court, in a memorandum opinion, declared that Robert
and Fannie were the owners, in 1927, of the fee, that the restraint on
alienation imposed by the will was unreasonable and void, that KRS
381.186 was inapplicable because the parties bringing the suit were
not life tenants, and that the 1927 division was valid. A supplemental
circuit court opinion reiterated that the attempted restraint on aliena-
tion was void and reaffirmed the 1927 division of the property pur-
suant to KRS 881.136. The children of Robert were then declared the
owners of the lower portion of the land.31
The Court of Appeals construed the will as devising a life estate
to the testator's children and a remainder to the issue of those child-
ren.32 Hence, the validity of the attempted restraint and the extent to
which the 1927 division violated the restraint, if valid, were presented
for determination. The well-established rule in Kentucky is that a
restraint prohibiting the voluntary alienation of a legal life estate is
valid.33 Recognizing this principle, the Court stated that insofar as
the restraint affected the life estates of Robert and Fannie, the
voluntary division by them violated it. However, this question was now
moot due to the 1960 statutory revisions.34 When the instrument
creating the restraint contains no express provision for forfeiture, the
law will imply one and create a right of entry in the grantor and his
heirs.35 But KRS 381.22130 provides that rights of entry, created before
July 1, 1960, become unenforceable thirty years after the effective date
of the instrument creating them unless a declaration of intent to
preserve the right was recorded before July 1, 1965. Thus, the heirs
31 Atkinson v. Kish, 420 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Ky. 1967).
2 Id. at 109. Gray v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W.2d 440 (1945), involved
a similar devise to the testator s wife for life, and to certain named beneficiaries
during their lives. The remainder interest was devised to the descendants of the
beneficiaries, but no fee could vest in any descendant until after the death of all
the life tenants. The remainder interest was classified as a defeasible fee in re-
mainder, i.e., subject to being divested by their predeceasing the life tenants.
3r v. Gray, 300 Ky. 265, 271, 188 S.W.2d 440, 444 (1945); see also
Dukeninier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 3,
83 (1960). This should not be confused with the doctrine of reasonable restraints
on the alienation of a fee which is peculiar to Kentucky. See note 55 infra.a4 KRS §§ 381.215-.223 (1962).
3n Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 247 (1916).
3o JRS § 381.221(1) (1962) states:Every possibility of reverter and right of entry created prior to July 1,
1960, shall cease to be valid or enforceable at the expiration of thirty
years after the effective date of the instrument creating it, unless before
July 1, 1965 a declaration of intention to preserve it is filed for record
with the county clerk of the county in which the real property is located.
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of the testator forfeited their right of entry since they had failed to
fie the required declaration.
37
The question is not whether the Court was correct in its decision
under the statute, as it clearly was, but whether the statute can con-
stitutionally cut off a right of entry. A footnote in the Atkinson
opinion 8 stated that a reversionary right of entry, like a possibility of
reverter, amounted to no more than an expectancy and would not
come within the constitutional protection of "vested rights." This ap-
pears to be the first constitutional construction of this question by the
Kentucky Court, and one which deserved more attention than a
brief mention in a footnote. The constitutionality of a retroactive
statute is of vital importance today as regards the validity of future
reform legislation in the property field. Contrary views on the con-
stitutionality of these acts are supported by authority.39 Thus, while
not purporting to criticize the Court's ruling, it is hoped that the
Court will give more consideration to such pressing questions in the
future.
After disposing of the restraint on alienation issue, the Court ad-
dressed itself to the circuit court's decision that KRS 881.136, the
partition statute, was inapplicable since the suit was not instituted by
life tenants. To determine the applicability of this section, the Court
of Appeals first had to determine the interests held by the children
of Robert who had instituted the suit. Relying on Gray v. Gray,40 the
Court held that these children were at least the holders of a fee simple
subject to divestment by their death prior to twenty-one years and ten
months after the death of the last life tenant. However, these in-
terests could not be divested because, upon further construction,41
37 420 S.W.2d at 109. In Withers v. Pulaski County Bd. of Educ., 415
S.W.2d 604 (Ky. 1967), the Court held the filing of an action under a deed
calling for a forfeiture of property if such property ceased to be used for a
school, obviated the necessity of filing a declaration of intent to preserve the right
of entry under KRS § 381.221 (1962). The Court further affrmed the circuit
court's dismissal of the action on the ground that a twenty-six day non-use of the
property was not sufficient to bring about a forfeiture under the deed. The Court
did state, however, that the use of the property for farm-hand classes or adult
education courses would not constitute the keeping of a school within the meaning
of the deed since the generally accepted definition of school is a place where in-
struction is imparted to the young.
38 420 S.W.2d at 109, n.5.
39 Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1956), held unconstitutional
a Florida statute purporting to cancel all reverter provisions which had been in
effect more than twenty-one years. The decision, however, was based on the
impairment of contract rights. Contra Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 v.
Batdorf, 6 IMI. 2d 486, 139 N.E.2d 111 (1958), holding a similar provision consti-
tutional on the ground that these interests were only expectancies.
40800 Ky. 265, 188 S.W.2d 440 (1945). See note 82 supra.
41The will provided:
I devise and give the . . . [property] in remainder unto my . . .
(Continued on next page)
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the will was found to convey fee simple interests in an undivided one-
half of the property. Basing this construction on the policy in favor of
early vesting, the Court concluded that the limitations placed in the
will were not intended to postpone the vesting of the fee but, rather,
were to set the outer limits for the application of the restraints on
alienation. To justify this position, the Court noted that once the title
reached Robert's children, there was no provision for a shifting of any
interest outside the direct line of inheritance. If any of the children
were to die without issue, the testator intended that child's interest
to remain in the family line, i.e., that it not be transferable by deed or
will.4 Thus, the limitations amounted only to a restraint and not a
,ithholding of title.
By this construction, the Court seems to be establishing a pre-
ference for limiting restraints only to alienability and not to vesting.
In the ordinary case, this adds little since the restraint remains in
effect and the property continues to be unmarketable until the re-
straint becomes non-existent. In Atkinson, however, the vesting of
title in these remaindermen made the property alienable by them
since the restraint was made unenforceable by the failure to preserve
the right of entry.
This construction does pose one problem in the instant case. As
was stated previously, KRS 381.136 limits the class of persons who can
bring the action for partition.43 Thus, the Court was faced with a
situation where the children of Robert could not bring the action be-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
[children] in equal shares but in the event one or more of my said
children shall die before or after the death of my said vife without
legal issue him or her surviving the equal portion so devised to the one
or more of them so dying shall pass and go to the survivor of the one or
more of my said children so dying.
Should one or more of my said children die before or after the death
of my said wife leaving issue him or her surviving the issue of such
deceased child shall take the share devised to the parent so dying.
But the devise in this clause contained is subject to the express condi-
tion that neither of my said children herein specifically named nor his, her
or their issue shall have power to incumber, sell, charge against or upon
or lease said real estate or any part thereof or interest therein until
twenty-one years and ten months after the death of the last remaining
survivor of my said children herein specifically named....
And provided further that upon the death of all my said children
before the expiration of twenty-one years and ten months from the death
of the last survivor of them, said real estate shall thereupon be vested
absolutely and without further restriction in the real representative or
representative of my respective children then owning the said real estate
and interest created therein by this will.
420 S.W.2d at 107.
42 Id. at 111.43 See note 30 supra.
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cause their interest was not a life estate, while Fannie, a life tenant, and
her children could maintain the suit. Partition could not be ac-
complished under KRS 381.1354 because there was some question
whether all the interests, as required by the statute, were before the
court, i.e., the interests of those persons not in esse. The Court believed
that this lack of statutory authority to bind future interest holders not
in esse was a major reason KRS 381.136 was enacted.45 Consequently,
the partition would have to be confirmed under that statute or not at
all. The Court held that common sense and the basic purpose of the
statute required that since Fannie and her children could maintain the
action, the children of Robert could also seek partition. A contrary
construction was viewed by the Court as absurd and not intended by
the Legislature.
4
While this decision may be necessary in the instant case to obtain
the objective of partition-the enjoyment of the property in severalty-
this case must be limited to its facts. To continue to write exceptions
44KRS § 381.135(1) (1962) provides:
A person desiring a division of land held jointly with others, or an allot-
ment of dower, may fie in the circuit court or county court of the
county in which the land or the greater part thereof lies a petition con-
taining a description of the land, a statement of the names of those
having an interest in it, and the amount of such interest, with a prayer
for the division or allotment; and thereupon, all persons interested in
the property who have not united in the petition shall be summoned to
answer on the first day of the next term of the court. The written
evidences of the title to the land, or copies thereof, if there be any,
must be filed with the petition.
Since Fannie was still alive, there was a possibility that she may have more
children who would be remaindermen, and these interests would not be before
the court.
45A judgment under KRS § 381.135 (1962) or the non-statutory powers of
an equity court (the basic partition procedures along with KRS § 381.120 (1962)
would not bind future interest holders not in esse and not before the court. Cf.
Burchett v. Clark, 162 Ky. 586, 172 S.W. 1048 (1915). Contra, Milligan v.
Masden, 25 Ky. L. Reptr. 144, 74 S.W. 1049 (1903), quoting STonY, EqurrY
JURISPRUDENCE § 889 (14th ed. 1918):
Doubts were formerly entertained whether in a suit in equity for a
partition brought only by or against a tenant for life where the re-
mainder is to a person not in esse, a decree could be made which would
be binding upon the persons in remainder. That doubt however is now re-
moved, and the decree is held binding upon them on the ground of
virtual representation of them by the tenant for life in such cases.
Kentucky is in accord with the view that to maintain an action for partition
the party instituting the action must have a possessory estate, i.e., a present right
to share possession; the purpose is to secure to the owner of the possessory estate
the right to enjoy such possession in severalty. See Duke v. Allen, 198 Ky. 368,
248 S.W. 894 (1923). Once this premise is accepted, it necessarily follows that to
secure the effective partition of the entire estate of the possessory owner, all other
interests, present and future, may be held subject to partition. L. SniEs & A.
Siirr, TnE LAw oF FUTuRE INTErmESTS § 1768 (2d ed. 1956).
46420 S.W.2d at 112.
[Vol. 56,
COuRT oF APPEALS REvEW
into the statute will result in unwarranted partitioning of property in
which persons not in esse hold future interests. The statute clearly de-
fines the circumstances by which this may be accomplished, and the
present case is not such a situation. Although courts in their judicial
function must interpret the words of the Legislature, the statutes them-
selves define the limits of this interpretation, and in Atkinson, this
limit has been reached and possibly exceeded.
In Slowey v. Jenkins,47 the Court of Appeals was presented with a
question involving the validity of gifts over after the devise of an ap-
parent fee simple title. The testatrix devised all her property to her
husband without any limitations or restrictions.48 However, a sub-
sequent clause provided for the daughter of the testatrix to take the
property in the event the father predeceased her. This contingency
did occur and a controversy arose between the daughter and her
father's second wife. The daughter contended that the property should
be distributed to her in accordance with the terms of the will because
her father had taken only a life estate or, in the alternative, a de-
feasible fee. The Court of Appeals agreed with the daughter's second
contention and reversed the lower court's holding that the gift over
was void because the father had taken a fee simple absolute. The
Court defined the father's estate as a defeasible fee simple with a
power to convey a fee simple absolute as to any and all the property.
The defeating event for the father was his death before his daughter
without having exercised his power of disposal.49
The majority of jurisdictions in this country follow the rule that a
gift of a fee simple with an absolute power to dispose when coupled
in the same instrument with a gift over of what remains undisposed,
voids the gift over.r0 This rule has been classified by the Kentucky
Court as taking a "large bite" from the intent of the testator; it was
prospectively discarded in Hanks v. McDanell.51 Hanks ruled that the
"Polar Star" rule, i.e., the intent of the maker, as gathered from the
whole of the instrument, would prevail and be enforced unless it
violated a statute or public policy. However, Hanks construed the
estate of the first taker as a life estate rather than a fee. Such a
construction of what initially appears to be a fee would not violate
47 408 S.W.2d 452 (Ky. 1966).
48The testatrix provided that "without any limitation, restriction or en-
cumbrance as to the title of my husband, Allen L. Jenkins, in and to the property
devised and bequeathed to him..... and then made certain requests of the
husband to allow the daughter to make her home with him. Id. at 455.
49 Id.
50 See L. Snvms & A. S~nH, supra note 45, at § 1482, and cases cited there-
in.
5' 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948).
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any statute or public policy of the state. Slowey, on the other hand,
construes the estate of the first taker as a defeasible fee rather than a
life estate. By adopting this construction, Kentucky is following the
minority view which in the consensus of many writers is the correct
view.
5 2
The basis of the rule voiding the remnant gift over, which by
definition would be an executory interest, is found in the dictum of
Chancellor Kent in the case of Jackson v. Robins 3 The Chancellor as-
sumed that an executory interest was indestructible and, therefore,
could not exist if it could be destroyed by the fee owner exercising an
unlimited power to dispose of the property and prevent the vesting
of the executory interest. Some authorities say the rule is illogical as
a matter of theory since there is no reason why a valid executory in-
terest cannot be subject to destruction by the exercise of a power of
disposal held by another.5 4
The modem rule is based on the rationalization that the executory
limitation is repugnant to the fee. This same argument would like-
wise be applicable to restraints on alienation of a fee, but Kentucky
does not find it repugnant to follow the doctrine of reasonable re-
straints on alienation.55 Conceptually, all executory interests are re-
pugnant to a fee since a fee has infinite duration, but fee simple
interests subject to executory limitations have been recognized since
the Statute of Uses in 1586.56 These interests do not violate the public
policy against the unmarketability of land because in cases involving a
power of disposal, that power may be exercised by the holder of the
first estate to convey the property in fee simple absolute, thereby de-
feating the executory interest. Striking down such interests is, on the
other hand, contrary to the primary policy of carrying out the intent
of the testator.
Kentucky, in Slowey, took the step urged by some scholars5r7 and
recognized the validity of a gift over after a fee title, albeit a defeasible
fee with an absolute power of disposal. Although difficult to rationalize
with traditional property concepts, the modem view suggests that by
52 L. Sams & A. SMIT, supra note 45, at § 1485; Dukeminier, Contingent
Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 MwNr. L.
REv. 13, 28 (1959); Matthews, Remnant Gifts Over in Kentucky, 44 Ky. L. J.
397 (1955).
53 16 Johns 537 (N.Y. 1818).
5 4 Dukeminier, supra note 52, at 28.
55 See Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 246
(1916). This is the landmark case in this area. For a general discussion of this
doctrine, see Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49
Ky. L.J. 3, 88 (1960).56 Dukeminier, supra note 52, at 29.
57 L. Smms & A. SmITh, supra note 50, at § 1489.
[Vol. 56,
COURT OF APPEALs REviEW
focusing on the intent of the testator regarding the creation of the
remnant gift over, the problem can be solved.5 8 When viewed in this
manner, the first taker has "full (but not exclusive) ownership in the
form of a possessory fee simple subject to an executory interest over
contingent on the first taker failing to dispose of the property."59 The
Court has thus shed an artificial classification based upon a speculation
of whether the testator intended to create a life estate or a fee in the
first taker.
Two cases related to this problem were also decided this term by
the Court of Appeals. In Creason v. Prince,60 the testator devised
property to his wife in fee simple except as provided subsequently in
the will. The wife was given full power of disposal over the property
although the last clause of the instrument provided for a gift over of
the undisposed property. After the gift over the testator reiterated
that this provision was not to be construed to hamper the wife from
disposing of the property in any manner. Reading the instrument as a
whole, the Court construed the intent of the maker to confer upon his
wife a full power of disposal, which would include transferring, as
the wife did, the property by way of a trust, with the corpus being
distributed at her death.61
This case is illustrative of the situation which could have arisen in
Slowey had the power to dispose been exercised. By following the
'Polar Star" rule to reach the testator's intent, the gift over was de-
feated by the devisees' action in disposing of the property under the
power conferred by the instrument.
In Chaffin v. Adams,62 a testatrix in a holographic will devised all
her property to her husband. A later clause read, "at my husband's
death I will my real property to ........................," the name of the re-
mainderman being left blank. In awarding the husband a fee simple,
the Court could find no reason for the testatrix to reduce her husband's
estate unless she intended to benefit a "secondary object of her
bounty." The failure to name a beneficiary of the remainder indicated
that she had no fixed intention to reduce the husband's estate. 63
The principle function of a court in construing a testamentary
instrument is to find the intent of the testator. Chaffin determined this
intent by following the "Polar Star" rule, i.e., by construing the will as
a whole. Although the testatrix at one time may have meant to limit
G8 Matthewvs, supra note 52, at 407-08.
GO Id.
0 415 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1967).
61 Id. at 91.
62412 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1967).
63 Id. at 564.
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the husband to a life estate by a gift over of the remainder, she did not
do so in her will.
D. Wums
According to the weight of authority, execution of mutual or
reciprocal wills 4 does not of itself indicate that the two parties have
entered into a contractual relationship concerning their testamentary
dispositions. 5 Finding a contractual intent, in the absence of con-
tractual language, must be accomplished by inference. In Arndefl v.
Peay,00 such an inference could not be made despite the fact that a
husband and wife executed separate wills containing reciprocal pro-
visions indicating a common purpose; they were drawn by the same
scrivenor and were executed on the same day.
Although the general rule is that no contractual inference will be
raised, the Court seems to be retreating from a position taken earlier
in Boner's Administrator v. Chestnut's Executor.67 There, wills which
specifically referred to each other and contained identical provisions
were held contractual. Arndell limits Boner to its facts and implies
that the Court will require reciprocal wills to at least specifically refer
to each other if a contract is to be found.
Possibly, the Court's reluctance to find contractual wills is based on
a general policy of sanctioning these devices, but not favoring them
since they are cumbrous and difficult to enforce.08 This is evidenced
by one of the remedies for the revocation of a contractual will: the
estate of the defaulting party is impressed with a trust in favor of
that party's legatees, 69 resulting in the continuous supervision of the
trust by the courts. In addition, while joint or reciprocal wills may be
executed as a result of common intent, this does not mean they are
executed with respect to a contract. A more logical reason for the
similarity of dispositions, particularly where the wills are those of
husband and wife, is the similar tastes and affections resulting from
years of living together."0 Standing alone, the fact that two wills were
64 Mutual or reciprocal wills are created when parties to a common plan
execute separate instruments rather than using a single or joint will embodying
the testamentary plan of two or more persons. Only when the provisions of the
separate wills are reciprocal, identical, or substantially similar are they mutual.
1 W. PAGE, WMLS § 11.1 (W. Bowe & D. Parker ed. 1960).
65 Id. at § 10.3. See also Annot., 169 A.L.R. 10 (1947).
66411 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1967).
67 317 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1958).
6 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1367 (1957).
69 This remedy was applied in Boner's Admx v. Chestnut's Ex'r, 317 S.W.2d
867 (Ky. 1958). See also Watkins v. Covington Trust & Banking Co., 303 Ky.
664, 198 S.W.2d 964 (1947); Tapp v. Reynolds, 383 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. 1964).
Another remedy is that of an action at law for breach of contract. 1 W. PAGE,
supra note 64, at § 10.3.70 W. PAGE, supra note 64.
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executed at the same time and contain identical provisions should not
give rise to an inference or presumption the wills were made pursuant
to a contract.
7 '
In light of modem authority,72 the Arndell decision is sound. More-
over, no undue hardship is placed on parties wishing to make con-
tractual wills. The problem can be met by carefully analyzing the
parties' desires and concisely and strictly drafting the wills.
E. ADVERSE POSSESSION
In order to acquire title by adverse possession, the possession
must be hostile, actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous for
the statutory period.' This black letter property law does not seem
difficult to comprehend; problems arise, however, when an adverse
holder attempts to quiet title or raise the defense of adverse possession
in an ejectment action. The question becomes one of the sufficiency of
evidence utilized to prove adverse possession. Since the taking of
property from a record owner is an alarming act in the United States
where real property is a revered institution,2 the burden placed upon
an adverse possessor should be heavy. The primary justifications for
allowing title to be acquired by adverse possession are to keep land
producing and to perfect defective titles.3 It logically follows that with
an increase in population, the consequential scarcity of land, and more
efficient systems of land registration, title by adverse possession should
become even more difficult to establish.
In Kentucky Women's Christian Temperance Union v. Thomas,4
the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision for the ad-
verse claimants, and ruled as a matter of law that the evidence was in-
sufficient to sustain their claim. In 1948 a former occupant, not then in
possession, deeded approximately one hundred acres to appellee.5
Between 1948 and 1967, appellee seeded ground, cleared some land
71 Id.
72 Id.
IKRS § 413.010 (1962): The statutory period necessary for adverse pos-
session in Kentucky is fifteen years; see Tarter v. Tucker, 280 S.W.2d 152 (Ky.1955).-2 Land is not technically taken by adverse possession; rather the record
owner is not allowed to assert his claim to the property.3 It has long been recognized that there is no social utility in allowing land
to lay idle. The sole historical basis of title by adverse possession is the develop-
ment of the statute of limitations on actions for the recovery of land. 1 W.
WAMr.s, LAw oF REAL PROiERTY 115 (1947).
4 412 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. 1967).
5 Cases against two adverse holders of adjacent tracts of land claimed by
the Union were joined. The second appellee, Tabor, received a deed from the
same person who was grantor of Thomas's deed in 1949. Tabor did not hold for
the statutory period and evidence of his occupancy was less substantial than
that of Thomas.
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by bulldozer, grew one crop, cut hay once every other year, dug a
pond, placed land in soil bank from 1959 to 1963, cut bushes each
year, and extended a mineral lease under which there was no
development. In 1950 the Court had ruled that acts of cutting timber
and giving or selling a small strip of land to a neighbor constituted
sufficient evidence to uphold an adverse possession claim.8 In a 1960
case the Court upheld the defense of adverse possession where the
evidence showed that for the requisite statutory period, defendants
had cut and removed timber, leased for minerals, paid taxes, and
moved a cabin from one point on the land to another.7
Evidence of possession presented in these earlier cases was no
stronger than that presented by appellee Thomas, although admittedly
possession in those cases existed for longer periods of time." The dig-
ging of a pond, cutting of hay, placing of land in a soil bank, and the
execution of mineral leases would seem to be as open, hostile, no-
torious, and exclusive as cutting timber or removing minerals. Since
the length of holding beyond fifteen years should make no difference,
that aspect of the earlier cases should provide no distinguishing factor.
These cases indicate that the Court is requiring more stringent
evidence of adverse possession, perhaps with the idea of making real
property even more sacred. More stringent evidentiary requirements
for a finding of adverse possession are warranted in that it further pro-
tects the rightful owners of real property.
In Department of Parks v. Stephens,9 a case of first impression, the
Court indicated that the Commonwealth could gain title to land by
adverse possession. Suit was brought by the Department of Parks to
quiet title to a two acre tract of land adjoining certain property it
owned near Cumberland Falls. The Department, which had no color
of title, built a stable and later a parking lot on the disputed tract. The
lower court ruled that the State could not obtain title by adverse pos-
session, and moreover, that the evidence was insufficient to uphold a
finding of adverse possession. The Court of Appeals disagreed with
regard to the Commonwealth's power to obtain land by adverse pos-
session, but it affirmed because the requisite evidence of adverse hold-
ing was lacking. The Court reasoned that the constitutional provisions
forbidding a taking of property without compensation would not pre-
vent the state from taking land by adverse possession since the
6 Cornelius v. Stephens, 812 Ky. 499, 288 S.W.2d 28 (1950).
7 Arnold v. Heffner, 330 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. 1960).
s The holding period in Cornelius was for over fifty years, in Arnold, thirty-
six. p 407 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1967).
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original owner was no longer in a position to assert title to the pro-
perty.
Whether a state can obtain title by adverse possession has been an
infrequently litigated issue. As pointed out in Stephens, at least one
authority states without equivocation that states and other govern-
mental entities may acquire title in this manner.10 The opinion further
states that no decisions to the contrary could be found. However, there
have been contrary decisions in at least one other jurisdiction. A line of
Pennsylvania cases holding that corporations with the power of
eminent domain could not acquire title by adverse possesssion is ap-
parently still operative authority.1
The basis of most decisions holding that governments can obtain
land by adverse possession and the case relied on by the Court of Ap-
peals was a Supreme Court case, Stanley v. Schwalley.'2 There, the
plaintiff's claim was based on a land sale contract inherited from her
father. The father had never received a deed and was in substantial
default at his death. The vendor had continued to pay taxes on the
property, and he later conveyed the tract to the city of San Antonio
which conveyed it to the United States. So the government was holding
the land as a bona fide purchaser for value under a conveyance duly
recorded; it appears that plaintiff's claim was rather weak and un-
worthy.'
3
Although universally cited as a basis for the proposition that states
can obtain title by adverse possession, Stanley did not explicitly hold
this. As Judge Field pointed out in his strong dissent, the Supreme
Court did not expressly approve the doctrine, but it merely implied
that the United States might plead adverse possession. Spealing out
against the consequences foreseeable from the majority's opinion, Field
said that to allow the government to claim property by adverse pos-
session would conflict with the whole course of judicial decisions in
England, as well as every state in the Union.' 4
10 See Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1967), which
cited 2 .. J.S. Adverse Possession § 6 (1936); see generally Annot., 123 A.L.R.
679 (1939).
11 See Brankin v. Philadelphia N. & N.Y. Ry., 286 Pa. 331, 133 A. 563
(1926); Carter v. Ridge Turnpike Co., 208 Pa. 565, 57 A. 988 (1904). These
cases and others cited therein enunciated a general rule that governmental
entities and public utilities could not obtain land by adverse possession. How-
ever, to benefit from this rule, it was necessary for a plaintiff to rebut a pre-
sumption, raised after twenty years of government possession, that the land was
paid for.
12 Stanley v. Schwalley, 147 U.S. 508, 524 (1892).
13 The majority's opinion was almost exclusively addressed to the issue of
sovereign immunity-whether a citizen could sue a U.S. Army officer for his
official acts.
14Stanley v. Schwalley, 147 U.S. 508, 524 (1892).
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Sections 13 and 242 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibit the
taking of property without just compensation.15 In State Park Com-
mission v. Wilder,'6 the Court said:
Section 13 of the Constitution declares that no man's property shall
be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representa-
tives, and without just compensation being previously made to him. This
declaration of an inherent and inalienable right has been a part of all
four Constitutions of Kentucky, and there is no exception in favor of the
state or subdivision .... Section 242 of the Constitution requires that
municipal and other corporations and individuals invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use shall pay or secure
the payment of just compensation before the taking thereof. . . . Both
sections prohibit the actual taking of property without payment. (Em-
phasis added.)
17
The Court's circumvention of these constitutional provisions was some-
what shaky. It reasoned that after the running of the statute of limita-
tions the original owner was no longer in a position to assert title to
property since that title had effectively vested in the adverse pos-
sessor.'8 Thus, continued the Court, the original owner had lost his
claim of title, and the state was no longer taking his property. How-
ever, the Court has overlooked the fact that the record owner would
still technically be the owner of the property; he is simply barred
from raising his claim. His rights are secured as against the whole
world except the adverse holder. Further, the state would still have
wrongly possessed the property fifteen years before such a claim
would be available.
15 Ky. CoNsT. § 13 provides:
No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of his life
or limb nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use
without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation
being previously made to him.
Ky. CoNsT. § 242 provides:
Municipal and other corporations, and individuals invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use, shall make just com-
pensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by them; which com-
pensation shall be paid before such taking, or paid or secured, at the
election of such corporation or individual, before such injury or de-
struction.
The General Assembly shall not deprive any person of an appeal from any
preliminary assessment of damages against any such corporation or indi-
vidual made by Commissioners or otherwise; and upon appeal from such
preliminary assessment, the amount of such damages shall, in all cases,
be determined by a jury, according to the course of the common law.
16 Kentucky State Park Comm'n v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W.2d 38
(1935); see also Carrico v. Colvin, 92 Ky. 342, 17 S.W. 854 (1891).
17Kentucky State Park Commn v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W.2d 38, 39
(1935).
18Commonwealth, Dep't of Parks v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky.
1967).
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Already vested with powers of escheat and eminent domain, it
seems that the state should not need the right to claim by adverse
possession. Adverse possession implies a wrongful taking. The question
raised, then, is why should one citizen be wrongfully injured for the
benefit of society? If the state really needed the land, it could con-
demn. The main reason for constitutional protection against uncom-
pensated exercise of the power of eminent domain is to prevent the
taking of private property for public use without just compensation
being paid before possession is taken. Furthermore, the average
citizen would not suspect the state of having wrongful designs on his
property. True, the citizen would have an action in reverse condem-
nation 9 until the adverse possession matured, but why should he be
subjected to the necessity of court action to protect his land from the
state? The state should be above such acts. Since adverse possession
cannot be maintained against the state,20 a citizen should be entitled
to a reciprocal right. If the state is going to deny adverse possession
of its property, it is only fair that it should refrain from similar acts
on the property of others.
F. BouNDAmEs
Property boundaries are lines indicated by various descriptive
elements, e.g., monuments, distances, quantities, and adjacent bound-
aries. In the construction of deeds, it is well established that descrip-
tions of material objects and monuments will prevail over inconsistent
calls for courses and distances.21 This rule of construction, however,
should be flexible, with the primary objective being to discover the
intent of the parties.22
19 At one time the cases on this issue held that a citizen could not sue the
state. For an enlightening discussion of the evolution of reverse eminent domain,
see Oberst & Lewis, Claims Against the State of Kentucky-Reverse Eminent
Domain, 42 Ky. L. J. 163 (1953). Where the power of eminent domain has been
improperly exercised, i.e., where just compensation has not been given,
governmental immunity is waived without legislative action, and a citizen may
sue the state.
20 Property can not be taken from the Commonwealth by adverse possession.
Ford Motor Co. v. Potter, 330 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Ky. 1959).
21 Bowling v. Gayheart, 396 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1965); Creech v. Jackson, 375
S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1964). Application of this general rule was sufficient to dispose
of Marcum v. Cantrell, 409 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1966). In Marcum the appellee had
been conveyed a deed which included a passvay in the courses and distances
description. After the assway had been built, the appellant received a deed from
the same grantor which also included in the courses and distances description the
same land on which the passway was built. In an action to quiet title, the Court
affimed the lower court's decision that a passway constituted a monument which
prevailed over the courses and distances description in the second deed.22 Lainhart v. Shepherd, 246 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952); Morris v. Judy, 216
Ky. 593, 288 S.W. 332 (1926).
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In Jackson v. Metcalf2 3 the plaintiff held title to a tract of land in
Harrison County. The patent from which this title originally stemmed
described one boundary of the tract as extending to the top of a ridge
and stated that this was a distance of one hundred and sixty poles.
However, these two descriptions were inconsistent. If the monument
marked the boundary, a small parcel of timber land would have been
excluded from the plaintiffs property. Likewise, a 1918 deed to the
property and the plaintiff's deed contained a description of the
property which excluded the timber land.
The dispute in this case arose when the defendant sold the timber
rights to that small parcel. This action in trespass ensued. Plaintiff was
denied relief at trial; the circuit court applied the general rule that
monuments24 prevail over distances and held that the plaintiff had not
established title to the timber land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed.
Initially the Court determined that the disputed parcel was con-
veyed by the patent since following the distances seemed more
reasonable than following the monuments. Turning to the 1918 deed,
the Court again ruled that the timber land was in fact conveyed, say-
ing: "To hold otherwise would require us to presume that the grantor
in the 1918 deed intended to retain a small landlocked tract, a pre-
sumption we are not willing to indulge under the circumstances pre-
sented."25 The Court pointed out that while the presumption was
against the retention of a small landlocked tract, it was a rebuttable
presumption since the primary question was the intention of the
grantor.26
Jackson is apparently the first Kentucky decision recognizing an
exception to the general rule. Although the Court cited several prior
decisions as authority, those cases merely upheld the rule of monu-
ments over distances.27 Only past dicta to the effect that the intention
of the parties is the primary objective in the construction of deeds sup-
ports the Court's position. Yet Jackson is a sound decision. The dis-
puted tract was generally considered as being owned by the plaintiff
and his predecessor in title, and it was obviously intended to be con-
veyed by the grantor of the 1918 deed. To affirm the lower court's
decision would have allowed the application of a general rule to de-
feat a reasonable result consistent with the intent of the parties.
23415 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. 1967).
24 The monument in the controverted deed in Jackson was the top of a ridge.
25 415 S.W.2d at 365.
26Id. See also 23 Am. JuR. 2d Deeds § 241 (1965).
27 See cases cited note 22 supra.
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G. CoNvEHsION
The standard normally used in assessing damages for conversion is
the market value of the converted property, i.e., the price at which the
property could have been sold by a willing seller to a willing buyer.28
However, where the property is such that the market value fluctuates,
e.g., corporate stock, the additional problem arises of determining the
time for establishing the value. There are three primary rules for the
solution of this problem.
The first rule, still followed by many courts, is the common law
rule which makes the value of the property at the time of conversion
the measure of damages. 29 The basic difficulty with this rule arises
when the value of the property increases after the conversion. In this
event, it can be argued that the defendant has been granted a wind-
fall, and it may be said that he is permitted to speculate at the plain-
tiff's expense.
The second rule awards the highest value from the time of con-
version to the time of the judgment. This is known as the "highest
intermediate value" rule and is followed by a majority of jurisdic-
tions.30 Clearly, this rule affords the plaintiff an opportunity to
speculate at the defendant's expense. The plaintiff is encouraged to
delay the trial so that a longer period will be available for the market
to rise. As McCormick states, "[The plaintiff] runs no corresponding
risk, for no matter how low swings the pendulum of prices, [he] gets
the peak price."3l
Thirdly, the rule of "highest replacement value"2 2 awards plaintiff
"the highest value which the commodity reaches from the time when
the plaintiff first learns of the conversion... until the end of the period
within which the plaintiff might, acting with reasonable promptness,
have replaced [the property] on the market."3 3 This rule (the "New
York" rule),3 4 presumes that had the plaintiff wanted the stock for
speculative reasons, he could have, within a "reasonable time," pur-
chased replacement shares. The plaintiff is awarded the highest value
2818 Am. Jurt. 2d Conversion § 82 (1965).
29 See Barkhausen v. Bulkley, 90 Colo. 558, 11 P.2d 220 (1932); Rogich v.
Dressel, 45 Wash. 829, 278 P.2d 367 (1954). Barldmusen states that this is the
majority rule, 90 Colo. at 559, 11 P.2d at 221. But see discussion in text infra.
30 C. McComucn, DAMAGES § 48 (1935). This treatise cites Ricketts v. Crit-
tenden, 2 Ky. Opin. 499 (1868) for dictum approving this view. See C. Mc-
Co ucx, supra, at § 48 n. 131, for a compilation of cases adopting these three
rules in the various states.
31 Id. at § 148, at 187.
32 C. McComuscy, supra note 30, at § 48, at 188.
33 Id.
34 Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211 (1873), overruling Markham v. Jaudon, 41
N.Y. 235 (1869).
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he would have paid had this self-protective course of action been
employed. Neither party is allowed to speculate to the other's dis-
advantage, and nothing more is expected of the plaintiff than the
exercise of sound business judgment. Nor is the plaintiff encouraged to
postpone the defendant's day in court as under the highest inter-
mediate value rule. McCormick says this rule "seems the most equi-
table and practical of the three."35 However, the rule is not without
weaknesses, e.g., the question of a "reasonable time" and the imposition
on the plaintiff of the burden of double investment for single ad-
vantage.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Amlung v. Banker's Bond Co.,36
had the opportunity to choose among these three rules. The plaintiff
had inherited certain shares of stock from her father's estate. Her
husband (not a party to this action) converted the stock over an eight
year period by forging her name to the certificates and transferring
them through the defendant's agent. Since the plaintiff left business
and financial matters to her husband, she was unaware of the con-
version until after her husband's hasty and unexplained departure.
At the trial, the plaintiff was awarded the market value of the stock at
the time of conversion. She appealed, contending that she should have
been awarded the increased current value of the stock. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
By such affirmation, the Court of Appeals adopted the common
law rule. Realistically, this was a case of first impression since the only
case discussing the measure of damages for conversion of corporate
stock was decided in 1868, and it presented the rule by way of
dictum.37 The common law rule was reasonably applied here even
though it is a rule subject to much criticism. In addition to the criti-
cisms noted previously, this rule has been condemned because it
deprives the plaintiff of all opportunity to speculate which he may
have had after the conversion. However, on the facts of this case,
awarding the plaintiff the lowest judgment available under the three
rules is just.
The equitable nature of this decision is noted because the Court
apparently reached a compromise. The defendant was an innocent
converter and was held liable only because brokers are impressed with
a fiduciary duty. Since there was no overt criminality, there were no
compelling reasons to impose higher damages. The other side of the
compromise arises from the fact that it cannot be clearly shown that
35 C. McCoimuci, supra note 30, at § 48, at 189.
30 411 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1967).37 Ricketts v. Crittenden, 2 Ky. Opin. 499 (1868).
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laches should not have barred the plaintiffs claim. The Court did not
want to hold this defendant liable to the fullest extent due to his "in-
nocence," but neither did it want to release him entirely. Therefore,
the Court awarded the lowest judgment available under the three
rules.
Conversely, the Court could reasonably have barred the plain-
tiff because of laches. A basic element of laches is that a party will be
charged with knowledge where the evidence leads to the conclusion
that he could have informed himself of the facts by the degree of
"diligence" which the law exacts . . . or where circumstances of which
he was cognizant were such as to put a man of "ordinary" prudence on
inquiry.38
The question before the Court in the instant case was whether a wife,
who left all financial matters to her husband, should be required, in
order to satisfy "ordinary prudence," to investigate his management of
those affairs. Such an investigation would only have required that the
plaintiff checked her lockbox once in the eight years preceeding the
trial. Because this does not appear to be an onerous burden, and be-
cause it can be argued that "ordinary prudence" would demand that
one not abandon the care and control of his lockbox for a period of
eight years, laches was not totally inappropriate as a defense in this
case. However, the Court's argument was that "Mrs. Amlung was an
ordinary, unassuming housewife with no business experience or acu-
men, a good woman trusting her husband," 9 and, therefore, she satis-
fied the requirement of ordinary prudence. This argument is not with-
out force.
The Court has reached a good decision by applying the common
law rule. But for purposes of stare decisis, it has adopted the least
acceptable rule since all defendants are now given the benefit of
speculating with stock rightfully belonging to another. Individuals
should not be compelled to suffer the loss of the opportunity to
speculate. The Court has not allowed for the more realistic cases which
will arise in the future, wherein the plaintiff has been wronged without
fault or irresponsibility on his part. It is hoped that the Court will
recognize this in future cases and limit Amlung to its facts.
H. EAsxmENrs
Kentucky Mountain Coal Co. v. Hacker40 involved both a trespass
3827 Am. Jun. 2d Equity § 167 (1966). The Court in Amlung cited and fol-
lowed Taylor v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1957), which conforms
with this basic element as quoted.
39 411 S.W.2d at 695.
40 412 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967).
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and an easement problem. The coal company apparently41 had been
hauling coal across appellee's land for some time before instituting an
action to condemn a right-of-way.42 Both parties acquiesced in the
condemnation proceedings, and appellant conceded trespass over ap-
pellee's land. Damages of $3,625.94 were awarded for the trespass and
$1,000 for the easement. Appellant appealed both awards. Trespass
damages were computed by charging two cents per ton for coal con-
veyed across the land. This figure was used because the evidence
showed that two cents per ton was customary rental for a right-of-way
in the area. The one thousand dollar figure evidently came solely from
the circuit judge's experience and estimation. The Court overruled
both figures and remanded the case.
The proper amount of damages for temporary trespass is the
depreciation in the rental value of the land during the period of
occupancy if the land is rental property, but if the land is occupied by
the owner, it is the diminution in the value of the use of the property.
43
Since appellee's land was neither occupied nor rented, the Court held
the reasonable rental value of the use was the proper measure of
damages, citing Cary-Glendon Coal Co. v. Carmichael.44 Thus, the
same test for measuring damages was announced in both Carmichael
and Hacker, but its components have changed. Carmichael awarded
damages of one and one-half cents per ton of coal conveyed across
the property since this was customary under private contract.45 How-
ever, the customary tonnage formula used in private contracts was
not regarded by the Court as a correct means of determining reason-
able rental value. Thus, the Hacker Court stipulated that Gary-Glen-
don was overruled to the extent that it was in conflict.
The Court's decision to diminish the damages for the coal com-
pany's trespass is questionable. In effect, the coal company is in a
better financial position because it chose to trespass instead of dealing
legally with the landowner. If the coal company had leased the right-
of-way, it is reasonable to say it would have had to pay approximately
41 The facts were not set out well in the case, but after several readings the
general ideas set out in the text began to emerge.
42 Condemnation proceedings were under KRS §§ 381.580-.620 (1962), the
statutory parallel of easement by necessity. Under these sections the coal company
was empowered to claim a right-of-way from the defendant.43 Edwards v. Lees Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936); Cary-
Glendon Coal Co. v. Carmichael, 258 Ky. 411, 80 S.W.2d 29 (1935); Price v.
Dawson Springs, 190 Ky. 349, 222 S.W. 470 (1920).44 Cary-Glendon Coal Co. v. Carmichael, 258 Ky. 411, 80 S.W.2d 29 (1935).
45 Id. Two previous litigations and a purported lease arrangement influenced
the decision. There the landowner, who ha[ a judgment for one and one-half
cents per ton, wanted more damages. Since the trespasser had not appealed,
damages were left in the amount previously determined.
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two cents per ton for coal conveyed across the property since evidence
showed this was the amount that other lessees in the area were pay-
ing. This was the amount of damages awarded by the circuit court,
and the amount the Court of Appeals remanded as being too large. By
choosing to act illegally, the coal company ended up paying less to
haul their coal. The practical result of this case is to encourage illegal
acts. If the Court thought it necessary to change the measure of
damages, logically it should have raised it. Such a move would have
a detrimental effect on potential trespassers.
The Court also reversed the lower court's award of damages for
the easement. A proper measure of damages for the easement was the
depreciation in land value-the difference between the market value
before and after the easement was granted.4 6 The Court pointed out
quite sharply that its opinion in Adams Construction Co. V. Bentley did
not allow the trial judge to value depreciation from his own knowledge
of the property.47 The record contained no evidence to support the
award of the trial judge.
I. Om AN GAs
An oil and gas lease involves the law of contract, and because of its
peculiar nature, it also involves the law of conveyance. A lease usually
contains a granting clause, an habendum clause, and a drilling and de-
lay rental clause.48 The purpose of the latter clause is to encourage the
testing, development, and operation of the leased premises.49 These
"incentive" clauses fall basically into two categories. One is the so-
called "or" lease and the other the "unless" lease.50
Due to the speculative nature of oil and gas operations, operators
would prefer a lease which secures their right to drill at any time
rather than one requiring immediate development under the threat of
4 6 Commonwealth v. Mann, 387 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth v.
George, 387 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1965); Young v. Tennessee Gas & Transmission
Co., 867 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1963).
47 335 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1960) provides: "But in any event, there must
be introduced in evidence some tangible figure from which the value of the use
reasonably can be deduced, else the court and jury are left to draw entirely ontheir experience aliunde, or upon naked speculation."
4 8 R. SU.IVAN, HA.N'DBOOK OF Om ' GAs LAw 86-12 (1955). A granting
clause is that which is conveyed; and an habendumn clause fixes the ultimate
duration of the lessee's interest. The drilling and delay rental clause fixes theobligation of the lessee to commence drilling or pay stipulated rentals.
49Kelley v. Hard~vick, 228 Ky. 349, 351-52, 14 S.W.2d 1098, 1099 (1929):
"The lease must be construed if possible to bring as strong a pressure to bear as
possible on the lessee to begin development as soon as he can."
50 An "unless" lease is contrasted with an "or" lease in as much as the
latter provides for either payment of delay rentals in the event of failure to drill, or
forfeiture of the leasehold. See Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests
Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 8 TExAs L. REV. 483, 528 (1930).
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forfeiture for non-production. 51 To secure this privilege, the lease
generally provides that a well be drilled within a certain time or the
lessee must pay a certain sum called delay rental.52 This enables a
lessee to postpone drilling by paying rent when this alternative ap-
pears favorable. However, failure of the lessee to pay or drill makes the
lease voidable since courts have construed this to be a forfeiture clause
in favor of the lessor.5 3 Hence, the lessee can lose his lease for failure
to comply with the provision to drill or pay, or, at the lessor's option,
the lessee can remain liable during the primary term, i.e., the length of
the lease, to either drill or pay delay rentals. Therefore, even if the land
proves to be "dry," the lessee may remain liable to pay the rentals
until the expiration of the primary term.
To alleviate this problem a surrender clause is added, giving the
lessee the right to terminate the lease at anytime. 54 This alternative
drill or pay provision combined with a forfeiture and a surrender
clause is known in the parlance of attorneys and the oil and gas in-
dustry as an "or" lease.5 5 The lessor benefits by having, as an alter-
native to development, a stipulated rent as long as the lease is held
by the lessee. The lessee benefits by being allowed to defer drilling
and, in the alternative, to absolve himself from liability in the case of
a "dry hole." An alternative to the surrender clause is the "unless"
lease which allows the lessee to absolve himself of liability for further
development or for paying rent where the land proves to be non-
productive.5 6 This clause provides that if no well is drilled within a
certain time, the lease will terminate as to both parties unless delay
rentals are paid. 57 Thus, if the lessee fails to drill, the lease will auto-
matically terminate unless the leaseholder keeps it alive by paying the
stipulated rentals.5 8 If the lessee finds the land unproductive, he can
refuse to drill or pay the rentals, and a termination of the lease will re-
51 R. SUllIVAN, supra note 48, at § 45.5 2eDelay rentals are payments, usually under a gas and oil lease, made by the
lessee for the privilege of extending the time for which he might utilize the
leasehold. BI.Ac&s LAW DicrixARY (4th ed. 1951).
53 R. Su~iavAN, supra note 48, at § 45.
54Id.
55 Id.
56 See note 52 supra.
57 R. Su ,vAN, supra note 48, at § 45.
58 H. WILLIAMS, On. & GAS LAW § 606.2 (1966):
The courts have been substantially unanimous in holding that if the
lessee fails to pay or tender the rental on or before the due date, the
lease ["unless" form] terminates automatically regardless of the fact that
subsequent to the due date the lessee may tender the rental payment.
See Gasaway v. Teichgraeber, 107 Kan. 340, 191 P. 282 (1920) wherein pay-
ment was mailed on the due date, but not received until the following day, and the
court held that the leasehold terminated.
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sult. No forfeiture or surrender is involved in the "unless" lease. The
lease simply terminates on the inaction of the lessee. 59
Both the "or" and the "unless" clauses give the lessee three choices:
1) to drill a well within the specified time; 2) in lieu thereof to pay
the stipulated delay rental; 3) or to terminate the lease even during the
primary term and thus avoid further liability of any ldnd.60 The lease
can be terminated under the "or" clause by surrendering the lease, and
under the "unless" clause by simply failing to drill and to pay delay
rentals.
The lessee does not affirmatively covenant under an "unless" clause,
and no action can be brought against him for failure to drill or pay.
However, under an "or" lease, the lessee affirmatively convenants that
he will either drill or pay. Thus, courts have construed this type of
lease in favor of the lessor,61 compelling the lessee to do one or the
other. The "or" lease is seldom used today except where the lessor is
primarily interested in having his land promptly developed. Even in
this situation, the "unless" form may be used but modified by an ex-
press covenant to drill.
62
The "or" lease creates a condition subsequent and when the condi-
tion occurs, i.e., the lessee does not drill or pay, the estate continues
in existence until the lessor exercises his right of re-entry.63 Conse-
quently, the lessor may waive the default and the principle of ratifica-
59 H. WVmLA s, supra note 58, provides:
This rule of automatic termination of the lease for failure to make timely
payment or tender of rental may seem unduly harsh in many cases...
[but these cases] seem correct. The "unless" type drilling and rental
clause is a clause of limitation, not one of covenant or condition. The
lessee may relieve himself of further liability under the lease by simply
failing to commence operations or pay rentals during the primary term.
The lessee who has this benefit of the automatic termination of the lease
should have no standing to claim relief from automatic termination when
he is responsible for a failure to make timely payment of rental.
60 1. SULLIVN , supra note 48, at § 45.
61 Comment, 18 Ky. L.J. 240 (1924):
The object of the rule is to promote development and prevent delay and
unproductiveness, and this is regarded as the real intent of the lessor even
if there are no express words of forfeiture. An opposite holding would
deprive the lessor of valuable royalties and grant to the lessee the use
of the land at a mere nominal rental.
See also Kolachnr v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 110 P. 902 (1910), which holds
that the surrender clause of an oil and gas lease will be strictly construed in
favor of the landowner.
62 R. SULLw, supra note 48, at § 46.
633 Monarch Oil & Gas Co. v. Richardson, 124 Ky. 602, 99 S.W. 668 (1907):
"The lessor must first refuse rentals, demand development, and wait a reasonable
time." See aso Bloom v. Rugh, 98 Kan. 589, 160 P. 1185 (1916): the failure to
assert the right of forfeiture ("unless" lease) allowed the lease to continue.
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tion and estoppel will operate to extend the lease." The "unless" lease,
in a majority of jurisdictions, creates a special limitation on the estate
granted and is construed as similar to a determinable fee. Thus, a
strict interpretation of the clause will not permit a court of equity to
prevent termination.65 If the lessee fails either to develop or to tender
timely payment of the delay rentals, the lease is said to terminate auto-
matically. Accordingly, there is nothing to forfeit, because at the
moment the rentals become due and are not paid, there is no lease.
Despite this strict interpretation, courts of equity have granted relief
from termination of "unless" leases in cases where the lessor has been
at fault, or because of accident, mistake, or inadvertance, the lessee was
unable to pay on time.66
In Ledford v. Adkins,67 the appellee was holder of an oil lease
which provided that delay rentals must be paid on or before May 1,
1965, and that failure to make such payment would terminate the
lease. Stricken with a serious illness in March, 1965, the appellee was
hospitalized until April 25, 1965, and required the care of a special
nurse until May 2. As a consequence of his illness, the delay rentals
were not tendered until May 18, 1965. The appellee had expended
$250,000 developing the lease, and he alleged that forfeiture would
cause appellants unjust enrichment in that amount. After considering
several policies and subconsciously admitting that an "unless" lease
required automatic termination (if, indeed, this case involved one),
6 4 H. WL S, supra note 58, at § 607.7:
Unlike the termination provision of an "unless" clause which operates
automatically and, at least in theory, without regard to equitable con-
siderations, the termination provision of an "or" clause operates by way
of condition and relief from forfeiture may be granted on the basis of
equitable considerations.
65 H. WmLims, supra note 58, at § 606.2.
66 Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 993 (1949):
With allowances to be made for ordinary variances in rulings from state
to state, explained in part at least by differences in the circumstances of
cases, and except for negative doctrines supported with more or less
consistency in one or two jurisdictions, the correct general conclusion
seems to be that equity will grant relief from termination of an "unless"
lease, or from forfeiture of an "or" or other lease, for nonpayment of delay
rentals, when it appears the leaseholder had fully intended to pay the
full amount, but, without gross negligence, and because of accident,
mistake, inadvertence, mischance, etc., failed to do so strictly on time.
See also Gloyd v. Midwest Ref. Co., 62 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1933) (an attempt
to pay was prevented by an accident over which the lessee had no control);
Jones v. Southern Nat. Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 84 (1948) (three
hundred dollars was tendered rather than $323 due to a mistake in the amount
of acreage leased). Contra, Ford v. Barton, 224 S.W. 268 (Tex. 1920); Oldfield
v. Gypsy Oil Co., 123 Okla. 293, 253 P. 298 (1926) (mail clerk erroneously
delivered the check to the wrong bank); Harvey v. Benmo Oil Co., 272 F. 475
(D.C. Olda. 1921) (delay in mailing was not the fault of the lessee).
67413 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1967).
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the Court concluded that equity must prevail and granted the lessee
the right to continue under the lease. The Court of Appeals has dealt
with the problem of forfeiture of oil and gas leases in many cases over
the years,68 but Ledford is the first in which the delay was caused by
severe physical incapacity.
It would seem that a proper analysis of the problem necessitates
that the Court determine whether the case involved an "or" or an
"unless" lease. However, the Court failed to mention the nature of the
lease, and whether the omission was intentional or merely inadvertance
is uncertain. Thus, it might be contended that the case has little im-
portance for purposes of stare decisis because of this failure. However,
the Court of Appeals has interpreted a statute in a manner which
indicates that these two types of leases have the same effect. The
statute states that if an oil and gas lease provides for "the payment or
tender of the rental on or before a certain day, and the rental is not
so paid or tendered, the lessor or landowner may avoid the lease or
contract." 9
In Walter v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co.,70 the acceptance of over-
due rentals had the effect of avoiding a forfeiture of the lease and
rendering the doctrine of waiver and estoppel available to the ap-
pellees.7- The Court specifically stated that this was an "unless" lease.
In allowing equitable relief, the Court interpreted the above quoted
statute:
The legislature was well aware of the difference in phraseology between
an "or" and an "unless" lease, and if it had intended that section of the
Act to relate to "unless" leases only or to "or" leases only, it would have
been a very natural and a very simple thing for it to say so specifically.
Its failure to do that, coupled with the language which it used, admits of
only one view; namely, that it was the legislature's intention that the
section should relate to any oil and gas lease which provided in sub-
stance that drilling might be postponed by the payment of rental.1 2
A reasonable reading of the statute and the Court's interpretation
thereof demonstrates that neither type of lease terminates auto-
matically upon a failure to pay exactly on time. The statute says that
the lessor may avoid the lease; this indicates that he has an option,
and the Walter case held that this option applied to both an "or" and
an "unless" lease. The "unless" lease in Walter was considered to be
63 See Sapp v. Massey, 358 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1962); Young v. Dunn, 302
KY. 332, 194 S.W.2d 378 (1946); Bell v. Kilburn, 192 Ky. 809, 234 S.W. 730
(1921); Jenkins v. Williams, 191 Ky. 165, 229 S.W. 94 (1921); Niles v. Meade,
189 Ky. 243, 224 S.W. 854 (1920).09 KRS § 353.020 (1962).
70300 Ky. 43, 187 S.W.2d 425 (1945).
71 Id. at 46, 187 S.W.2d at 427.
72 Id, at 50, 187 S.W.2d at 428.
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voidable and not absolutely void,73 a result that could not have been
reached under the common law theory of automatic termination. Inter-
preting Ledford as an extension of Walter would indicate that all dis-
tinctions between "unless" and "or" leases are eliminated in Kentucky.
Indeed, the nature of the lease is unimportant in disposing of the case.
Unfortunately, the Court has been too unscrutible to allow such broad
statements. It is impossible to do more than speculate as to the sweep
of Ledford without a more detailed explanation by the Court as to why
it reached the result it did.
73 Id. at 48, 187 S.W.2d at 428.
XVI. TAXATION
In 1965, the Court decided, in Russman v. Luckett,' that the con-
stitutional provision2 requiring the assessment of property for taxation
at one hundred per cent of its "fair cash value" would be strictly en-
forced, regardless of the fact that it was a long-standing custom for
public officials to assess property at a fraction of its "fair cash value."3
A natural outgrowth of Russman was the problem of computing
"fair cash value." In Department of Revenue v. Oldham County,4 the
Court was presented with the problem for the first time. The case
concerned the Oldham County officials' rejection of the method of
computation used by the Department of Revenue. The Department of
Revenue had made a study of all farm sales in Oldham County during
1964 and 1965 by taking statements from the parties to the sales
transactions, obtaining the sales prices recited in the deeds, and
observing the amounts paid for federal tax stampsY Those transactions
which did not appear to be bona fide, arms length transactions were
eliminated from consideration. Each sales price was compared with
the county tax commissioner's 1964 and 1965 assessments of the trans-
ferred property. This comparison showed the assessment for the years
1964 and 1965 represented 21.6 per cent of the "fair cash value," i.e.,
the assessments for those years had to be multiplied by 4.6 to produce
an amount representing "fair cash value." Applying this method and
making appropriate adjustments, the Department of Revenue com-
puted the 1966 assessment.
The actual assessment for 1966, made by the county tax commis-
sioner, was below the Department of Revenue's assessments, and a
fifteen per cent blanket increase was needed to produce the proper
assessment as computed by the Department of Revenue." The Oldham
County officials argued that the Department of Revenue's method was
erroneous and that the Department of Revenue was not relying on
any case, regulation, or statute as authority for the application of such
method. The Court, in upholding the method of computation used by
the Department of Revenue, stated that it was somewhat astonishing
that the Oldham County officials had made such an argument in spite
of the expressed direction of KRS 138.150, which provides:
1391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965). The Court struck down fractional assess-
ments and ruled that all property must be assessed at its "fair cash value."2 Ky. CoNsT. § 172.
31965-66 Court of Appeals Review, 55 Ky. L. J. 444 n.2 (1966).
4 415 S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1967).
5 Brief for Appellant at 11, Department of Rev. v. Oldham County, 415
S.W.2d 386 (Ky. 1967).
0 415 S.W.2d at 388.
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The Department of Revenue shall equalize each year the assessments
of the property among the counties. It shall compare the recapitulation of
the county tax commissioners' books from each county with the records
of sales of land in such county or with such other information that it
may obtain from any source and shall determine the ratio of the assessed
valuation of the property to the fair cash value. The Department of
Revenue shall have power to increase or decrease the aggregate assessed
valuation of the property of any county or taxing district thereof or any
class of property or any item in any class of property. The Department
of Revenue shall fix the assessments of all property at its fair cash value.
When the property is not assessed at its fair cash value, such assessments
shall be increased or decreased to its fair cash value by fixing the per-
centage of increase or decrease necessary to effect the equalization.
(Emphasis added.)
If the Oldham County officials had taken a closer look at the statute,
they would have found that it expressly authorized the method of
computation used by the Department of Revenue.
Even though the statute sets forth a formula to use in computing
the "fair cash value," is this the only formula that will be upheld by the
Court? Prior to Russman, tax commissioners were not restricted to
any particular formula in computing property values for the assess-
ment of property taxes so long as the assessments were fair and
equitable.7 The formula stated in KRS 133.150 seems to be the market
or comparative method of valuation.8 This method is based on the
actions of landowners buying and selling property and the theory that
the sales price of a particular piece of property will indicate the value
of a comparable piece of property. In applying this approach, the
property being assessed is compared to similar property sold within a
reasonable time before the date of appraisal. Sales within the preceding
year are the most reliable, but if there is an insufficient number of
sales of comparable property within this period, then sales from an
earlier period can be used. These earlier sales are reliable as a
standard if proper adjustments are made for market fluctuations. The
number of sales to be used may vary with the class of property, but
there should be enough sales to form a pattern; otherwise, the value
estimate is mere speculation. Property characteristics to be considered
in comparing property include location, size, and use of streets, side-
walks, sewers, and gas. This seems to be the best approach to use
regardless of whether the appraisal is a mass appraisal or only ap-
praisal of a single piece of property.
Another approach to the valuation of property is the reproduction
cost method. 9 This approach is founded on the theory that a piece of
7 Fayette County Bd. of Supervisors v. O'Rear, 275 S.W.2d 577 (Ky. 1955);
Borders v. Cain, 252 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1952).
O DEPATmNT F REN, RrAL PnoPETu APPRAsAL MAuuAr. 24 (1962).
9Id. at 4.
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property should be worth no more than the cost to reproduce it. In
applying this method, land is classified according to its use, i.e.,
residential, commercial, industrial, or farm. In classifying property, it
is always valued by its highest and best use.10
A third procedure for valuing property is the income approach"
which is based on the theory that the value of property is the present
worth of the net return it may be expected to produce during its use-
ful life. Of course, this procedure is applicable only to investment
property.
Since different methods of valuation are more appropriate in some
situations than others,12 the Court should not put the Department of
Revenue in a straitjacket and limit its methods of valuation. The
method of valuation is not a sword by which the Department cuts in-
to the taxpayers' pockets without a remedy for the taxpayer. The Court,
in Fitzpatrick v. Patrick,'3 a declaratory judgment action, gave Mont-
gomery County landowners a temporary injunction against the col-
lection of taxes where the landowners alleged that their property was
assessed in excess of "fair cash value" and that they had no admini-
strative remedy. The Court admitted that neither the revenue statutes
nor the Department of Revenue provided a method by which an
individual taxpayer may seek relief from an improper assessment,
14
but that the statutes had to be construed as providing an opportunity
for a hearing and appellate review. The Court set forth a procedure
which they thought was necessarily contained within the statutes and
which would provide an adequate remedy against assessments in
excess of "fair cash value."15
When the Department of Revenue ascertains that it will be
necessary to raise the assessed valuation of particular property, notice
of the contemplated action must first be given to the county clerk of
the county where the property is located, to the school districts af-
fected, and to the taxpayers of that county. This notice is delivered
through the county judge, who will post it on the courthouse door. In
addition to being posted, notice shall also be published in the news-
paper as required by the legal notice statutes.' 6 If the property of an
individual landowner is singled out for an increase, he shall be notified
10 Id. at 45.
,lId. at 10.
12Due to the nature of the property, one of the approaches to the valuation
of property may be the only approach that can be applied. In the mass appraisal
of property usually only one approach can be utilized as it is impossible to apply
all three approaches within the time allotted.
13 410 S.W.2d 143 (Ky. 1966).
14KRS §§ 138.150-.170 (1962).
15 410 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Ky. 1966).
16 KIRS ch. 424 (1962).
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by a registered letter from the Department of Revenue,1 7 fixing the
time and place for a hearing. If the increased assessment involves a
blanket raise of assessments, the notice must state that any individual
taxpayer who believes the proposed raise would increase his assess-
ment above "fair cash value" may file with the Department of Revenue,
on or before the date of the hearing, an application for exoneration of
his property from proposed increase.18
At the hearing, any taxpayer who had duly filed an application for
exoneration is entitled to be heard and present evidence in support of
his claim that the proposed blanket increase would cause his property
to be assessed above "fair cash value."' 9 The Department of Revenue
will take the evidence into consideration and then value the property.
This action is then certified to the county judge of the county where
the proposed raise is to occur 20 and notice is then mailed to each tax-
payer who applied for exoneration, stating the disposition of the ap-
plication.
2 .
A taxpayer whose application has been denied, in whole or in part,
shall then have a right of appeal to the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals.
The Board is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
appeals from rulings of any state agency affecting revenue and
taxation.22 All proceedings before the Board are de novo. If the final
ruling of the Board is unfavorable to the taxpayer, he may appeal to
Franklin Circuit Court or the circuit court of his home county.23 The
Department of Revenue shall then be summoned to fie an answer
within twenty days. After such answer, the court will enter judgment
affirming, modifying, or remanding the entire matter to the Board for
further consideration. The ruling in the circuit court may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals as provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Through this elaborate procedure, the Court has guaranteed the tax-
payer protection from arbitrary action by the Department of Revenue.
The dissenters in the Oldham County case used Fitzpatrick as a
basis for their dissent.24 They contended that the majority approved
a method of increasing property assessments which was considered
erroneous in Fitzpatrick. This is not accurate. Fitzpatrick does not
hold that the method of assessment used in Montgomery County was
erroneous, but rather, it merely requires that where the assessment
17 KRS § 183.160 (1966).
18 410 S.W.2d at 146.
19 410 S.W.2d at 146.
20KRS § 133.170 (1966).
21410 S.W.2d at 146.
22 KRS § 131.340 (1966).2
3 KRS § 131.370 (1966).
24 415 S.W.2d at 391.
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of property is alleged to be in excess of "fair cash value" and the
landowners have no adequate administrative remedy, the Court would
temporarily enjoin the collection of taxes. The dissenters' reliance on
this case does not seem to be well-founded.
Another problem considered in the Oldham County case was the
interpretation of KRS 183.180 which reads: "When the Department
of Revenue has completed its action on the assessment of property in
any county it shall, not later than June 20, certify the assessment to
the county clerk." (Emphasis added.) In spite of this statute, the
Department of Revenue certified the increased assessment to the
County Court Clerk of Oldham County on July 29, 1966. However,
the Court did not regard this delay as fatal to the proposed increase.
With regard to the effect of the word "shall," the Kentucky Legis-
lature has provided: "As used in the statute laws of this state, unless
the context requires otherwise; . . . 'shall' is mandatory."25 Before the
enactment of this statute Kentucky had no universal or inflexible rule
by which directory provisions could in all circumstances be dis-
tinguished from mandatory provisions. Generally, provisions regarding
time were considered directory and not a limitation of authority. If
there was substantial compliance with the terms of a statute contain-
ing a time limit, so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute and no
harm resulted, the provision was deemed directory and a slight
variation did not invalidate the proceedings.26 As late as 1963, in
Webster County v. Vaughn,27 the Court held that the word "shall"
was directory. It might be questioned what the Legislature has really
accomplished by enacting KRS 446.010. If the Court continues to
construe "shall" as directory where the context of the statute does not
require such a construction, it would appear that a meaningless statute
has been enacted. Such construction clearly contravenes the Legisla-
ture's intent and lacks ostensible authority. An interesting event will
occur when the Department of Revenue contends "shall" as used in
the taxing statutes, is mandatory.
28
2 5 Stanfield v. Willoughby, 286 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1956); Clark v. Biehl, 313
Ky. 142, 230 S.W.2d 626 (1950); Stevens v. Coleman, 311 Ky. 313, 224 S.W.2d
149 (1949); Ward v. Hurst, 300 Ky. 464, 189 S.W.2d 594 (1945).
26 Middletown's Admx v. Middletown, 297 Ky. 109, 179 S.W.2d 227
(1944); Ewing v. Union Cent. Bank, 254 Ky. 623, 72 S.W.2d 4 (1984); Mc-
Creary v. Speer, 156 Ky. 783, 162 S.W. 99 (1914).
27 365 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1963).
28 Marcum v. Indiana Terminal R.R., 363 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1962); 52 Ky.
L.J. 670 (1964).
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A. AssUMPToN OF RiSK
The doctrine of assumption of risk developed late in the law of
torts' and has since been surrounded by controversy and confusion.2
Most of the difficulties have stemmed from the fact that the distinction
between assumption of risk and contributory negligence has been dif-
ficult to conceptualize and apply. Kentucky acted to eliminate these
difficulties when, in Parker v. Redden,3 the Court of Appeals abolished
the defense of assumption of risk. Commenting on past problems the
distinction has created, the Court noted in Parker: "As seems to be
true of the courts of most other jurisdictions, our court has worked
around in this area. Sometimes purporting to recognize a distinction...
and other times saying there is no distinction."4 Although most agree
that a distinction does exist, 5 the utility of recognizing it has been
neglected, 6 and the result of this neglect has been to confuse the
distinction almost hopelessly.7
1Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
2W. PnossER, ToRTs 450 (8d ed. 1964). The general confusion is noted in
Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d at 591-92. Most authorities agree that the dis-
tinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence was never
clearly made, and that this lack of explanation is the origin of the confusion.
Prosser himself fails to clearly explain assumption of risk. He thinks that where a
plaintiff acts reasonably, then assumption of risk has the effect of denying the
defendant's negligence.
3 W. PaossEa, supra note 2, at 453. See also 2 F. HAPR & F. JAmEs, LAw
oF TonRs 1162 (1956).
4 Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d at 591. For specific evidence of this in-
consistency, see Whitaker v. Cole, 890 S.W. 2d 893 (Ky. 1965); Lanzer v. Went-
worth, 315 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1958); Carlisle v. Reeves, 294 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1956);
Morrison & Curklin Const. Co. v. Cooper, 256 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1953).
5 In theory a distinction is made between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. Assumption of risk rests upon the voluntary consent of the plaintiff
to encounter the risk and take his chances, while contributory negligence rests
upon his failure to exercise the care of a reasonable man for his own protection.
REsTATEMN_(SECOND) O ToRTs, Explanatory Note § 496, comment 9 at 562
). See also Koshorek v. Pennsylvania R.R., 318 F.2d 364 (Sd Cir. 1963);
Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 240 P.2d 580 (Cal. 1952); Kleppe v. Prawl, 181
Kan. 590, 313 P.2d 227 (1951); B/chards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1959);
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959);
Kingwell v. Hart, 45 Wash. 401, 275 P.2d 431 (1954); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel
Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937).6t ome courts have viewed the two doctrines as interchangeable, resolving
that a voluntary choice to encounter a known danger and thereby assume the
risk is equivalent to an unreasonable choice to encounter the danger; hence as-
suming the risk of a known danger is contributory negligence. Schlemmer v. Buf-
falo R. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 1 (1907); McGregor v. O'Bryne, 203 Ala. 266, 82 So.
508 (1919); Schaleif v. Grigsby, 88 Cal. App. 174, 263 Pac. 255 (1927). See
Note, Distinction Between Assumption of Risk and Contributon Negligence, 23
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 91 (1966).
7 The legal problem of distinguishing the difference between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence is made more difficult by the many irreconcilable
(Continued on next page)
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Perhaps the confusion can be explained by observing that the two
doctrines (contributory negligence and assumption of risk), while dis-
tinct, are symbiotic and somewhat overlapping.8 Although there are
many points of similarity between the two doctrines, they differ in that
assumption of risk is inherent in a situation where a non-negligent
plaintiff, when faced with another's negligent act, assumes the risk of
being harmed by that pre-existing negligence.9 Contributory negli-
gence, on the other hand, places fault on the plaintiff who is himself
originally negligent by traditional tort standards, and whose negligence
is a prime contributing cause of his injuries.' 0 A majority of the courts
have retained this distinction for widely variant reasons. In the main,
however, retention is due to the sound policy behind recognizing those
cases where the plaintiff knew of the danger and acquiesced in it."
In Parker, the plaintiff, while driving his car on a two lane high-
way, saw a car disabled with a flat tire in the oncoming lane. To
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
holdings. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90
(1959); Petrane v. Margolis, 20 NJ. Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476 (1952); Mudrich
v. Standard Oil Co., 158 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d 859 (1950); Ferguson v.
Jongima, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960). See also Greenhill, Assumption
of Risk, 16 BAILOR L. REV. 111 (1964).8 Perhaps that is why some courts are questioning the doctrine. For example,
the Oregon Court recently held that if the plaintiff voluntarily placed himself in
danger, the jury might find his action was contributory negligence. Assumption of
risk would then become redundant Bitter v. Beals, 225 Ore. Rep. 504, 358 P.2d
1080 (1961). While the Oregon court seemed to abolish the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk, other courts, while perhaps not going that far, have nevertheless
indicated the significant resemblance between the two doctrines. Schlemmer v.
Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 1 (1907); Swift & Co. v. Schuster, 192 F.2d 615
(10th Cir. 1951); Freedman v. Hurwitz, 116 Conn. 283, 164 A. 647 (1933);
Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950); Camp v. J. H.
Kirpatrick Co., 250 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Cir. App. 1952).
. The traditional basis for distinguishing the two doctrines has been the theory
that assumption of risk requires knowledge of the danger, while contributory
negligence requires deviation by the plaintiff from the standard of a reasonable
man. W. Pnossim, supra note 2, at 452. See Cassidy v. Quisenberry, 346 S.W.2d
304 (Ky. 1961); Sennba v. Wedger, 156 Mass. 462, 31 N.E. 642 (1892);
Halepeska v. Callihan Interest Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
1o Contributory negligence is conduct by the plaintiff which deviates from the
standard to which he should comply for his own welfare and which is a legally
contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing
injury to the plaintiff. Most legal scholars agree that the doctrine of contributory
negligence arose in the English case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103
Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). See 2 F. HAmER & F. J~ims, supra, note 3, at 1193, for
a comprehensive definition and development of the defense of contributory
negligence. See also REsTATE MrENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
31 Reasons for retaining the distinction vary with different jurisdictions. The
doctrines have been distinguished on the concept that assumption of risk rises
out of contractual relations hip rather than tort. Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 240
P.2d 580 (Cal. 1952); Kleppe v. Prawvl, 181 Kan. 590, 313 P.2d 227 (1959);
Kingwl Iat 45 Wash. 401, 275 P.2d 431 (1954). The doctrines have alsobeendistinguished on degrees of liability. Midland Nat'l Bank v. Frances Co-
operative, 157 Minn. Rep. 325, 196 N.W. 272 (1923).
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facilitate changing the tire, plaintiff parked his car facing the front of
the disabled car. Using the lights from his car, plaintiff placed himself
between the two cars in an effort to help change the tire. The de-
fendant smashed into the rear of the disabled auto, pushing it into
plaintiff's auto and pinning him between the cars. A judgment was
rendered for plaintiff and the driver of the disabled car. Defendant ap-
pealed on the ground that the plantiffs were either contributorily
negligent as a matter of law or that they had assumed the risk (it is
unclear which theory was relied on).
In abolishing the doctrine of assumption of risk, the Court of Ap-
peals held that whether the plaintiff had acted as a reasonably pru-
dent man was a jury question.'2 The decision was rationalized on the
ground that assumption of risk, as applied by the courts, acts as a
complete bar to a plaintiff's cause of action regardless of the reason-
ableness of his conduct.' 3 The Court concluded that reasonableness of
conduct should be the prime consideration in all negligence cases.14
Thus, the doctrine of assumption of risk should be eliminated from
tort law since it can "operate as a bar to recovery in certain situa-
tions where in pure application contributory negligence would not
affect a bar."15 The authorities agree that assumption of risk can be
a more complete bar to recovery than contributory negligence.'
6
In Parker, the Court reviewed the Kentucky decisions and con-
fessed that confusion was the best way to describe them. 17 If this con-
fusion has led to unjust results, 18 the distinction was rightly abolished,
12Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d at 593. But see Mullins v. Bullens, 383
S.W.2d 180 (Ky. 1964); Carlisle v. Reeves, 294 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1956).
13 Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d at 592.
14The Court stated that the assumption of risk doctrine should no longer be
recognized because reasonableness of conduct should be the basic consideration
in all negligence cases. The instant case is distinguished from previous holdings
because Redden had a more justifiable reason for subjecting himself to the
danger. He was defined as a "good samaritan" helping a lady in trouble. Id. at
593.
15 Id. at 592. It is interesting to note that the Court cited no authority for
this proposition, although the decision does contain a generalized basis in its dis-
cussion of the strict rule of assumption of risk. Nonetheless, the proposition seems
correct.
'6 "Assumption of risk, whether or not it is called contributory negligence
will bar recovery in an action founded on strict liability, where the plaintiff's
ordinary negligence will not.... It seems clear that assumption of risk may also be
a defense where defendant has the last clear chance." W. PnossEn, supra note 2, at
454. See generally 2 F. HAraEa & F. JAmzs, supra note 3, at 1162-92.
17 See notes 2-4 supra.
Is The assumption of risk defense is disliked by many because of its history
of barring recovery in cases of genuine hardship, particularly in cases of injury
to employees. A movement is on foot by some legal writers to abrogate the de-
fense. W. PRossER, supra note 2, at 452. See also J. FL.mmG, LAw OF TORTS
249-58 (2d ed. 1961); 2 F. HARPER & F. JA_4ms, supra note 3, at 1162-92.
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for the "integrity of the decisions" 9 is, and should be, the overall con-
cern.
Although a majority of courts have refused to merge these two
doctrines,2 0 a growing minority has abolished assumption of risk be-
cause its application was deemed unfair in certain factual situations.2 '
Moreover, other objections to retaining the distinction have appealed to
some courts. These seem to be procedural rather than substantive:
Quite aside from any questions of policy or of substance, the concept of
assuming the risk is purely duplicative of other more widely understood
concepts such as scope of duty or contributory negligence .... Therefore,
the term and the concept should be abolished. It adds nothing to modem
law except confusion.22
The Court of Appeals has, in effect, adopted this approach. Where
the injury revolves around the plaintiffs action when encountering
defendant's negligence, the question will not be whether plaintiff as-
sumed the risk, since an affirmative answer to the question would bar
recovery. Rather, the question will be whether, whatever the factual
situation, the plaintiff acted reasonably: "We think any problem
[arising because of the separate doctrines] can be eliminated by
weighing reasonableness in the light of necessity or urgency for the
[plaintiff's] action and the difficulty of removing the risk before
acting."2
3
Thus, Parker has substantially altered the law with regard to
questionable behavior on the part of a plaintiff. If a plaintiff is con-
tributorily negligent, he is barred.24 Heretofore, consideration has al-
ways been given to the reasonableness of the plaintiff's actions where
19The West Virginia court opined that the doctrines of contributory
negligence and of assumption of risk are not identical, but that the failure to
distinguish them has been characteristic of the judicial decisions. Hunn v.
Windsor, 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937).
20 See note 5 supra.
21 See, e.g., the cases in note 8 which have abolished or altered the content
of assumption of risk. See generally, J. F.an!INc, supra note 18.
22 2 F. HAPER & F. JAmEs, supra note 3, at 1191. It is argued that as-
sumption of risk serves no purpose which is not covered by other doctrines. It
is not only confusing but often results in denial of recovery in cases where it
should not be denied. W. Pnossan, supra note 2, at 453. See also Note, supra note
6.
23Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d at 593. See generally REsTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 466 (1955). See W. Pnossma, supra note 2, at 512, on the
considerations inherent in the merger of the doctrines.24 Goetz v. Green River Rural Elec. Co-operative Corp., 398 S.W.2d 712
(Ky. 1966); Skees v. Whitaker, 398 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. 1965); Hunts Adm'r v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 254 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1952); Peerless Mfg. Corp. v. Daven-
port, 281 Ky. 654, 136 S.W.2d 770 (1940); Archer v. Bourne, 222 Ky. 268, 300
S.W. 604 (1927); Straight Creek Fuel Co. v. Mullins, 189 Ky. 661, 225 S.W.
726 (1920).
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contributory negligence was in issue.25 But, where the question was
whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk, he was barred without re-
gard to the reasonableness of his conduct if he had voluntarily placed
himself in a position where he took the chance of being hurt by a
known danger.26 In view of Parker, whether the issue is couched in
terms of contributory negligence or assumption of risk, the test will be
the reasonableness of plaintiffs actions. The "abolition" of the as-
sumption of risk doctrine is complete. It is no longer enough to prove
that a plaintiff did certain acts which exposed him to injury. Hence-
forth, it will also be necessary to prove that these actions were un-
reasonable.2
7
Two additional facets of Parker not handled directly by the Court
should be discussed. The first is that under the traditional assumption
of risk doctrine, the plaintiff must have had knowledge of the risk in-
volved.28 Moreover, the plaintiff must also have comprehended and
appreciated the danger itself. A plaintiff can know of the defect, but
not appreciate the danger. In such a case no risk could be assumed,
since for the doctrine to apply, both knowledge of the risk and ap-
preciation of the danger are necessary.29 Presumably however, under
Parker, the defendant need only show that plaintiff either knew or
should have known of the danger in the exercise of ordinary care, and
with this knowledge, he would not have proceeded as he did.
A second area of conjecture is the standard to be applied to the
plaintiff. Ordinarily, under assumption of risk, the standard has been
2 5
In using the reasonableness criteria for contributory negligence cases as
distinguished from assumption of risk, the West Virginia court cogently explained:
"The essence of contributory negligence is carelessness; of assumption of risk,
venturousness." Hunn v. Windsor, 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S.E. 57 (1937). See Mul-
lins v. Bullens, 383 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. 1964); Sweeny v. Schadler, 259 S.W.2d
680 (Ky. 1952); Tate v. Hall, 247 Ky. 843, 57 S.W.2d 968 (1933).
261n a Kentucky case involving the question of whether a passenger in an
automobile was contributorily negligent in continuing to ride with a driver she
saw was intoxicated, the Court stated that assumption of risk amounts to con-
tributory negligence so as to bar recovery when a plaintiff is not only aware of
dangerous conitions but also appreciates the danger. If the danger is a matter of
common knowledge, the Court opined, it will be conclusively presumed that the
injured person appreciated the danger. Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 745, 151
S.W.2d 1021, 1022 (1941). See also Porter v. Cornett, 306 Ky. 251, 206 S.W.2d
83 (1948).2 7 As a forerunner to this proposition in Parker, the Court held in Whitaker
v. Cole, 390 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1965) that in order for intentional exposure to
danger to operate as a bar, it must be unreasonable.
28Unless expressly agreed by the plaintiff he does not assume the risk of
harm arising from the defendant's conduct unless he knows of the existence of the
risk and appreciates its unreasonable character. RESTATENimNT (SEcoND) OF
TORTs § 496(D) (1965). See Nantz v. Nantz, 354 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1962); Dean
v. Nartz, 392 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1959); Richards v. Richards, 324 S.W.2d 400 (Ky.
1959).2 9 1ESTATaNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 496(D) (1965).
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subjective.30 Since Parker looks only to contributory negligence, the
test would be objective,3 ' and the Court so indicated. The inquiry now
may be as to the fairness of the ordinary prudent man test as applied
to the unique fact situations which have usually given rise to the de-
fense of assumption of risk.32
B. LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Recent Kentucky cases33 involving the last clear chance doctrine 4
serve only to point out disagreement rather than to provide solutions
as to when a last clear chance instruction should be given. In Kentucky,
as in most jurisdictions, the doctrine applies when the plaintiff, through
his negligence, places himself in a position of inextricable peril, and
the defendant knows of his peril.35 The question then becomes whether
the defendant exercised reasonable care after discovering plaintiff's
peril.
In Fenwick v. Daugherty, 36 the Court dwelt on the meaning of
the term "clear chance." A clear chance, if it exists in a given case, is
"a point in time at which the curtain closes on the ability... (to avoid
30 Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are based on different
standards. Assumption of risk is concerned with a subjective standard requiring
knowledge on behalf of the plaintiff of the danger. Contributory negligence re-
lates to an objective standard requiring the conduct demanded of a reasonable
man. Note, supra note 6, at 95. See Surface v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 169 F.2d
937 (8th Cir. 1948); Murdich v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d
859 (1950); Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
31 The Court verified that the objective standard will be injected in place of
the "old" subjective assumption of risk standard. The controlling question is
whether the plaintiff acted reasonably. Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d at 592.
32 See, e.g., cases cited in note 30 for application of the subjective assumption
of risk standard. It is important to note that for some situations, Kentucky has
statutorily abolished the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. See KRS § 277.320 (1962).33 Fenwick v. Daugherty, 418 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1967); Butts v. Wright,
418 S.W.2d (Ky. 1967); Frank v. Silvers, 414 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1967).
34 The doctrine of last clear chance had its origin in the English case of
Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). In this case the
plaintiff negligently left his donkey fettered in the highway and the defendant
drove into it. Defendant was held liable because even though the plaintiff was
negligent, the defendant should have been able to prevent the injury with reason-
able precaution. This case is probably the reason for calling last cear chance theJackass doctrine." For appropri te instruction on last clear chance, d t
necessity of contributory negligence for its application, see 0. STANALEY, KErucxyINSTRUCrION TO JURIES § 597 (2d e. 1957). See also Washington Mfg. & Mining
Co. v. Barnett, 19 Ky. Law. Rptr. 958, 42 S.W. 1120 (1897).
T new duty is created when: (1) the plaintiff is in a position of peril;(2) the situation is obvious to the reasonable man; and (3) there is reasonabletime for defendant to avoid the accident. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co.v. Lawson, 240 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Ky. 1951). See also Jones v. Gardner, 262 Ky.812, 91 S.W.2d 520 (1936); Hensley v. Braden, 262 Ky. 672, 91 S.W.2d 34
(1935).
36418 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1967).
1968]
KENTucKY LAW JotuRNAL
the accident). Whether that interim constitutes a 'clear' chance
should be left to the jury."37 This problem, i.e., whether the time
lapse between discovery and collision provided a "clear" chance, arose
in Butts v. Wright.8 That case involved a collision between a tractor
stopped to make a left turn and a following car. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court decision refusing a last clear chance in-
struction, ruling as a matter of law that it was "apparent [from the
evidence] that... [the defendant] did not have a clear chance in the
exercise of ordinary care to avoid the collision."39
Two judges dissented, pointing out that wherever there is a "clear"
chance and a party does not avail himself of it, there would be no
accident. In other words, failure to take a "clear" opportunity to avoid
injuring the plaintiff would constitute an intentional wrong. In arguing
that last clear chance is a question for the jury, the dissenters offered
this theory:
If either party to an accident could have avoided or averted it by the
exercise of ordinary care after it was too late for the other party to do
so by the exercise of ordinary care on his own part, he alone is re-
sponsible .... [T]he last negligence in point of time is the superseding
and proximate cause. And this is true whether the damage is to person
or property; last clear chance is premised on cause, not effect.40
The dissenters seem to be referring to two gray areas which arise in
those cases wherein last clear chance becomes a theory of the case.
First, there may be some concern that the use given the term is
creating confusion as to its exact application. This concern can be seen
in that part of the dissent which pointed out that where a chance is
37 Id. at 245. It has been suggested that a man's conduct at any given time
should be judged according to what a reasonable man would be able to do. This of
course disregards the acts of the substandard man. It is wrong not to look for
danger when reasonable people would even though failure to look may spring
from an inevitable habit. Where both negligences are antecedent, and defendant
cannot avoid the event, his negligence may be the latest but it cannot be the
graver wrong. 2 F. H~mwE & F. JAmEs, supra note 3, at 1253.
38418 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1967). It has been contended that if the defendant
does not discover the plaintiff's situation, but merely might do so by reasonable
care, it is obvious that neither party can have a last clear chance. The plaintiff,
still in a position to escape, causes the injury by his own inattentiveness. He can-
not reasonably expect of the defendant any more precaution than he exercises
himself. W. PnossER, supra note 2, at 441. See Underwood v. Gardner, 249
S.W.2d 950 (Ky. 1952).
39 418 S.W.2d at 655. "The 'last clear chance' rule is in effect in this
jurisdiction and where it becomes applicable under the facts, the antecedent
negligence of the injured party becomes the nonimportant factor." (Emphasis
added.) Weintraub v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 299 Ky. 114, 184 S.W.2d 345
(1945).
40 418 S.W.2d at 656. Modem judicial statements on the doctrine of "last
clear chance" seem to agree that last clear chance is only an extension in logic of
the proximate cause principle. See cases collected in Green, Contributory Negli-
gence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C. L. RBv. 3 (1927).
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"clear," there can be no "accident."41 The dissent called the term a
"misnomer."42 A parallel exists between the history of the assumption
of risk doctrine and the last clear chance doctrine. Courts created con-
fusion in both areas with rulings "as a matter of law," and it became
necessary to rectify the confusion. The last clear chance doctrine
should not be abolished merely because the courts have confused its
application.
43
The second gray area in last clear chance law is whether the
doctrine applies to situations where two motor vehicles are involved.
In Fenwick the Court implied, as did the majority in Butts, that the
doctrine is applicable only where one party is a pedestrian. The dis-
senters in Butts sought to clarify this point by indicating that if Butts
had been standing on the highway, the doctrine would apply; how-
ever, the dissent urged that there is no reason not to apply the doctrine
merely because Butts was sitting on a tractor.
44
C. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
In Kentucky, as elsewhere, violating a statute and thereby causing
injury to another is negligence per se 45 and only the issue of damages
goes to the jury.4" In Service Lines, Inc. v. Mitchell,47 the plaintiff
41 See text supra at note 40.
42 Butts v. Wright, 418 S.W.2d at 656.
43 Id.
44By scrutinizing the history of the "last clear chance" doctrine it is obvious
that it is not exclusively applied to pedestrian cases in highway accidents. 2
F. HARPER & F. JAr.s, supra note 3, at 1255. See generally Rose v. Vasseur, 320
S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1959); Lexington Roller Mills v. Thornherry, 314 Ky. 11, 234
S.W.2d 491 (1950); Weintraub v. Cincinnati N. & C. Ry., 299 Ky. 114, 184
S.W.2d 345 (1944); Cincinnati N. & C. Ry. v. Renaker, 287 Ky. 388, 153
S.W.2d 906 (1941).
45 "[T]he great majority of the courts hold that an unexcused violation
(of a statute] is conclusive on the issue of negligence, and that the court must
so direct the jury." W. Pnossa, supra note 2, at § 35. For the violation of a
statute to be considered negligence per se in Kentucky, the statute must be one
that was enacted for safety purposes and not just for governmental convenience.
Vissiman v. Koby, 309 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1958). The injury sustained must be
one that the statute was enacted to prevent. Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White,
306 Ky. 361, 208 S.W.2d 64 (1948). The injury must be sustained by a person
or by a property interest which the statute contemplated protecting. Buren v.
Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964). In addition, before liability
will be imposed on the violator, the violation of the statute must be the proximate
cause of the injury sustained. Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.
Ky. 1966); Commonwealth v. Ragland Potter Co., 305 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1957).
See Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 479 (1950).
46 In Mannor v. Marmor, 409 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1966), the Court confused
the qustion of violation of statutory duty vith the question of causation. It
noted, Ordinarily a violation of statutory duty is evidence of negligence en-
titling the adverse party to submission of that issue to the jury," basing this state-
ment on Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 306 Ky. 361, 208 S.W.2d 64 (1948),and *reyhound Corp. v. Hounshell, 351 S.W.2d 64 (8y. 1961). These cases did
not hold that the negligence issue was to be submitted to the jury, but that where
(Continued on next page and footnote 47 on next page)
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stopped his car on a highway at night when it quit rnning. Over
fifteen minutes of effort failed to restart the car, but no precautions
were taken to remove it from the highway. Defendant's truck driver
approached this scene from behind and a collision occurred killing two
children in the car. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff.
On appeal, the defendant relied on KRS 411.130(2)48 and KXRS
189.450(1),49 arguing that the plaintiff's actions constituted negligence
per se, and, therefore, a directed verdict was required. The appeal re-
volved around whether it was "impossible" or "impracticable" within
KRS 189.450(1) to get the car off the highway. The Court of Appeals
held that it was impossible or impracticable, citing Corpus Juris
Secundum as authority.50 That source says the rule is clear that
violation of a statute by leaving a car on the highway is not negligence
per se where it was impossible or impracticable to move it,"provided
proper precautions are taken in other respects." (Emphasis added.)51
The Court overlooked the proviso emphasized above. The plain-
tiff admitted that he made no examination to determine whether the
car could have been moved onto the shoulder of the road. In fact,
testimony of another witness showed that at least a portion of the
shoulder could have been used, and was used later to move vehicles
around the wreckage., 2 Even under these facts, the Court ignored the
statutory violation and concentrated on the alternatives facing the
plaintiff with respect to the deceased infants.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
there is an issue of causation, that issue is for the jury. In a later case, Tooke v.
Adkins, 418 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1967), where there was no question of causation,
the Court found the defendant negligent as a matter of law for the violation of a
statute.
47 418 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1967).
48 "If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or child, then the recovery
shall pass to the mother and father of the deceased... " This statute precludes
negligent parents from obtaining a recovery for a tortious act to their child.
Emerine v. Ford, 254 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1953).
49 This statute provides:
(1) No person shall stop a vehicle, leave it standing or cause it to stop
or be left standing upon the main traveled portion of a highway ....
(a) A vehicle that has been disabled while on the main traveled
portion of such a highway in such a manner and to such extent that
't is impossible to avoid the occupation of the main traveled portion
or impracticable to remove it from the highway until repairs have
been made or sufficient help obtained for its removal....
50 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 332 (1949).
51Id. See also Duet v. Tramontana, 26 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1946); Horn v.
Barras, 172 So. 451 (La. App. 1937); Camp v. Wilson, 258 Mich. 380, 241 N.W.
844 (1932); Bornemann v. Lusha, 221 Wis. 359, 266 N.W. 789 (1936). All of
these cases support the interpretation that violation of a statute similar to Ken-
tucky's is negligence per se even where it was impossible or impracticable to
move the car, unless proper precautions are taken in other respects.
52 418 S.W.2d at 529.
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[The plaintiff was] confronted with two dangerous conditions. There was
obvious danger in permitting the children to remain in the car which was
parked in the nighttime on the paved portion of the highway. Ob-
viously, it also was dangerous to remove three children to a narrow
shoulder . . . in close proximity to heavy traffic passing by at high
speed.53
This position ignores the obvious fact that perhaps the car could have
been moved off the road instead of just the children. But the Court
compounded the mistake with its next sentence. "It is universally held
that where a person is confronted with two dangerous conditions he is
not required to select, in an emergency, the one which on mature re-
flection might appear to be the least dangerous."
54
It could be argued that this driver was parked on the pavement
for so long a period i that not a day or even a week could have pro-
vided a more "mature reflection." There was nothing "sudden" about
plaintiff's emergency. It would be unwise to draw inferences from the
opinion since it is not clear what instructions were given the jury. But
it would seem that they were more complicated than the case would
warrant, i.e., either the plaintiff was negligent per se or he was not-
and if he was, did this negligence cause the injuries. Furthermore, does
the court or the jury decide whether it was "impracticable or im-
possible" to move the car? Apparently this question was not considered
by either the lower court or the jury.;6 The Service Lines case seems
to portend holes in Kentucky's statutory negligence law.
D. ADNussioN AND RELEASE
Two cases were decided last term involving situations in which a
plaintiff, whether unwittingly or not, settled his case against himself.
53 Id. at 530. The Court completely overlooked the third course of action the
plaintiffs could have taken: leaving the children in the car and pushing it onto the
shoulder. This action would have avoided both dangerous alternatives, and
might well have saved the lives of the children.
5 4 BESTATEMNT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 296, comment a (1965) provides:
The [emergency] rule . .. is applicable when the sudden emergency is
created in any way other than by the actor's own tortious conduct, or
where it is created by the unexpected operation of a natural force or by
the innocent or wrongful act of a third person. The fact that the emer-
gency is created by the actor's own conduct does not prevent the rule
from being applicable if his conduct is not tortious.
5f The time span was more than fifteen minutes. The basis of the special
rule in emergencies is that the actor is left no time for thought, or is reasonably so
disturbed or excited that he cannot weigh alternative causes of action and must
make a speedy decision based very largely upon impulse or guess. W. PRossER,
supra note 2, at 171.
56 Th opinion is silent on this point. Other courts have held this to be a
question for the jury. Breaux v. Soares, 18 Cal. App. 2d 489, 64 P.2d 146 (1937);
Dare v. Boss, 111 Ore. 190, 224 P. 646 (1926); Walker v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
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In Nunellee v. Nunellee,57 the plaintiff was a passenger in a car which
was owned by her son and driven by her granddaughter, and which
collided with another automobile at an intersection. The plaintiff sued
both drivers, and both contended that the other was at fault. The
jury determined the issue against the plaintiff's driver. However,
despite this finding, the Court of Appeals ordered entry of a judg-
ment n.o.v. against the plaintiff because she had sworn during a pre-
trial deposition and again at the trial, that her granddaughter had not
run a red light: "No amount of reasoning can produce any interpreta-
tion of the testimony quoted above except that [the plaintiff] had
absolved [her granddaughter] of any negligence insofar as her claim
is concerned."58
This judgment was rendered despite the fact that a jury had found
that the defendant (plaintiff's driver) had been negligent. Thus, the
defendant was negligent as to the other driver but not negligent as to
her passenger. 59 The passenger here was a seventy-nine year old
woman who had been contradicted by four impartial witnesses.6 0
Ordinarily, the plaintiff's testimony would have been discounted, as it
was here by the jury, by reason of her age and the conflicting testi-
mony. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals took the case away from the
jury and rendered a judgment n.o.v.
61
If such relatively weak testimony can negate an otherwise viable
cause of action, plaintiffs would be well advised to keep quiet. In any
event, it would seem that a jury question should remain unless the
"admission" absolutely negates the elements of the complaint.
In Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Cardwell,62 an
insurance company settled Cardwell's claim against other parties, who
were joint tort-feasors with the Highway Department. In return for
57 415 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1967).
58 Id. at 116.
59 The factual situation and result are similar to Zipperle v. Welsh, 352
S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1961). In that case, two passengers in the defendant's car had
sued both the defendant and the driver of the other car involved in the collision.
They testified that the light was in the defendant's favor, but were contradicted
by the other driver and another witness. The jury found the other driver not
negligent and the defendant negligent. Judgment n.o.v. was entered for the
defendant due to the plaintiffs' judicial admissions.
60 Brief for Appellee at 7, Nunnellee v. Nunnellee, 415 S.W.2d 114 (Ky.
1967).
61 heerule on judicial admissions was not always so strict in Kentucky. Be-
fore Zipperle v. Welsh, 352 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1961), a judicial admission barred
a plaintiff's recovery only if the facts testified to were peculiarly within his know-
ledge. Sutherland v. Davis, 286 Ky. 743, 151 S.W.2d 1021 (1941). See also Bell
v.Hron 284 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1955). In Bell, the Court advised that "[tiherule sol be applied with caution because of the variable nature of testimony
and because of the ever-present possibility of honest mistake." 284 S.W.2d at
815.
62 409 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1966).
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the settlement, Cardwell signed a general release. Six days later Card-
well initiated a Board of Claims action against the Highway Depart-
ment. The Board of Claims found as a matter of fact that the prior
release was not intended to release the Highway Department and
awarded damages to Cardwell. The Highway Department appealed.
The Court of Appeals, relying on Kingins v. Hurt,63 reversed, find-
ing the release was intended to release the Highway Department and
that the plain meaning of the release document itself should control.
In addition, if the right to proceed against a non-settling tort-feasor is
not expressly reserved, all tort-feasors are thereby released.
6 4
In Kentucky there have been two lines of decisions with the
Cardwell-Kingins line representing the strict rule. That rule holds
that the release document controls and that the intent of the releasing
party is of no importance if it is not incorporated into the release. In
the name of "orderly procedure" this rule curtly states: "Surely it does
not ask too much of draftsmen and others dealing in such instruments
to take the time and trouble to have them say what is meant." 5
This strict rule can only benefit tort-feasors since injured parties
desiring to settle rarely "deal" in drafting insurance companies' ad-
hesion documents.66 Most defendants in tort cases are represented by
insurance companies whose main concern is with their own clients.
Thus, any settlement and release is drawn to fully protect the de-
fendant. The plaintff's rights against other tort-feasors are of no
concern to the insurer.
3344 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1961).
64The release stated:
and by these presents do for myself, my heirs, executors, administrators
and assigns, release and forever discharge the said J. R. White Con-
tracting Co. and James Smith and all other persons, firms or corporations
from all claims, demands, damages, actions or causes of action, on ac-
count of damage to property, bodily injuries or death, resulting, or to re-
suit, from an accident to myself which occurred on or about the 28th
day of September 1955.... 409 S.W.2d at 305.
05 409 S.W.2d at 306.
63 As is pointed out by Judge Stewart in his dissent, Prosser, Harper and
James, and Corbin all criticize the rule. See W. Phossm,, supra note 2, at 272;
1 F. HARPux & F. JAM~s, supra note 3, at 712; A. CoRnuN, CorNrrACr § 596
(1960). Corbin is particularly strong in his criticism:
The tendency to relax the operation of the "parol evidence rule" when a
stranger to the writing is involved is to be thoroughly approved when it
prevents a writing from being held to be a substitution integration and
discharge when the contracting parties have not so agreed. It is also to
be approved in those cases where it is used to prevent what appears on
the face of an instrument to be a "release" of one joint obligor or joint
tort feasor from operating or a discharge of another such obligor or tort
feasor. Offered testimony showing that the claimant did not intend
the document to be a discharge of all of his claims should be, for that
purpose, admissible in any suit against anybody.
1968]
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The parallel line of cases in which the intent of the releasing party
controls6 7 was recognized by Judge Stewart in an able dissent.68 The
"intention" approach was the law prior to Kingins. This is the so-called
"modern" view as opposed to the "common law" rule set down in
Cardwell. Actually, the "common law" rule of Cardwell is not the
strict common law rule under which release of one tort-feasor re-
leased all. Rather, the "common law" rule in Cardwell is a hybrid form
and will allow a subsequent suit against a joint tort-feasor, provided
such intent is clearly expressed in the release document. The trend of
authorities is to prefer the modem view69 and to criticize the common
law rule.70
67 Louisville & Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes, 117 Ky. 860, 79 S.W. 261
(1904) is the initial case in this line.
68 409 S.W.2d at 306.69 The nile expounded in Cardwell is not the pure "common law" rule, but
a hybrid. Four views are expressed by the courts on the question of whether the
release of a joint tort-feasor operates as a release of other joint tort-feasors: 1)
At common law the release of one joint tort-feasor released all, even if the releasor
by express language attempted to reserve rights against tort-feasors who were not
parties to the release. Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 696
(D.C.N.C. 1953); Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956); Davidow
v. Segforth, 58 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1952); Bland v. Warrickshire Corp., 160 Va.
131. 168 S.E. 443 (1933). 2) Jurisdictions finding the common law rule too harsh
hold that a joint tort-feasor will not be discharged in the presence of an express
reservation of rights. Devy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 A. 883 (1915);
Liouzis v. Corliss, 94 N.H. 377, 54 A.2d 365 (1947); Garbe v. Halloran, 150
Ohio St. 476, 83 N.E.2d 217 (1948). This is also the position adopted by the
Restatement and by Kentucky in Cardwell. RESTATEmENT OF TorTs § 885(1)
(1938). 3) Other jurisdictions alleviate the harshness of the common law rule by
characterizing the release as a covenant not to sue one joint tort-feasor, which
does not discharge the remaining joint tort-feasors. Fagerhy v. Phoenix Flour Mills
Co., 50 Ariz. 227, 71 P.2d 1022 (1987); Laurenzi v. Vranizan, 25 Cal. 2d 806,
155 P.2d 638 (1945); Martin v. Burney, 160 Fla. 183, 34 So. 2d 36 (1948);
Hickbein v. Anders, 201 Ore. 128, 258 P.2d 897 (1953). Apart from differences
in phraseology, the substantive distinction between a release and a covenant not
to sue is nebulous, and has been characterized as "entirely artificial." Pellet v.
Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 788 (1945). 4) The modem view,
which further repudiates the common law rule, makes the intention of the parties
to the release the test whether or not the other joint tort-feasors, not parties there-
to, are affected. Eagle Lion Films v. Loew's Inc., 219 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1955);
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1952);
McKenna v. Austin, 184 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Lysfjord v. Flintkote Co.,
185 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. Gas Service Co., 185
Kan. 604, 347 P.2d 394 (1959); Grondqnist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d
159 (1954); Weldon v. Lehman, 226 Miss. 600, 84 So. 2d 796 (1956); Black v.
Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 P. 577 (1930); Burke v. Burnham, 97 N.H. 203, 84
A.2d 918 (1951); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958); Safety Cab
Co. v. Fair, 181 Okla. 264, 74 P.2d 607 (1937). This had been the view
,followed in Kentucky until Kingins. Daniel v. Turner, 820 S.W.2d 135 (Ky.
11959).7 0 See notes 66 and 69 supra. The basis of the common law rule had been
that when the cause of action, being one and indivisible, is released, all persons
otherwise liable therefore are consequently released. This approach later gave
way to the more equitable reason that the single injury could have but one satis-
faction and the release, being construed more strictly against the releasor, is
(Continued on next page)
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The state of the law is confused. It is submitted that the Cardwell
dissent is more persuasive, particularly in view of its criticism of
Kingins. Both the majority and the dissent in Cardwell agree that
Kingins was the first use of the hybrid rule in Kentucky. However, the
Kingins opinion deserves some investigation since it was based on the
assumption that Kentucky was then "committed to the basic rule it-
self,"71 i.e., the common law rule. Actually, the "modem" rule was the
law of Kentucky before Kingins. The cases cited in Kingins appear to
be indicative of this modem interpretation, but the Court overlooked
this and dogmatically reiterated the Restatement, or hybrid rule.
Thus, the dissent in Cardwell seems clearly correct and cogent in
suggesting that Kingins is insufficient authority for the proposition
that Kentucky has been committed to the variation of the common
law rule, and that Kingins should be interpreted correctly and over-
ruled.
As seen from the above discussion, the Kingins and Cardwell de-
cisions are contrary to the trend of authorities and represent a back-
ward step in Kentucky's treatment of the release problem. A return to
the prior "modem view," allowing parol evidence as to the intention
of the parties when a stranger to the release agreement claims its bene-
fit, should be made as soon as possible. Plaintiffs should not be denied
full recovery and co-tort-feasors, not involved in the settlement, should
not benefit from that settlement.
E. INVASION OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy has recently provoked much legal debate
72
and last term a controversy arose involving this important, though
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
conclusive evidence of satisfaction. Abb v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 Wash. 428,
68 P. 954 (1902). The rule has been called a "surviving relic of the Colden
period of metaphysics." Friday v. United States, 289 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1957).
71 844 S.W.2d at 812.
72 The rise of questionable commercial, governmental, and social practices,
coupled with tremendous advances in technology, has led to the increased im-
portance of the right of privacy. Books exploring the subject of privacy in
moden society include: M. BNTON, THE PriwAcY INVADEas (1964); S. DAsH,
R. KNOWLTON & R. Scmvlvrz, THE EAVSDRoPPERs (1959); V. PACKARD, THE
N ieD SOCmTr (1984); A. WVSTN, PRIVACY AND FDaDOr (1967).
Packard offers the following hypothetical family situation indicating the
status of privacy in our day. The mother, trying on a dress in a department store,
is watched by hidden closed circuit T.V. installed to prevent shoplifting. The
father, at a business meeting, is being evaluated by a company spy planted by
the president. At the same time he is himself investigating the credit condition of
others and within a few hours, he will have records, showing their life histories,
former jobs, residences, family background, and very complete estimates of their
past, present, and future financial status. Their son is being given a polygraph
and personality inventory test as a prerequisite for employment. These same
rtontinued on next page)
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nebulous, right.78 In Wheeler v. Sorenson Manufacturing Co.74 the
Court had occasion to investigate the right in the milieu of a labor
controversy.
75
The employer was resisting unionization, and a part of this cam-
paign involved publishing a large flyer revealing an employee's wages,
pay increases, and other salary information, in an effort to show that
unionization was unnecessary 6 and would actually hurt the em-
ployees. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that this publication made her
an unwilling party to the labor dispute, caused her to be held in dis-
favor by her fellow employees, caused her to be summarily fired, and
rendered her unable to find another job in the area. She alleged that
the publication was unwarranted and issued without her knowledge
or consent.77 The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim for relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding as
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
,prospective employers have already interviewed his associates and teachers con-
,cerning his political opinions. Their daughter, in high school, is completing a
questionnaire which will analyze the family and sexual adjustment to allow the
school to better understand her. V. PACKARD, THE Nma= SocIm= 3-4 (1964).
The right of privacy has also been recognized constitutionally. It has been
held that various guarantees of the Bill of Bights have a penumbra creating a zone
of privacy which the government may not force the citizen to surrender. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73 Prosser categorized the right to privacy tort according to the conse-
quences that may result from the individual injury: (1) Intrusion upon the
plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) Public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) Publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) Appropriation, for the defendants
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. W. Pnossan, supra note 2, at § 112.
This formulation fails to articulate the underlying interest protected by the
tort, seeking to explain it in the terms of other existing torts, mental distress, defa-
mation, and misappropriation. The unique interest protected in privacy cases is
best defined by Professor Bloustein. "[T]he injury is to our individuality, to our
dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy represents a social vindication of
the human spirit thus threatened rather than a recompense for the loss suf-
fered." Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. IEv. 962, 1003 (1964).
74415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967).
75 One of the grounds for the dismissal of the action given by the trial court
and argued on appeal was that the National Labor Relations Board had pre-
empted the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an action to recover damages
for invasion of the right of privacy arising out of tactics employed in a union
organization campaign. 415 S.W.2d at 584.
76 415 S.W.2d at 583. The flyer showed that the plaintiff had received an
increase of twenty cents per hour in a little more than a year, and contrasted it
'with an agreement made by a neighboring firm with the union calling for only a
five cent per hour annual increase, minus four dollars a month union dues.
77 The complaint further alleged that by the unwarranted and unauthorized
use of her name and wage statement, the appellee had violated her right to
privacy, and seriously jeopardized her ability to work and earn money. Moreover,
it alleged that her right to live peaceably and quietly had been violated, and
by reason of such use she had sustained and would continue to sustain intense
mental suffering and distress, causing her damage in the sum of fifty thousand
dollars. 415 S.W.2d at 584.
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a matter of law that the invasion, if any, was warranted and reason-
able.7
8
The Court recognized that the right to privacy was "well estab-
lished" in Kentucky,79 but that it is not "exact or absolute."80 Rather,
the right of privacy is relative to the customs of the time and place, and
it is determined by the norm of the "ordinary man."8' The Court went
on to decide this factual, "ordinary man" issue. It admitted that it did
not know why the flyer was circulated,82 and merely held that in its
"opinion" the distribution was not actionable. Thus, the allegations
made by the plaintiff were summarily dismissed.83 If this issue, which
the Court admitted was barred on the "ordinary man" test, was not
for the jury, it is difficult to conceive of one which would be.8
78 Since the right of privacy as a tort has never been clearly defined, the
cases coming before the Court have almost invariably involved demurrers, dis-
missals of complaints, and summary judgment. Most such actions have been dis-
missed by the Court as failing to state a claim. Bell v. Louisville Courier-
Journal & Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966) (publication of police judge's
tax delinquency); Horstman v. Newman, 291 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1956), Pangallo
v. Murphy, 248 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1951), and Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295
Ky. 845, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1948) (all involving oral publication); Lucas v.
Moskins Stores, Inc., 262 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1954), and Voneye v. Turner, 240
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951) (both involving letters of indebtedness sent to plaintiff's
employer); Perry v. Moskins Stores, Inc., 249 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1952) (ad-
vertisement come-on sent to plaintiff signed with girls name and telephone
number); Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944), and
Tomlin v. Taylor, 290 Ky. 619, 162 S.W.2d 210 (1942) (both involving cor-
porations which were held not entitled to the personal action of violation of
right of privacy); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 280 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929)
(publication of wife's picture and statements made by her after seeing her hus-
band slain). A few claims have been remanded by the Court for further action.
Sellers v. Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959) (publication of picture of
mutilated child not clear from pleadings whether child had been identified in
the publication); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 87 S.W.2d 46 (1981) (tapp-
ing telephone wires); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927)
(publication of plaintiff's indebtedness to public).
79 415 S.W.2d at 584.
80 Id. at 585.
81 Id. Of the character of the ordinary man Prosser says:
He is not to be indentified with any ordinary individual, who might
occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and careful man,
who is always up to standard. Nor is it proper to identify him even with
any member of the very jury who are to apply the standard; he is
rather a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior,
determined by the jury's social judgment. W. PRossEa, supra note 2, § 32,
at 154.
82 415 S.W.2d at 585.
8 3 The Court does not discuss in what other contexts it would find publica-
tion of some parts of the employee's record by the employer to be warranted and
reasonable. The implication seems to be, however, that such publication will not
be found unreasonable if it is not threatening or coercive and does not contain
words of contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, is of interest to those for whom
it is published and serves the business interest of the employer. The employee's
interest in the records is not mentioned.84 Although the Court does not state its rationale for disallowing the jury to
(Continued on next page)
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Two recent products liability cases reaffirmed the landmark case
of Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing Co.,8 5 which com-
mitted Kentucky to the developing theory of strict liability. In both
Kroger v. Bowman 6 and Rogers v. Karem,87 injuries were sustained
when soft drink carrying cartons proved defective and bottles fell and
broke, cutting the plaintiffs. Dealers Transport was cited in both cases
to impose liability on the remote bottling companies regardless of
proof of negligence.
In Kroger, the Court held that a grocery owed no duty to a
bottler to inspect the carton. Such a duty does run from the grocer to
the customer, but failure on the part of the grocer to discharge his
duty to the customer does not preclude indemnity against the bottlers
for injuries to the customer. In Rogers, the Court held that even
though the claims were based on implied warranty,8 the customer
could sue the store owner and the owner could in turn sue the bottling
company on the strict liability theory. 9
The two cases do not appear to add appreciably to the law of the
area, and the results were predictable in light of Dealers Transport.
Kentucky can be said to have joined a number of jurisdictions in ap-
plying a strict liability theory9" to achieve the desirable social philo-
sophy requiring the manufacturer to spread the risk among all its con-
sumers via the expediency of liability insurance. In addition, the
Court is no longer concerned with whether the complaint sounds in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
decide whether the invasion of the plaintiff's right to privacy was reasonable, it
is probably analogous to reasons the Court takes the reasonable man test away
from juries in negligence cases. Assuming that it is the exclusive function of the
jury to fix standards of conduct, the Court tends to usurp this function. The
reason is that in questions of whether a defendant has been guilty of conduct,
which creates an undue probability of harm to others, those who judge his con-
duct must weigh the utility of the act against the probability of harm which
it contains, not the utility of the act to the actor alone but the utility of the act
to society. However, the general utility of such conduct is not likely to receive
much consideration from a jury who sees before them a plaintiff whose vital
interests have been harmed by a particular instance of it. Only the most confirmed
optimist would dare to hope that they would judge the defendant's conduct by
what that ideal creature, the "reasonable man," would do. Bohlen Mixed Questions
of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 118, 119 (1924). See also RESTATEmENT
(SEcorD) OF TORTS § 328(B) (1965).
85 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966).
86411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967).
87 405 S.W.2d 741 (Ky. 1966).
8 8 In Dealers Transport there were counts of negligence and breach of implied
warranty. 402 S.W.2d at 443.89 This, of course, is the normal procedure in pure warranty actions.
9oSee, e.g., Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for In uries Caused by
Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (1957); V.
PRossER, supra note 2, at § 97.
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tort or in contract."' Implied warranty is the basis for strict liability
theory, and privity is not necessary.92
91 Dealers Transport points out that recovery against a remote vendor sounds
more in tort than in contract, but that this determination is irrelevant in view of
the policy genesis of strict liability theory. 402 S.W.2d at 445-46.
92 See Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Ky.
1966). See also W. FRossmn supra note 2, at 681. For a discussion of this case,
see 1965-66 Court of Appeais Review, 55 Ky. L.J. 472-77 (1967).
XVIII. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A. ORDERs OF SuDBIIIoN
A workmen's compensation case is initiated by a hearing conducted
in the county where the alleged accident or exposure to occupational
disease occurred.' The hearing is conducted by one or more members
of the Workmen's Compensation Board [hereinafter referred to as
the Board], by the Director, or by a hearing officer.2 A report of each
hearing is forwarded to the full Board, which renders a decision.3
Each case is automatically submitted to the Board at its first regular
meeting following the expiration of the time for the taking of all
proof.4 The plaintiff may file a brief on the merits of the case within
fifteen days after its submission,5 and the defendant then has fifteen
days, after the filing of the plaintiff's brief or the expiration of plaintiff's
time for filing, in which to file his brief.6 Apparently, the Board has
traditionally sent each counsel notice of an order of submission to
enable them to be aware of deadlines for filing briefs. During the last
term, the Court of Appeals had before it two cases which dealt with
this custom.
In Collista Coal Co. v. Castle,7 the claimant fied his brief on
October 15, 1964, four days before the date of submission. The Board
did not send the defendants a notice of submission, and on November
9, 1964, it awarded the claimant compensation benefits for permanent,
total disability. Defendant requested a reconsideration of the award,
alleging that he received no notice from the Board that the case had
been submitted for decision. The Board reconsidered and set aside its
previous award. After receipt of defendant's brief, a new award was
entered denying compensation for permanent injury. On appeal, the
circuit court reversed the Board and reinstated the first award of per-
manent, total disability. Before the Court of Appeals, the defendant
argued that the Board had ample grounds to reopen the case under
KRS 342.1258 on the basis of change of condition, mistake, or fraud.
1RuL.s AND REG. OF WoRKMEN'S Comp. BD., WCB 1-1, § 6(a) (1964).2 id.
3Id. at §§ 6(f), 15(c).
4 Id. at § 15(a).
5 Id. at § 14(a).
6Id.
7 407 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1966).
8KRS § 342.125(1) (1962) provides:
Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party interested and
a showing of change of conditions, mistake or fraud, the board may at
any time review any award or order, ending, diminishing or increasing
the compensation previously awarded, within the maximum and minimum
provided in this chapter, or change or revoke its previous order, sending
(Continued on next page)
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The Court held that no notice of an order of submission was neces-
sary in view of the Board's rules providing for automatic submission.
In effect, the parties were held strictly accountable for the rules.
In American Tobacco Co. v. Sallee,9 the Board awarded compen-
sation to the claimant three weeks after the taking of proof had been
completed. No notice of an order of submission was received by
counsel and neither filed a brief. Defendant appealed on the ground
that he relied on the Board's established custom and practice of giving
notice of an order of submission. Defendant distinguished Collista by
urging that the unfair and misleading aspects of the Board's custom
of sending notice had not been fully made apparent to the Court in
that action. Although the defendant was denied relief, the Court
nevertheless expressed its sympathy for his position by stating:
Basic fairness would suggest that if the Board, regularly and con-
sistently over a period of at least two years, had ignored its automatic
submission rule and had given notice of an order of submission, counsel
with knowledge of the custom should have been entitled to expect
notice.' 0
The variance in the Court's attitude in the two cases can only be
explained by observing that Collista apparently was not argued from
the standpoint of unfair and misleading practices on the part of the
Board as was American Tobacco, i.e., the Court was not made aware
that these practices existed and were relied upon by the attorneys.
However, this distinction is questionable when viewed in light of the
Court's previous decisions regarding the Board's right to reopen a
case.
On numerous occasions the Court has held that the Board has
broad discretion in determining whether a case should be reopened
under KRS 342.125.11 Collista points up the wisdom of these previous
cases. There, the Board was aware of its own procedure in notifying
parties of submission in all cases and that attorneys had come to rely
upon such notice. Being aware of the unfairness to defendant's counsel
(who was not given notice), the Board permitted relief by reopening
the case and allowing defendant to submit his brief. However, in
reviewing this decision, the Court did not apply its usual "large dis-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
immediately to the parties a copy of its subsequent order or award.
Review under this section shall be had upon notice to the parties
interested and shall not affect the previous order or award as to any
sums already paid thereunder.
9 419 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1967).
'oId. at 161.
11 Davenport v. National Carbide Co., 339 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1960); Clear
Fork Coal Co. v. Gaylor, 286 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1956).
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cretion" test. Instead, it attempted to review the facts and fashion its
own equitable result. The Court's conclusion was to hold the parties
strictly accountable to the rules.
Clearly, the Court reached an unjust result. Since the Board had
engaged in the practice of giving notice for over two years, it is ap-
parent that the Collista attorneys were just as misled as were the
attorneys in American Tobacco. In American Tobacco, the Court in-
dicated that if prejudice were shown, the defendants would be en-
titled to reopen the case and file their brief. Prejudice is obvious in
Collista since the filing of defendant's brief effected a reversal in the
Board's decision. Since the defendant in Collista relied upon the
Board's custom and was prejudiced thereby, it follows that the
defendant should have been granted the relief he sought. This is
exactly what the Board had done until reversed by the Court of Ap-
peals. Since the Board is more familiar with the pertinent facts in
cases arising under KRS 842.125, it should be permitted broad dis-
cretion in attempting to reach a just result. Had the Court of Appeals
applied its "large discretion" test in Collista, the Board's ruling would
have remained unchanged, and a just result would have been reached.
As stated previously, the Court in American Tobacco acknowledged
the unfairness in the situation where counsel had relied upon the
Board's custom of sending notice. However, the Court refused to al-
low the defendant to submit his brief, reasoning as follows: "Were
the case a closer one on the two issues above mentioned we would
be inclined to hold that the board committed prejudicial error in
failing to give notice of an order of submission according to its
established custom and practice."12 The Court went on to say that
the Board's decision on the two points was so eminently correct as to
make it "extremely unlikely"13 that the defendant's brief could have
persuaded the Board to reach a different decision. In addition, the
Court said the evidence "amply supports" one of the issues,14 and the
proof on the other issue was "more than adequate."'5 Clearly the
Court based its decision on the grounds that there was ample proof
to support the Board's findings in favor of the claimant. However,
rather than look at the sufficiency of the claimant's evidence, the Court
should have looked at the sufficiency of the defendant's evidence. It
is urged that the proper test for the Court to apply should be: if there
is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for a party, he is entitled to
12 419 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Ky. 1967).
13 Id. at 162.
14 Id.
15 Id.
[Vol. 56,
CO6uT OF APPEALS REVw
file a brief. Such a test would not prejudice the defendant. If there was
insufficient evidence to support his case, he would lose regardless of
the effectiveness of his brief. On the other hand, if the evidence was
sufficient to support a verdict for the defendant, as in the American
Tobacco case, he would be given his opportunity to argue the pro-
bative force of his evidence.
To further illustrate the point, assume all of the facts are the same
in American Tobacco except that the Court determines that ample
proof to support the claimant's award was lacking. Would the defend-
ant have been entitled to submit his brief? Of course, but it would
have been an idle gesture since he would also have been entitled to
a directed verdict. It appears that the Court's action in refusing
defendant the opportunity to argue the probative force of his evidence
had the effect of directing a verdict for the claimant. However, the
Kentucky test for a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff is much
more stringent than the test used in American Tobacco. In Thomas
Jefferson Fire Insurance Co. of Louisville v. Barker,16 the Court said
that a directed verdict is proper for the plaintiff where "there is no
conflict in evidence"; "the evidence introduced is susceptible of but
one interpretation by reasonable men; [or] all the evidence tends to
support the cause of action alleged and to disprove the defense."'7
Compare the stringency of these tests with the "amply supported,"
"more than adequate," and "extremely unlikely" language of the Court
in American Tobacco.
The defendant was denied his day in court in so far as having his
counsel heard on the probative force of the evidence, simply because
it was "extremely unlikely" he could have persuaded the Board to a
different decision. It is urged that the mere possibility of the
defendant's success should be sufficient grounds for permitting sub-
mission of a brief.
B. REOPENING AN AWARD-EvIDENCE OF MIsTAKE
The Kentucky Workmen's Compensation law provides that the
Board may reopen and review a case upon evidence of fraud, change
of condition, or mistake.' 8 Two cases handed down last term are
significant as guides for the interpretation of this statute.
In Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. v. O'Bryan,19 the employee had
10 251 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1952).
17 Id. at 863.
IsKRS § 342.125(1) (1962). The text of this statute is fully set out in
note 8, supra.
19414 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1967).
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filed a claim for compensation alleging total and permanent dis-
ability due to silicosis, a disease of the lungs frequently contracted by
coal miners. Medical testimony disagreed as to the employee's disa-
bility and whether he was indeed suffering at all from silicosis. The
parties agreed upon a lump sum settlement of $2500 which was ap-
proved by the Board. But some ten months later the employee filed a
motion to reopen pursuant to KRS 342.125. In support of his motion,
he filed the affidavit of a physician who had examined him before and
after the agreed award. The affidavit contended that the employee's
condition had regressed to the point of total and permanent disability.
The Board, in denying this motion, said that since the agreed award
was in settlement of the original claim of total disability, there had,
in effect, been no "change of condition." The Court reversed this
decision, stating that if there was no change of condition, a "mistake"
existed in that the Board approved a settlement of $2500 for total dis-
ability when statutory allowances in such a case would have exceeded
$16,000.
In Beth-Elkhorn Corp. v. McFalU20 the employee had prosecuted
a claim against his employer and the Special Claim Fund. The Board
entered an order which stated that the employee recover compensation
from the Special Claim Fund, and also recover of "said defendant"
his medical expenses. The order further stipulated that the claim
against the employer be dismissed. That portion of the order which
held "said defendanf' (evidently the Special Fund) liable for the
medical expenses was doubtless erroneous since the statute provides
that medical expenses are to be recovered from the employer.2' Since
the employee obviously could not recover his medical expenses from
the Special Fund, he later filed a motion seeking recovery of the ex-
penses from his employer. The Board sustained this motion but was
overruled by the Court of Appeals. The Court held that Board without
authority to enter such an order since the original order was final, and
the matter became res judicata with regard to the employer.
The Court obviously saw fit to place the O'Bryan case within the
purview of KRS 42.125, but specifically rejected similar treatment for
the McFall case, stating that "there was nothing to reopen."22 In
O'Bryan the employer argued that since the claimant asserted total
disability in his original application, it was obviously no change of
condition for him to reiterate this claim on motion to reopen. The
20 415 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1967).
21KRS § 342.020 (1962) states that "the employer shall furnish .
medical, surgical, and hospital treatment...."
22 415 S.W.2d at 858.
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Court rejected this theory, basing its decision on the rationale of
Messer v. Drees,23 in which a claimant was allowed to reopen when
new medical testimony asserted he was totally disabled due to brain
damage. Messer does appear relevant because the Court therein stated
that:
when subsequent events indicate that an award was substantially induced
by a misconception as to the. . extent of disability at the time of the
hearing, justice requires further inquiry. Whether it be called a "mistake"
or a "change in conditions" is a matter of mere semantic taste.24
In McFall, the Court pointed out that no appeal was taken from
the original award. The Court relied on Hysteam Coal Corp. v. In-
gram,25 which held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the
Workmen's Compensation Board the same as it does to a decision of
a court.
It would appear that O'Bryan was correctly decided whether based
on a "mistake" theory or on the obvious change of condition. The
Court refused to let a technical argument defeat the reality of the
situation, i.e., that the employee deserved a reopening for considera-
tion of competent medical testimony that his condition had con-
siderably worsened. The decision followed a statement of the Court
in Messer v. Drees: "The important question is whether the man got
the relief to which the law entitled him, based upon the truth as we
are now able to ascertain it."28 Larson, the principal authority on
workmen's compensation law, also supports the holding, stating: "the
objectives of the legislation are best accomplished if the commission
can increase, decrease, revive, or terminate payments to correspond to
claimant's changed condition."27
On the other hand, the decision in McFall seems somewhat tenuous.
When examined in the light of KRS 842.020, it appears that the
Board's order was a mistake. This position is strengthened by the fact
that the Board sustained the employee's subsequent motion to recover
from his employer, thereby admitting that the original order con-
tained a mistake.
Moreover, the decision in McFall seems clearly inconsistent with
Black Mountain Corp. v. Gilbert.28 There, the employee filed a motion
to correct an apparent clerical error in the original award, allowing
233 82 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1964).
24 Id. at 213.
25283 Ky. 411, 141 S.W.2d 570 (1940).
263 82 S.W.2d at 213.
272 A. LAnsoN, WoruaxN's COMPENSATION LAW § 81.10 (1965).
28296 Ky. 514, 177 S.W.2d 894 (1944).
19681
KENTucKY LAw JouNAL[
disability payments for eight years instead of the then-allowed ten
year period. The Board sustained the motion, and its order was
affirmed by the Court. This was done despite the employer's argument
that the original order was a final disposition of the case, an argument
similar to the one asserted by the employer in McFall. In the instant
case, the Court, as in Black Mountain, should have allowed the Board
to change its order on the basis of mistake. It is established law that
the Board has large discretion in determining whether a case shall be
reopened 29 but McFall seems to limit such discretion.
It would appear that by its decision in O'Bryan and McFall the
Court is somewhat inconsistent. O'Bryan may show a loosening in the
requirements of reopening for adjustment, but this liberality is over-
shadowed by the strict decision in McFall.
C. IMMIJmNr= ERom NEGLiGENCE ACIONS
KRS 42.015(1)30 creates an "employer" class, immune from com-
mon law negligence actions by employees. This immunity arises from
the employee's election to come under workmen's compensation,
thereby waiving his common law rights against his employer.31 The
combined cases of Peters v. Radcliff Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. and
Miller v. Thomas J. Nolan & Sons32 are significant in that they clearly
designate those persons who fall within the bounds of this "employer"
class.
The Court, on an ad hoc basis, has gradually been defining who is
and is not immune from common law negligence actions. The first
important case was McEvilly v. L. E. Myers Co. 33 which held that
KRS 342.015(1), read in conjunction with KRS 42.055,34 meant that
29 Davenport v. National Carbide Co., 839 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1960); Clear
Fork Coal Co. v. Gaylor, 286 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1956).
80 KRS § 342.015(1) (1962) provides:
Where at the time of the injury both employer and employee have
elected to furnish or accept compensation under the provisions of this
chapter for a traumatic personal injury, received by an employee by
accident and arising out of and in the course of his employment ... the
employer shall be liable to provide and pay compensation under the
provisions of this chapter and shall be . . . released from all other
liability.
31 Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
32 412 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1967).
33211 Ky. 31, 276 S.W. 1068 (1925).
34 KRS § 342.055 (1962) provides:
Whenever an injury for which compensation is payable under this
chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some other
person than the employer a legal liability to pay damages, the injured
employee may either claim compensation or proceed at law by civil
(Continued on next page)
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"some other person than the employer refers to a third party having
no connection with the general work being performed, and whose act
of negligence was wholly disconnected with the work."3 5 McEvilly
would not allow an employee of a subcontractor to recover common
law damages against the principal contractor. After McEvilly came
Dillman v. John Diebold & Sons Stone Co.,3 6 holding that to declare a
subcontractor immune from suit by the employees of a superior con-
tractor on the same job would amount to "taking away their right to
sue and putting nothing in its place"3 7 since they have no right in
workmen's compensation against him. Then Jennings v. Vincent's Ad-
ministratrix$8 extended employer immunity to a superior contractor
under KRS 342.060,39 which makes him secondarily liable to employees
of the subcontractor for workmen's compensation. On the basis of
McEvilly, the Court in Miller v. Scott" held that an employee covered
by workmen's compensation, who is injured by the negligence of a
fellow employee working on the same job, cannot sue the latter for
common law damages.
In Peters, the employees of one subcontractor, injured while en-
gaged in work for their employer, filed common law negligence
actions against other subcontractors working on the same job. The
employees appealed from a judgment for the subcontractors. The
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the employees of one sub-
contractor, although covered by workmen's compensation through
their own employer, could bring a common law negligence action
against other subcontractors working on the same job.
Distinguishing and narrowing its previous holdings in McEvilly,
Miller v. Scott, and Jennings, the Court indicated that an injured
employee may maintain a common law negligence action against any
person other than fellow servants and those liable, either primarily or
secondarily, to him in workmen's compensation. Stated simply, one
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
action against such other person to recover damages, or proceed both
against the employer for compensation and such other person to recover
damages, but shall not collect from both. (Emphasis added.)35 MeEvilly v. L. E. Myers Co., 211 Ky. 31, 34, 276 S.W.2d 1068, 1071
(1925).
36241 Ky. 631, 44 S.W.2d 581 (1931).
37 Id. at 634, 44 S.W.2d at 583.
38284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W.2d 537 (1940).
39 KRS § 342.060 (1962) provides:
A principal contractor, intermediate or subcontractor shall be liable for
compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any one of
his inttrmediates or subcontractors and engaged upon the subject matter
of the contract, to the same extent as the immediate employer.
40 339 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1960).
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who has none of the obligations of an employer can no longer claim
immunity under the doctrine espoused in McEvilly, Miller, and
Jennings.
The decision in Peters represents the majority view. A contrary
view is taken in five jurisdictions;41 however, four of those states find
the basis for their decision in statutory language which varies con-
siderably from that in the Kentucky statute. Massachusetts is the only
state with statutory language similar to Kentucky which accepts the
contrary view.
42
While Kentucky looked to the specific language in its statute in
reaching the Peters decision, Massachusetts looked to the purpose of
its act as set forth in one of its earlier decisions. Massachusetts defined
its policy as follows: "One purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Act was to sweep within its provisions all claims for compensation
flowing from personal injuries arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment by a common employer insured under the act .... 43 From
this stated purpose Massachusetts reasoned that a "common employer"
would be the principal contractor. Hence, all subcontractors and their
employees working under this principal contractor were included
within the immunity. However, it seems that Massachusetts should
have been able to find language within its statute to justify its decision.
If the Court could not, then it seems probable that the court may have
stated the purpose of the act too broadly in its earlier opinion. By
interpreting the act's purpose rather than its specific language, it
seems that the Massachusetts court unduly broadened the sweep of
the statute.
Larson is critical of the Massachusetts decision and labels it as the
type of reasoning by which "black" is determined to be "vhite." 44
Larson states that it is necessary to interpret the words of the statute
which say the employer is immune to mean the employee is immune,
in order to reach the result the Massachusetts court did.45 Larson
argues that since the subcontractor has assumed no statutory re-
sponsibility toward other subcontractor's employees, he has no reason
to expect immunity from common law suits due to their injury.46 It
appears that both authority and sound reason support the Kentucky
Court's decision in Peters.
41 Massachusetts, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, and Virginia.
42 Catalano v. George F. Watts Corp., 255 Mass. 605, 152 N.E. 46 (1926).
43 Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 597, 190 N.E. 815, 817 (1934).
442 A. LAnsoN, supra note 27, at § 72.32.
45 d.
46 Id.
